Paper: arXiv 2412.17712
Authors: Xuchen Wu, Sebastian Jaimungal
Abstract
We study partial information Nash equilibrium between a broker and an informed trader. In this setting, the informed trader, who possesses knowledge of a trading signal, trades multiple assets with the broker in a dealer market. Simultaneously, the broker offloads these assets in a lit exchange where their actions impact the asset prices. The broker, however, only observes aggregate prices and cannot distinguish between underlying trends and volatility. Both the broker and the informed trader aim to maximize their penalized expected wealth. Using convex analysis, we characterize the Nash equilibrium and demonstrate its existence and uniqueness. Furthermore, we establish that this equilibrium corresponds to the solution of a nonstandard system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) that involves the two differing filtrations. For short enough time horizons, we prove that a unique solution of this system exists. Finally, under quite general assumptions, we show that the solution to the FBSDE system admits a polynomial approximation in the strength of the transient impact to arbitrary order, and prove that the error is controlled.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 9.5/10
- Empirical Rigor: 1.0/10
- Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing
Why this score: The paper is highly theoretical, involving advanced stochastic calculus, convex analysis, and characterization of Nash equilibria via forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) with differing filtrations; it lacks any empirical validation, backtesting, or implementation details, focusing solely on mathematical existence and approximation results.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
A["Research Goal<br>Nash Equilibrium in<br>Broker-Trader Partial Info Setting"] --> B
subgraph B ["Methodology & Inputs"]
B1["Formulate Two-Person Game<br>Broker vs Informed Trader"]
B2["Define State Processes<br>Asset Prices & Trading Signal"]
B3["Convex Analysis &<br>FBSDE Framework"]
end
B --> C["Computational Process<br>Characterize Nash Equilibrium via<br>Nonstandard Forward-Backward SDEs"]
C --> D{"Prove Existence &<br>Uniqueness?"}
D -- Yes --> E["Key Findings & Outcomes"]
D -- Limited Time Horizon --> E
subgraph E ["Outcomes"]
E1["Equilibrium Existence<br>& Uniqueness Proof"]
E2["Polynomial Approximation<br>of Solution wrt Impact Strength"]
E3["Error Control &<br>Explicit Bounds"]
end
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper proposes a multi‑asset broker‑trader model with partial information where the informed trader holds a trading signal and the broker off‑loads inventory, and characterises the Nash equilibrium as the solution of a filtered system of forward‑backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs
Source sentence
We study partial information Nash equilibrium between a broker and an informed trader. Furthermore, we establish that this equilibrium corresponds to the solution of a nonstandard system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) that involves the two differing filtrations.
Assumes 6
- The broker only observes aggregate asset prices and cannot separate underlying trends from volatility. market
Source sentence
The broker, however, only observes aggregate prices and cannot distinguish between underlying trends and volatility.
- The broker and the informed trader have different filtrations: the broker’s strategies are G‑adapted while the trader’s are F‑adapted. model
Source sentence
This leads to a partial information setting for the Broker, but a full information setting for the informed trader. Of particular note is the differing filtrations that the two agents have.
- Transient price impact is linear with constant positive semi‑definite matrices p and h that commute. execution
Source sentence
Transient price impact model: The broker’s trading activity in the lit exchange has transient impact on the asset price, which we denote Y and whose dynamics is assumed3 to be: ( dY ν t = (h νt −p Y ν t ) dt , Y ν 0 = y , where y ∈L2(G0), p and h are K × K constant positive semi-definite matrices representing decay coefficients and instantaneous impact parameters, respectively. We further assume p and h commute.
- The time horizon is short enough so that a unique solution to the FBSDE system exists. other
Source sentence
For short enough time horizons, we prove that a unique solution of this system exists.
Show 2 more
- The performance criteria for both agents are strictly concave functionals of their trading strategies. statistical
Source sentence
Specifically, we show JI and JB are strictly concave and Gâuteaux-differentiable in the component over which the corresponding agent maximizes. Note that, unlike in [9], we obtain the following result without any further restriction on a, p, h, and T . Proposition 3.2.
- Matrices p and h are simultaneously diagonalizable (they commute and are positive semi‑definite). model
Source sentence
re positive semi-definite and commute, they are simultaneously diagonalizable (see, for example, Theorem 5.76 of [4]), that is, there is an invertible K × K matrix O such that p = OˆpO−1 and h = OˆhO−1, where ˆp and ˆh are diagonal matrices whose diagonals consist of eigenvalues of p and h, which are nonnegative, respectively.
