Paper: arXiv 2509.11990
Authors: Fedor Shabashev
Abstract
Prediction markets have gained adoption as on-chain mechanisms for aggregating information, with platforms such as Polymarket demonstrating demand for stablecoin-denominated markets. However, denominating in non-interest-bearing stablecoins introduces inefficiencies: participants face opportunity costs relative to the fiat risk-free rate, and Bitcoin holders in particular lose exposure to BTC appreciation when converting into stablecoins. This paper explores the case for prediction markets denominated in Bitcoin, treating BTC as a deflationary settlement asset analogous to gold under the classical gold standard. We analyse three methods of supplying liquidity to a newly created BTC-denominated prediction market: cross-market making against existing stablecoin venues, automated market making, and DeFi-based redirection of user trades. For each approach we evaluate execution mechanics, risks (slippage, exchange-rate risk, and liquidation risk), and capital efficiency. Our analysis shows that cross-market making provides the most user-friendly risk profile, though it requires active professional makers or platform-subsidised liquidity. DeFi redirection offers rapid bootstrapping and reuse of existing USDC liquidity, but exposes users to liquidation thresholds and exchange-rate volatility, reducing capital efficiency. Automated market making is simple to deploy but capital-inefficient and exposes liquidity providers to permanent loss. The results suggest that BTC-denominated prediction markets are feasible, but their success depends critically on the choice of liquidity provisioning mechanism and the trade-off between user safety and deployment convenience.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 3.0/10
- Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10
- Quadrant: Philosophers — conceptual discussion, lower math and empirical scores
Why this score: The paper’s mathematical complexity is moderate, relying on basic arithmetic and pricing formulas without advanced derivations, while empirical rigor is low as it lacks backtests, datasets, or implementation details, focusing instead on conceptual trade-offs.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
A["Research Goal: Feasibility of<br>Bootstrapping Liquidity in BTC-Denominated Prediction Markets"] --> B{"Methodology: Comparative Analysis"}
B --> C["Liquidity Provisioning Methods<br>Cross-Market Making<br>Automated Market Making<br>DeFi Trade Redirection"]
C --> D{"Evaluation Criteria<br>Execution Mechanics, Capital Efficiency, Risks"}
D --> E["Risk Assessment<br>Slippage, Exchange-Rate Volatility, Liquidation"]
E --> F{"Computational Analysis<br>Comparative Risk & Efficiency Modelling"}
F --> G["Key Findings & Outcomes<br>1. Cross-Market Making: Best user safety, requires capital<br>2. DeFi Redirection: Fast bootstrapping, high volatility risk<br>3. AMM: Simple deployment, capital-inefficient"]
G --> H["Conclusion: BTC Markets Feasible<br>Success depends on balancing user safety vs deployment convenience"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper proposes using Bitcoin as a settlement asset for prediction markets and analyzes three liquidity provisioning methods: cross‑market making, automated market making, and DeFi‑based redirection.
Source sentence
This paper explores the case for prediction markets denominated in Bitcoin, treating BTC as a deflationary settlement asset analogous to gold under the classical gold standard. We analyse three methods of supplying liquidity to a newly created BTC-denominated prediction market: cross-market making against existing stablecoin venues, automated market making, and DeFi-based redirection of user trades.
Assumes 3
- Market makers can reliably convert USD bid/ask prices into Bitcoin amounts using the current BTC/USD price. execution
Source sentence
To do this, they convert the existing USD bid and ask prices into Bitcoin.
- Professional market makers or platform‑subsidised liquidity are available to provide the required limit orders in the downstream BTC‑denominated market. market
Source sentence
Our analysis shows that cross-market making provides the most user-friendly risk profile, though it requires active professional makers or platform-subsidised liquidity. Just like equity and FX markets, prediction markets have professional market makers who submit limit orders and make money from bid-ask spread.
- Liquidity providers are willing to accept fee and hedge costs that adjust downstream quotes relative to source market prices. model
Source sentence
Market maker quotes bid and ask prices as limit orders on the downstream market at the price of bid and ask on the source market plus commission: bidd = bids −fee and askd = asks + fee, where bids, asks are the bid and ask on the source prediction market, and bidd, askd are the corresponding quotes on the downstream market. Source Exchange Ask = asks Bid = bids Downstream Exchange Ask = askd Bid = bidd fee hedge
Data
No dataset named in the text.
Costs
Not applicable
Finds 4
- Cross‑market making provides the most user‑friendly risk profile among the three methods. theoretical
Source sentence
Our analysis shows that cross-market making provides the most user-friendly risk profile, though it requires active professional makers or platform-subsidised liquidity.
- DeFi redirection enables rapid bootstrapping and reuse of existing USDC liquidity but reduces capital efficiency due to liquidation and exchange‑rate risks. theoretical
Source sentence
DeFi redirection offers rapid bootstrapping and reuse of existing USDC liquidity, but exposes users to liquidation thresholds and exchange-rate volatility, reducing capital efficiency. Borrowing at the maximum 72% LTV implies liquidation after only a 12–13% fall in BTC/USD, so in practice users must borrow at lower ratios (e.g. 30–40%) to provide a buffer, which reduces capital efficiency.
- Automated market making is simple to deploy but is capital‑inefficient and exposes liquidity providers to permanent loss. theoretical
Source sentence
Automated market making is simple to deploy but capital-inefficient and exposes liquidity providers to permanent loss. Automated market making ensures continuous liquidity and simple deployment, but is capital-inefficient and can result in permanent loss for liquidity providers.
- BTC‑denominated prediction markets are feasible overall, contingent on the chosen liquidity provisioning mechanism and the trade‑off between user safety and deployment convenience. theoretical
Source sentence
The results suggest that BTC-denominated prediction markets are feasible, but their success depends critically on the choice of liquidity provisioning mechanism and the trade-off between user safety and deployment convenience. 3 Conclusion This paper considered prediction markets denominated in Bitcoin and examined practical methods for bootstrapping liquidity.
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 16 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.
Cited References (13)
- Prediction Market Accuracy in the Short and Long Run (2008)
- Prediction Markets (2004)
- Do Prediction Markets Produce Well-Calibrated Probability Forecasts? (2013)
- Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (2008)
- Aave V3: Technical Paper (2022)
- Polymarket Documentation (2025)
- Above the Fold: Market Mechanics (2022)
- Manifold Markets: Open Source Implementation (2025)
and 5 more
- SoK: Decentralized Exchanges (DEX) with Automated Market Maker (AMM) Protocols (2023) — link
- A Short Survey on Business Models of Decentralized Finance (DeFi) Protocols (2023) — link
- Logarithmic Market Scoring Rules for Modular Combinatorial Information Aggregation (2007)
- Holding Rewards: 4.00% Annualized Reward on Eligible Positions (2025)
- Polymarket set to launch new resolution and rewards system after Zelensky suit dispute (2025) — link
0 of 13 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.