Paper: arXiv 2501.07828
Authors: Thanos Drossos, Daniel Kirste, Niclas Kannengießer, Ali Sunyaev
Abstract
To trade tokens in cryptoeconomic systems, automated market makers (AMMs) typically rely on liquidity providers (LPs) that deposit tokens in exchange for rewards. To profit from such rewards, LPs must use effective liquidity provisioning strategies. However, LPs lack guidance for developing such strategies, which often leads them to financial losses. We developed a measurement model based on impermanent loss to analyze the influences of key parameters (i.e., liquidity pool type, position duration, position range size, and position size) of liquidity provisioning strategies on LPs’ returns. To reveal the influences of those key parameters on LPs’ profits, we used the measurement model to analyze 700 days of historical liquidity provision data of Uniswap v3. By uncovering the influences of key parameters of liquidity provisioning strategies on profitability, this work supports LPs in developing more profitable strategies.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 6.0/10
- Empirical Rigor: 6.0/10 (capped from 7.0: no out-of-sample test; see penalty flags)
- Quadrant: Holy Grail — high math complexity, high empirical rigor (effective empirical rigor capped from 7.0)
Why this score: The paper uses mathematical models (impermanent loss, adverse selection) and statistical analysis of 700 days of historical Uniswap data, indicating moderate math and high empirical rigor.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD A["Research Goal: Determine how AMM parameters affect LP profitability"] --> B["Data Input: 700 days of Uniswap v3 historical data"] B --> C["Methodology: Measurement model based on Impermanent Loss"] C --> D["Key Parameters Analyzed:<br>Pool Type, Duration, Range Size, Position Size"] D --> E["Computation: Quantify impact of each parameter on returns"] E --> F["Key Findings: Identified optimal configurations<br>for more profitable liquidity strategies"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper proposes a measurement model based on impermanent loss to evaluate how liquidity provisioning parameters affect LP returns.
Source sentence
We developed a measurement model based on impermanent loss to analyze the influences of key parameters (i.e., liquidity pool type, position duration, position range size, and position size) of liquidity provisioning strategies on LPs' returns.
Assumes 6
- Position duration might cause the decrease in IL and rewards for large position sizes. model
Source sentence
We assume that position duration might cause this decrease in IL and rewards for large position sizes because positions with large sizes typically have shorter durations than positions with small sizes.
- Liquidity pools charging high fees attract risk‑seeking LPs who take riskier positions. model
Source sentence
We assume that liquidity pools charging high fees attract risk‑seeking LPs who take riskier liquidity positions (e.g., by selecting smaller range sizes) to gain higher rewards.
- LPs with narrow ranges are more sensitive to price fluctuations and close positions sooner. model
Source sentence
We assume that LPs with narrow ranges are more sensitive to price fluctuations and close their positions sooner to limit potential IL.
- Stable‑stable liquidity pools hardly incur IL and can be used as a baseline for comparison. data
Source sentence
As stable‑stable liquidity pools typically hardly incur IL, we used them as a baseline for comparison with other liquidity pools regarding LP profits.
Show 2 more
- Positions with narrow price ranges are exposed to high IL but can yield high rewards if managed actively. model
Source sentence
Positions with narrow price ranges are exposed to high IL but can yield high rewards if managed actively and appropriately.
- The measurement model only accounts for realized IL and neglects gas fees and volatility. model
Source sentence
The measurement model only accounts for realized IL, neglects gas fees, and does not consider the actual volatility of token pairs.
Data
Uniswap v3 liquidity pools · crypto
- Uniswap v3 historical liquidity data crypto-onchain public
Source sentence
We prepared the final data set for the analysis by extracting LP transactions over a period of 700 days, starting from May 1, 2022 (block 14,691,320) until April 1, 2024 (block 19,560,244).
Costs
Not modeled
Source sentence
The measurement model only accounts for realized IL, neglects gas fees, and does not consider the actual volatility of token pairs.
Finds 5
total return 2.7%
- Realized impermanent loss averaged a 3.8% loss per position compared to a buy‑and‑hold strategy. performance
Source sentence
On average, realized IL led to a 3.8% loss per position compared to a simple buy-and-hold strategy.
- 49.5% of positions generated negative returns from providing liquidity. performance
Source sentence
We also observed that 49.5% of the positions generated negative returns from providing liquidity.
- Positions with larger range sizes carry less IL and earn fewer rewards, but are the only ones with positive returns. performance
Source sentence
Based on these observations, we conclude that positions with larger position range sizes carry less IL and earn fewer rewards; however, they are the only positions with positive returns.
- Stable‑risky pools have the highest IL and rewards but negative returns on average; risky‑risky pools achieve the highest returns due to high fee structure. performance
Source sentence
Stable‑risky pools carry the highest IL and rewards, but negative returns on average. Pools with correlated tokens had positive returns on average, with risky‑risky pools having the highest returns due to their high fee structure.
- Long‑term narrow‑range strategies perform best in risky‑risky pools, while short‑term wide‑range strategies yield highest returns in stable‑risky pools. performance
Source sentence
For pools with correlated tokens (e.g., risky‑risky pools), long‑term narrow‑range strategies perform best. For pools with less correlated tokens (e.g., stable‑risky), short‑term wide‑range strategies yield the highest returns.
Checked by others
Supported by
- Liquidity provision in CLMMs: evidence from transactions data
Compare the findings
This paper: 49.5% of positions generated negative returns from providing liquidity.
That paper: Standalone liquidity provision is profitable only for a minority of LPs, suggesting other motives beyond pool rewards.
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.
Cited References (73)
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and 65 more
- Does the Introduction of US Spot Bitcoin ETFs Affect Spot Returns and Volatility of Major Cryptocurrencies? (2024) — link
- High-frequency market making: liquidity provision, adverse selection, and competition (2017) — link
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7 of 73 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.