Data
No dataset named in the text.
Costs
Not applicable
Finds 5
- A Nash equilibrium exists and is unique for sufficiently short time horizons. theoretical
Source sentence
Using convex analysis, we characterize the Nash equilibrium and demonstrate its existence and uniqueness. For short enough time horizons, we prove that a unique solution of this system exists.
- The Nash equilibrium is exactly characterised by a filtered system of FBSDEs involving the two differing filtrations. theoretical
Source sentence
Furthermore, we establish that this equilibrium corresponds to the solution of a nonstandard system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) that involves the two differing filtrations. As a result, we obtain a filtered system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) that characterizes the Nash equilibrium.
- The solution to the FBSDE system admits a polynomial (asymptotic) approximation in the strength of the transient impact parameter to arbitrary order, with controlled error. theoretical
Source sentence
Finally, under quite general assumptions, we show that the solution to the FBSDE system admits a polynomial approximation in the strength of the transient impact to arbitrary order, and prove that the error is controlled. The approximation we develop is represented as an asymptotic series, where each term in the series admits a closed form solution in terms of the previous coefficients in the expansion.
- An explicit perturbation analysis yields closed‑form expressions for each term of the asymptotic series representing the equilibrium strategies. theoretical
Source sentence
Specifically we obtain a representation of the form ηt = M X m=0 hmηm t + Rη,M,h t , and νt = M X m=0 hmνm t + Rν,M,h t , where we provide explicit representations of (ηm t , νm t )m. To this end, the following lemma provides the FBSDEs that each term in the series satisfies, and proves that a unique solution exists, as well as provides the explicit form of the solution. Lemma 5.1.
- The remainder terms from truncating the asymptotic series at order M are o(M). theoretical
Source sentence
Moreover, we prove that the error terms, Rη,M,h t and Rν,M,h t , from truncating the series at a given order M, are both o(M). Moreover, we prove the remainder terms from truncating the series at order M are o(M).
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 34 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
6 papers in the archive : When a Correct Reward Is Not Enough: Diagnosing and Guiding …
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.
Cited References (33)
- Strategic Learning and Trading in Broker-Mediated Markets — → 2412.20847
- Optimal execution of portfolio transactions (2001)
- Optimal execution and speculation with trade signals — → 2306.00621
- Optimal trading with differing trade signals (2020)
- Bandits for algorithmic trading with signals (2023)
- Market making with alpha signals (2020)
- Optimal trading with signals and stochastic price impact (2022)
- Optimal liquidation with signals: the general propagator case (2022)
and 25 more
- Algorithmic market making for options (2021)
- Solvability of differential Riccati equations and applications to algorithmic trading with signals (2022)
- Dynamic trading with predictable returns and transaction costs (2013)
- Optimal liquidation under partial information with price impact (2020)
- Real-time segmentation of on-line handwritten arabic script (2014)
- Fast classification of handwritten on-line Arabic characters (2014)
- Estimate and Replace: A Novel Approach to Integrating Deep Neural Networks with Existing Applications (2018) — link
- Chapter III Complements to measure theory (1978) — link
- Nash Equilibrium between Brokers and Traders — → 2407.10561
- Semimartingale Theory and Stochastic Calculus (1992)
- Brownian Motion and Stochastic Calculus (1998)
- Brownian Motion, Martingales, and Stochastic Calculus (2016)
- Linear Algebra Done Right (2023)
- Equilibrium points in $n$-person games (1950) — link
- Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading (1985)
- Trading Mechanisms in Securities Markets (1992)
- Optimal Portfolio Choice Under Incomplete Information (1986)
- A Note On Utility Maximization Under Partial Observations (1991) — link
- Portfolio Optimization with Unobservable Markov-Modulated Drift Process (2005)
- Trading algorithms with learning in latent alpha models (2019) — link
- Mean Field Games with Partial Information for Algorithmic Trading (2019) — link
- Mean-field games with differing beliefs for algorithmic trading (2020) — link
- Incorporating order-flow into optimal execution (2016) — link
- Brokers and Informed Traders: Dealing With Toxic Flow and Extracting Trading Signals (2022) — link
- Unwinding Toxic Flow with Partial Information — → 2407.04510
4 of 33 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.