Paper: arXiv 2408.02634

Authors: Robert McLaughlin, Nir Chemaya, Dingyue Liu, Dahlia Malkhi

Abstract

This paper introduces a trade ordering rule that aims to reduce intra-block price volatility in Automated Market Maker (AMM) powered decentralized exchanges. The ordering rule introduced here, Clever Look-ahead Volatility Reduction (CLVR), operates under the (common) framework in decentralized finance that allows some entities to observe trade requests before they are settled, assemble them into “blocks”, and order them as they like. On AMM exchanges, asset prices are continuously and transparently updated as a result of each trade and therefore, transaction order has high financial value. CLVR aims to order transactions for traders’ benefit. Our primary focus is intra-block price stability (minimizing volatility), which has two main benefits for traders: it reduces transaction failure rate and allows traders to receive closer prices to the reference price at which they submit their transactions accordingly. We show that CLVR constructs an ordering which approximately minimizes price volatility with a small computation cost and can be trivially verified externally.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 5.0/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 7.0/10
  • Quadrant: Holy Grail — high math complexity, high empirical rigor

Why this score: The paper presents a novel algorithm (CLVR) with clear computational complexity analysis and theoretical bounds, but the core methodology is relatively intuitive (greedy local minimization) rather than heavily advanced. Empirically, it uses simulation on synthetic data extrapolated from empirical sources, reports quantitative results (95% failure reduction, 85% volatility reduction), and discusses practical implementation aspects, indicating strong data/implementation focus.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal: Reduce intra-block price volatility<br>in AMM DEXs"] --> B["Framework: Decentralized Finance<br>Block Building & Transaction Ordering"]
  B --> C["Key Methodology: CLVR Ordering Rule<br>Look-ahead Volatility Reduction"]
  C --> D["Data/Input: Trade Requests<br>Price Reference"]
  D --> E["Process: Greedy Approximation<br>Minimizes volatility with low compute"]
  E --> F["Computational Process:<br>Construct Transaction Ordering"]
  F --> G["Key Outcome 1: Reduced Price Volatility<br>Minimizes intra-block swings"]
  F --> H["Key Outcome 2: Lower Failure Rate<br>Closer execution prices"]
  G & H --> I["Final Outcome: Verifiable<br>Efficient Trade Execution"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper proposes the CLVR algorithm, a practical method for computing a near‑optimal transaction ordering that minimizes intra‑block price volatility on AMMs.

Source sentence
We introduce Clever Look-ahead Volatility Reduction (CLVR), a practical method for computing (nearly) optimal

Assumes 5

  • The analysis focuses on the Uniswap V2 constant‑product market maker mechanism. model
    Source sentence
    For this work we will focus only on the Uniswap V2 [2] AMM mechanism (known as a “Constant-Product Market Maker”, or CPMM), as it is both popular and relatively simple.
  • Trading is assumed frictionless with zero fee (f = 0.0). model
    Source sentence
    For simplicity, we consider a frictionless trading environment with f = 0.0, expressed in Equation 2.
  • Traders set a slippage tolerance and incur gas fees if a trade fails. market
    Source sentence
    When the execution price of a transaction yields the trader less than the specified minimum, the transaction will fail, but the trader will still incur gas fees.
  • Larger block sizes give the ordering algorithm more flexibility to improve price stability. execution
    Source sentence
    we show that larger blocks give ordering algorithm such as CLVR more flexibility to organize trades and improve price volatility.
Show 1 more
  • The study does not account for traders using routers that split transactions across multiple liquidity pools. other
    Source sentence
    We do not account for traders using routers, which split transactions over several liquidity pools – this would require a multi‑pool analysis.

Data

  • Synthetic workloads extrapolated from empirical data synthetic public
    Source sentence
    We evaluate the impact of transaction ordering using a simulation over synthetic workloads extrapolated from empirical data with a variety of parameters like block sizes, liquidity availability, and transaction sizes.
  • Uniswap V2 USDC‑USDT swaps · Uniswap V2 crypto-onchain public
    June 19, 2024 to July 19, 2024 (UTC) · USDC‑USDT pool
    Source sentence
    we collected all 4,192 swaps that executed on Uniswap V2’s USDC‑USDT AMM between June 19, 2024 and July 19, 2024 (UTC).

Costs

Partial Costs appear only as a robustness check, a flat fee without spread or impact, or outside the headline numbers.

Gas fees are incurred on failed transactions due to slippage protection, but are not explicitly modeled in the headline performance metrics.

Source sentence
When the execution price of a transaction yields the trader less than the specified minimum, the transaction will fail, but the trader will still incur gas fees.

