Paper: arXiv 2405.09764
Authors: Thibaut Mastrolia, Tianrui Xu
Abstract
Flaws of a continuous limit order book mechanism raise the question of whether a continuous trading session and a periodic auction session would bring better efficiency. This paper wants to go further in designing a periodic auction when both a continuous market and a periodic auction market are available to traders. In a periodic auction, we discover that a strategic trader could take advantage of the accumulated information available along the auction duration by arriving at the latest moment before the auction closes, increasing the price impact on the market. Such price impact moves the clearing price away from the efficient price and may disturb the efficiency of a periodic auction market. We thus propose and quantify the effect of two remedies to mitigate these flaws: randomizing the auction’s closing time and optimally designing a transaction fees policy for both the strategic traders and other market participants. Our results show that these policies encourage a strategic trader to send their orders earlier to enhance the efficiency of the auction market, illustrated by data extracted from Alphabet and Apple stocks.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 8.5/10
- Empirical Rigor: 6.0/10
- Quadrant: Holy Grail — high math complexity, high empirical rigor
Why this score: The paper employs advanced mathematical modeling, including optimal stopping theory and game-theoretic analysis for auction design, which indicates high math complexity. It is empirically validated with real-world data from stocks (Alphabet and Apple), demonstrating backtest-ready implementation, though the data processing appears less extensive than a full trading system backtest.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
A["Research Goal<br>Determine optimal mechanisms<br>for periodic auction markets"] --> B["Identify Key Problem<br>Strategic traders delay orders<br>to exploit information"]
B --> C["Methodology<br>Model auction dynamics<br>with time-varying arrival rates"]
C --> D{"Data Inputs<br>Alphabet & Apple stock data<br>Empirical order arrival patterns"}
D --> E["Computational Process<br>Simulate price impact<br>under different designs"]
E --> F["Proposed Remedies<br>1. Randomize closing time<br>2. Optimize transaction fees"]
F --> G["Simulation & Estimation<br>Calibrate model & test<br>efficiency gains"]
G --> H["Key Findings<br>Remedies reduce delay incentive<br>Enhance market efficiency"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper proposes two regulatory remedies for periodic auctions: randomizing the auction’s closing time and introducing a transaction‑fee schedule that increases with the trader’s arrival time.
Source sentence
We thus propose and quantify the effect of two remedies to mitigate these flaws: randomizing the auction's closing time and optimally designing a transaction fees policy for both the strategic traders and other market participants. First, we introduce a randomization design of the auction’s closing time.
Assumes 6
- Limit order prices are independent normally distributed variables with mean µmm and standard deviation σmm. statistical
Source sentence
Note that linear supply functions are also considered in [Du and Zhu (2017), Fricke and Gerig (2018), Jusselin et al. (2021)] We assume that (Pi)i≥1 is a family of independent normally distributed 6 random variables with mean µmm and standard deviation σmm.
- The efficient price of the asset is a normal random variable with mean µ* and standard deviation σ*. statistical
Source sentence
We assume that the efficient price of the risky asset denoted by P ∗is a normal random variable with mean µ∗and standard deviation σ∗.
- Each limit order’s supply function is linear: Qi = K(PclT – Pi) with K>0 fixed. model
Source sentence
The parameter K > 0 is the slope of the supply function assumed to be fixed for each limit order.
- Limit orders arrive according to a Poisson process with intensity λ·t. model
Source sentence
We model the arrival of these limit orders by a Poisson process M with intensity λmm t = λ × t where λ is a positive constant.
Show 2 more
- The strategic seller chooses a deterministic arrival time τ∈[0,T] and a price P to sell. market
Source sentence
We consider a strategic seller joining the auction at a deterministic time τ between 0 and T aiming at optimally liquidating her position in the risky asset.2 The strategic seller controls the exact time τ she arrives in the auction together with the price P at which she is willing to sell the asset, and the direction of the trade (which is selling).
- The auction mechanism follows the basic rule of maximizing the number of matched orders (no priority rules, no additional matching constraints). execution
Source sentence
5 Additionally, we would like to remind that our model of a periodic auction adopts the most basic set of rules.
Data
- Apple and Alphabet stock daily prices market-prices public
Source sentence
We use trading data extracted from YahooFinance for Apple and Alphabet (Google) stock on period Oct-2-2023 to Dec-29-2023 to calibrate the parameters µmm and σ. We get Apple’s µmm = 184.39 and Alphabet’s µmm = 134.24.
Costs
Modeled
A transaction fee indexed on arrival time is introduced (linear fee ξℓ(t)=a·t or square fee ξs(t)=a·t²) to incentivize earlier arrival.
Source sentence
Second, we introduce a transaction fee indexed on the arrival time of every market participant in the auction, i.e., the later a trader arrives, the higher they pay. We assume that the exchange proposes two type of exchange fees: either a linear fee indexed on the time of arrival of the strategic trader and the efficient price ξℓ(t) = at or a square fee structure ξs(t) = at2, with randomization of closing time τ cl.
Finds 3
- Without regulation, a strategic trader optimally arrives at the last moment (τ = T) to maximize price impact, which can move the clearing price away from the efficient price. theoretical
Source sentence
In a periodic auction, we discover that a strategic trader could take advantage of the accumulated information available along the auction duration by arriving at the latest moment before the auction closes, increasing the price impact on the market. Such price impact moves the clearing price away from the efficient price and may disturb the efficiency of a periodic auction market.
- Randomizing the closing time with optimal probability p≈0.08 (≈8% chance of ending at T‑1) shifts the strategic trader’s optimal arrival to τ=9 and improves market quality (e.g., Apple MQ from 3.6659 to 3.6365). performance figure from elsewhere in the paper
Source sentence
For both Apple and Alphabet, we observe in Table 3 that the optimal ˆp is around 0.08. With randomization set at ˆp = 0.08, the stock exchange successfully encourages a strategic trader to arrive earlier.
- Introducing time‑dependent transaction fees (linear or square) yields lower exchange objective values (Λ0) than the no‑fee case, indicating improved market quality and earlier trader arrival. performance
Source sentence
From the last two columns of the table, we could see that our transaction fee model improves market quality since Λ0 is always smaller that the market quality when ξ = 0. From the strategic trader’s perspective, they now have the incentive to arrive earlier as their optimal arriving time ˆτ is less than 10 for several of the cases shown here.
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 8 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
3 papers in the archive
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.