Paper: arXiv 2502.20001

Authors: CY Yan, Steve Keol, Xo Co, Nate Leung

Abstract

Decentralized exchanges (DEXs) face persistent challenges in liquidity retention and user engagement due to inefficiencies in conventional automated market maker (AMM) designs. This work proposes a dual-mechanism framework to address these limitations: a ``Better Market Maker (BMM)’’, which is a liquidity-optimized AMM based on a power-law invariant (\(X^nY = K\), \(n = 4\)), and a dynamic rebate system (DRS) for redistributing transaction fees. The segment-specific BMM reduces impermanent loss by 36% compared to traditional constant-product (\(XY = K\)) models, while retaining 3.98x more liquidity during price volatility. The DRS allocates fees (\(γV\), \(γ\in {“0.003, 0.005, 0.01"}\)) with a rebate ratio \(ρ\in [“0.3, 0.4”]\) to incentivize trader participation and maintain continuous capital injection. Simulations under high-volatility conditions demonstrate impermanent loss reductions of 36.0% and 40% higher user engagement compared to static fee models. By segmenting markets into high-, mid-, and low-volatility regimes, the framework achieves liquidity depth comparable to centralized exchanges (CEXs) while maintaining decentralized governance and retaining value within the cryptocurrency ecosystem.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 8.5/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 4.5/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper presents a formal mathematical model with advanced derivations for a power-law invariant and arbitrage resistance, indicating high mathematical complexity. However, while it references simulations and specific numerical outcomes, it lacks reproducible code, detailed statistical analysis of backtests, or public datasets, placing it more in the theoretical research domain than fully backtest-ready implementation.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal: Reduce Impermanent Loss & Boost Liquidity"] --> B{"Methodology"}
  B --> C["BMM: Power-law AMM<br>X<sup>4</sup>Y = K"]
  B --> D["Dynamic Rebate System DRS<br>Fee = γV, Rebate ρ"]
  
  C & D --> E["Computational Process:<br>Simulations under High Volatility"]
  
  E --> F["Key Findings/Outcomes"]
  F --> G["36% Reduction in Impermanent Loss"]
  F --> H["3.98x Liquidity Retention"]
  F --> I["40% Higher User Engagement"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper proposes a dual‑mechanism framework consisting of a Better Market Maker (BMM) AMM based on a power‑law invariant (XⁿY=K, n=4) and a Dynamic Rebate System (DRS) that redistributes transaction fees.

Source sentence
This work proposes a dual-mechanism framework to address these limitations: a ``Better Market Maker (BMM)'', which is a liquidity-optimized AMM based on a power-law invariant ($X^nY = K$, $n = 4$), and a dynamic rebate system (DRS) for redistributing transaction fees.

Assumes 4

  • Liquidity pools follow the power‑law invariant XⁿY=K with n set to 4 as the optimal trade‑off. model
    Source sentence
    To address these limitations, we introduce a power-law invariant designed to optimize liquidity retention while maintaining efficient price discovery. Although n = 5 offers marginally higher retention than n = 4, the improvement beyond n = 4 is minimal, suggesting diminishing returns.
  • The dynamic rebate system allocates a fraction γ of transaction volume (γ∈{0.003,0.005,0.01}) and rebates a proportion ρ∈[0.3,0.4] to traders. model
    Source sentence
    The DRS allocates fees ($γV$, $γ\in \{0.003, 0.005, 0.01\}$) with a rebate ratio $ρ\in [0.3, 0.4]$ to incentivize trader participation and maintain continuous capital injection.
  • Simulations are conducted under high‑volatility market conditions to evaluate performance. market
    Source sentence
    Simulations under high-volatility conditions demonstrate impermanent loss reductions of 36.0\% and 40\% higher user engagement compared to static fee models.
  • Small trades are assumed to have negligible impact on reserves (ΔX ≪ X) for slippage analysis. execution
    Source sentence
    Notice that ∆X ≪X, a first-order expansion on P leads to Pafter ≈Pbefore −(n + 1) nK Xn+2 ∆X (20) Plugging it into Eq.8, we can derive S ≈−(n + 1) ∆X X (21) 8 Define the Slippage Ratio β, we can compute β = Sproposed Straditional = n + 1 2 (22) so that applying BMM on the other side of the trading pair (i.e. trading Y against X), the slippage will linearly increase as n increases.

Data

Synthetic data only.

Costs

Modeled Costs are part of the reported headline results.

Fees are modeled as a proportion γ of transaction volume (γ∈{0.003,0.005,0.01}) with rebates at ratio ρ∈[0.3,0.4].

Source sentence
The DRS allocates fees ($γV$, $γ\in \{0.003, 0.005, 0.01\}$) with a rebate ratio $ρ\in [0.3, 0.4]$ to incentivize trader participation and maintain continuous capital injection.

Finds 5

  • The segment‑specific BMM reduces impermanent loss by 36% compared to the traditional constant‑product model. performance
    Source sentence
    The segment-specific BMM reduces impermanent loss by 36\% compared to traditional constant-product ($XY = K$) models, while retaining 3.98x more liquidity during price volatility.
  • The BMM retains 3.98× more liquidity during price volatility than the traditional model. performance
    Source sentence
    The segment-specific BMM reduces impermanent loss by 36\% compared to traditional constant-product ($XY = K$) models, while retaining 3.98x more liquidity during price volatility. Table 2: USDT Liquidity Retention Comparison Price Multiplier Traditional AMM (Y) Proposed Model (Y) Retention Multiple 1× 10,000 10,000 1.0× 100× 100 3,981 3.98× 1,000× 10 1,585 15.85× Table 2 summarizes a sample comparison of USDT
  • Simulations show a 40% higher user engagement under the proposed framework versus static fee models. performance
    Source sentence
    Simulations under high-volatility conditions demonstrate impermanent loss reductions of 36.0\% and 40\% higher user engagement compared to static fee models.
  • The DRS reduces volume volatility during market stress and drives higher trading activity while maintaining protocol revenue. performance
    Source sentence
    Volume volatility was notably reduced under the DRS, particularly during periods of market stress, as the adaptive mechanism helped counteract downward trends. Importantly, while the dynamic model stimulated higher trading volumes, it maintained protocol revenue by dynamically balancing fee distribution.
  • At n=4, slippage is increased by 2.5× relative to the traditional AMM. performance
    Source sentence
    For instance, at n = 4, the slippage is increased by 2.5x comparing to the traditional AMM.

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 36 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.