Finds 5

  • CLVR reduces traders’ transaction failure rates by approximately 95% compared to random ordering when slippage tolerances are used. performance
    Source sentence
    we find that when traders use slippage tolerance settings, CLVR transaction ordering can significantly reduce traders’ transaction failure rates by approximately 95% compared to random ordering.
  • Larger blocks enable CLVR to achieve up to an 85% reduction in price volatility on empirical data. performance
    Source sentence
    Section 5.6 demonstrates 85% reduction in price volatility on empirical data.
  • CLVR attains superior price stability relative to the prior VHGSR method (Vol(CLVR)=3.13×10⁻⁷ vs Vol(VHGSR)=2.22×10⁻⁶). performance
    Source sentence
    Vol(CLVR) = 3.13 × 10−7 ... VHGSR, Vol(VHGSR) = 2.22 × 10−6
  • Splitting transactions under CLVR can reduce price volatility by six orders of magnitude even in a block with only two transactions. performance
    Source sentence
    even in a small block with only two transactions, traders can enjoy a reduction of price volatility of 6 orders of magnitude just from splitting their transaction into small ones.
  • CLVR provably protects traders from traditional three‑transaction sandwich attacks. theoretical
    Source sentence
    We prove that CLVR protects traders from the traditional 3-transaction sandwich attacks.

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 39 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Cited by 1 paper in the archive (1 by independent authors)

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.

Cited References (58)

  1. Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules (2023)
  2. MEV Makes Everyone Happy under Greedy Sequencing Rule (2023)
  3. Flash boys 2.0: Frontrunning in decentralized exchanges, miner extractable value, and consensus instability (2020)
  4. Data Independent Order Policy Enforcement: Limitations and Solutions (2023) — link
  5. Uniswap v2 Core (2020)
  6. The conceptual flaws of decentralized automated market making (2023)
  7. Proposer-builder separation, payment for order flows, and centralization in blockchain (2024)
  8. The Power of Default: Measuring the Effect of Slippage Tolerance in Decentralized Exchanges (2023)
and 50 more
  1. A large scale study of the ethereum arbitrage ecosystem (2023)
  2. The Evolution of Decentralized Exchange: Risks, Benefits, and Oversight (2024)
  3. Sok: Preventing transaction reordering manipulations in decentralized finance (2022)
  4. DeFi TVL 1.06T- June 1th 2024 (2024)
  5. Dexes TVL and volume (2024)
  6. Unconditional inclusion lists (2024)
  7. SoK: decentralized finance (DeFi)(2021) (2021) — link
  8. Maximal Extractable Value and Allocative Inefficiencies in Public Blockchains (2023)
  9. PROF: Protected Order Flow in a Profit-Seeking World (2024) — link
  10. Sok: Mev countermeasures: Theory and practice (2022) — link
  11. A Study of MEV Extraction Techniques on a First-Come-First-Served Blockchain (2024)
  12. I See You! Robust Measurement of Adversarial Behavior (2023)
  13. On-Chain Foreign Exchange and Cross-Border Payments (2023)
  14. Project Mariana: Cross-border exchange of wholesale CBDCs using automated market-makers (Final report) (2023)
  15. Learning from DeFi: Would Automated Market Makers Improve Equity Trading? (2023)
  16. Coexisting exchange platforms: Limit order books and automated market makers (2021)
  17. Decentralized exchange: The uniswap automated market maker (2021)
  18. On The Quality Of Cryptocurrency Markets (2022)
  19. Battle of the bots: Flash loans, miner extractable value and efficient settlement (2023)
  20. Automated market making and loss-versus-rebalancing (2022) — link
  21. The adoption of blockchain-based decentralized exchanges (2021) — link
  22. The need for fees at a dex: How increases in fees can increase dex trading volume (2022)
  23. The high-frequency trading arms race: Frequent batch auctions as a market design response (2015)
  24. Computation of Optimal MEV in Decentralized Exchanges (2024)
  25. Arbitrageurs’ profits, LVR, and sandwich attacks: batch trading as an AMM design response (2023) — link
  26. Would Order-by-Order Auctions Be Competitive? (2022)
  27. Statistical properties of the volatility of price fluctuations (1999)
  28. A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation: Will the Market Fix the Market? (2024)
  29. Order-Fair Consensus in the Permissionless Setting (2021) — link
  30. Quick Order Fairness (2022) — link
  31. Themis: Fast, strong order-fairness in byzantine consensus (2023)
  32. Byzantine ordered consensus without byzantine oligarchy (2020)
  33. EIP-7547: Inclusion lists [DRAFT] (2023)
  34. What is the optimal trading frequency in financial markets? (2017)
  35. The Gini methodology: a primer on a statistical methodology (2013) — link
  36. Implementation details for frequent batch auctions: Slowing down markets to the blink of an eye (2014)
  37. On frequent batch auctions for stocks (2022)
  38. Too fast or too slow? Determining the optimal speed of financial markets (2018)
  39. Loss-Versus-Fair: Efficiency of Dutch Auctions on Blockchains — → 2406.00113
  40. Augmenting batch exchanges with constant function market makers (2022) — link
  41. The Effect of Trading Fees on Arbitrage Profits in Automated Market Makers (2023)
  42. A myersonian framework for optimal liquidity provision in automated market makers — → 2303.00208
  43. When does the tail wag the dog? Curvature and market making (2022)
  44. Improved price oracles: Constant function market makers (2020)
  45. Volatility in US and European Equity Markets: An Assessment of Market Quality (2002) — link
  46. Uniswap v4 core [draft] (2023)
  47. An overview of uniswap v4 for researchers (2025)
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  49. Towards a theory of maximal extractable value II: Uncertainty — → 2309.14201
  50. Estimating investor preferences for blockchain security (2022)

3 of 58 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.