Paper: arXiv 2512.12871

Authors: Millend Roy, Agostino Capponi, Vladimir Pyltsov, Yinbo Hu, Vijay Modi

Abstract

Electricity markets are under increasing pressure to maintain reliability amidst rising renewable penetration, demand variability, and occasional price shocks. Traditional capacity market designs often fall short in addressing this by relying on expected-value metrics of energy unserved, which overlook risk exposure in such systems. In this work, we present CapOptix, a capacity pricing framework that interprets capacity commitments as reliability options, i.e., financial derivatives of wholesale electricity prices. CapOptix characterizes the capacity premia charged by accounting for structural price shifts modeled by the Markov Regime Switching Process. We apply the framework to historical price data from multiple electricity markets and compare the resulting premium ranges with existing capacity remuneration mechanisms.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 8.5/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 7.0/10
  • Quadrant: Holy Grail — high math complexity, high empirical rigor

Why this score: The paper employs advanced stochastic modeling (Markov regime-switching, jump-diffusions) and financial option theory with derivations, while empirically validating the framework using real-world electricity market data from multiple regions (NYISO, CAISO, ERCOT, Germany, Italy) and comparing premiums to existing mechanisms.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  Start["Research Goal: Develop a risk-sensitive capacity pricing framework for electricity markets"] --> DataInputs["Data & Inputs: Historical Price Data from Multiple Electricity Markets"]
  DataInputs --> Methodology["Methodology: Model Capacity as Reliability Options using Markov Regime Switching Process"]
  Methodology --> Computation["Computational Process: Simulate Price Regimes and Option Payoffs"]
  Computation --> Premiums["Output: Calculated Capacity Premiums"]
  Premiums --> Comparison["Analysis: Compare CapOptix Premiums with Existing Remuneration Mechanisms"]
  Comparison --> Outcomes["Key Findings: CapOptix accounts for structural price shifts and risk exposure, yielding premium ranges that differ from expected-value based mechanisms"]
  
  style Start fill:#e1f5e1,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px
  style Outcomes fill:#fff3e0,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper proposes CapOptix, a capacity pricing framework that treats capacity commitments as reliability options and values the capacity premium using financial option theory.

Source sentence
we present CapOptix, a capacity pricing framework that interprets capacity commitments as reliability options, i.e., financial derivatives of wholesale electricity prices.

Assumes 2

  • Generators are price takers and do not influence market prices. market
    Source sentence
    Assumption 1 (Price-Taking Behavior). Upon constructing the generation portfolio, the generator retains the right to participate in wholesale electricity markets or engage in forward contracts. The generator works as a price taker, i.e., it can respond to market prices but does not influence them.
  • Operating‑and‑maintenance expense per unit of installed capacity is constant over the analysis horizon. model
    Source sentence
    Assumption 2 (Constant O&M Rate). We levelize the operating-and-maintenance expense per unit of installed capacity and assume it is constant over the horizon [0, T + τ], O&M(t) = O&M for 0 ≤t ≤T + τ.

Data

  • NYISO energy price series · NYISO Settlement archives market-prices public
    2016 to 2024
    Source sentence
    (a) New York (NYISO): Energy price series from 2016 to 2024.
  • Germany day‑ahead price data market-prices unknown
    2019 to 2024
    Source sentence
    (b) Germany: Day-ahead prices from 2019 to 2024, capturing long-term stability and recent disruptions from 2022 onwards.

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result.

Finds 4

  • Capacity premiums derived from the reliability‑option model decrease with longer contract durations, showing sub‑linear growth of premium values. pricing-calibration
    Source sentence
    decreases with the increase in contract duration, which proves the sub-linear growth of premium values.
  • Reliability‑option valuations produce capacity premiums comparable to existing capacity‑remuneration mechanisms, closing the cost‑recovery gap without over‑payment. performance
    Source sentence
    This suggests that, at the statewide level, an RO design could deliver comparable cost recovery for generators as the existing ICAP construct.
  • In California, the RO premium (~$21k/MW‑yr) is far lower than the current capacity‑obligation payment (~$99k/MW‑yr), indicating that RO can achieve cost recovery with much smaller payments. pricing-calibration
    Source sentence
    we get $ 99,720/MW-yr, which is much higher (almost 5×, unlikely that such a gap could be closed through auction adjustments alone) than the premium payment of $21k/MW-yr estimated by ROs.
  • Higher strike prices make the reliability option cheaper because it triggers less often, especially in markets like Germany where large spikes are rare. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Higher strikes make the option cheaper since it triggers less often and pays less when it does, especially in Germany, where outsized spikes are rare.

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 41 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.

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0 of 100 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.