Paper: arXiv 2509.10094
Authors: René Aïd, Philippe Bergault, Mathieu Rosenbaum
Abstract
Recent regulation on intraday electricity markets has led to the development of shared order books with the intention to foster competition and increase market liquidity. In this paper, we address the question of the efficiency of such regulations by analysing the situation of two exchanges sharing a single limit order book, i.e. a quote by a market maker can be hit by a trade arriving on the other exchange. We develop a Principal-Agent model where each exchange acts as the Principal of her own market maker acting as her Agent. Exchanges and market makers have all CARA utility functions with potentially different risk-aversion parameters. In terms of mathematical result, we show existence and uniqueness of the resulting Nash equilibrium between exchanges, give the optimal incentive contracts and provide numerical solution to the PDE satisfied by the certainty equivalent of the exchanges. From an economic standpoint, our model demonstrates that incentive provision constitutes a public good. More precisely, it highlights the presence of a competitiveness spillover effect: when one exchange optimally incentivizes its market maker, the competing exchange also reaps indirect benefits. This interdependence gives rise to a free-rider problem. Given that providing incentives entails a cost, the strategic interaction between exchanges may lead to an equilibrium in which neither platform offers incentives – ultimately resulting in diminished overall competition.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 8.5/10
- Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10
- Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing
Why this score: The paper employs advanced stochastic control and game theory (CARA utility, PDE for certainty equivalent, Nash equilibrium proofs) without presenting any backtests, real data, or numerical experiments beyond theoretical solutions.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
R["Research Goal: Efficiency of Shared Order Books in Electricity Markets?"]
R --> M1["Methodology: Principal-Agent Model"]
M1 --> M2["Agents: Exchanges incentivizing Market Makers"]
M2 --> M3["Assumptions: CARA Utility Functions"]
M3 --> C["Computational Process: Nash Equilibrium Analysis via PDE"]
C --> O1{"Key Findings"}
O1 --> O2["Incentive Provision = Public Good"]
O1 --> O3["Competitiveness Spillover (Free-Rider Problem)"]
O1 --> O4["Equilibrium Result: No Incentives Offered"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper develops a Principal‑Agent model of two exchanges sharing a single limit order book, derives the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium between exchanges, and characterises optimal incentive contracts for market makers.
Source sentence
We develop a Principal-Agent model where each exchange acts as the Principal of her own market maker acting as her Agent. In terms of mathematical result, we show existence and uniqueness of the resulting Nash equilibrium between exchanges, give the optimal incentive contracts and provide numerical solution to the PDE satisfied by the certainty equivalent of the exchanges.
Assumes 6
- Each exchange is associated with a dedicated market maker who does not switch between platforms. model
Source sentence
This observation motivates one of the core assumptions of our model: each exchange is associated with a dedicated market maker, who does not switch between platforms.
- Liquidity takers interact with a specific exchange, although their orders may be executed on either venue via the shared order book. execution
Source sentence
Similarly, liquidity takers are assumed to interact 2 with a specific exchange, although the execution of their orders may occur on either venue due to the shared order book.
- All agents (exchanges and market makers) have CARA utility functions, possibly with different risk‑aversion parameters. model
Source sentence
Exchanges and market makers have all CARA utility functions with potentially different risk-aversion parameters.
- A risk‑constraint parameter \(\bar q\) caps market‑maker inventory. model
Source sentence
The parameter ¯q serves as a risk constraint for market makers: it caps their inventory by preventing further buying when their position is too long, and further selling when it is too short.
Show 2 more
- The two exchanges share a single limit order book, so a quote posted on one exchange can be hit by a trade arriving on the other. market
Source sentence
In this paper, we address the question of the efficiency of such regulations by analysing the situation of two exchanges sharing a single limit order book, i.e. a quote by a market maker can be hit by a trade arriving on the other exchange.
- Providing incentives to market makers incurs a cost equal to the reservation utility of the market maker. model
Source sentence
But, because the provision of incentive is costly (the platform has to pay the reservation utility of the market maker), an exchange may benefit from not incentivizing her market maker and letting the other platform pay for incentive provision.
Data
No dataset named in the text.
Costs
Not applicable
Finds 5
- Incentive provision constitutes a public good because a competitiveness spill‑over effect makes each exchange benefit from the other’s incentives. theoretical
Source sentence
From an economic standpoint, our model demonstrates that incentive provision constitutes a public good. More precisely, it highlights the presence of a competitiveness spillover effect: when one exchange optimally incentivizes its market maker, the competing exchange also reaps indirect benefits.
- The strategic interaction can lead to a free‑rider problem, potentially resulting in an equilibrium where neither exchange offers incentives, reducing overall competition. theoretical
Source sentence
This interdependence gives rise to a free-rider problem. Given that providing incentives entails a cost, the strategic interaction between exchanges may lead to an equilibrium in which neither platform offers incentives -- ultimately resulting in diminished overall competition.
- The model yields existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium between the two exchanges. theoretical
Source sentence
In terms of mathematical result, we show existence and uniqueness of the resulting Nash equilibrium between exchanges, give the optimal incentive contracts and provide numerical solution to the PDE satisfied by the certainty equivalent of the exchanges.
- When only one exchange provides incentives, both market makers reduce their spreads around zero inventory, increasing effective liquidity. theoretical
Source sentence
When only exchange E0 provides a contract, the quotes of both market makers decrease around inventory zero – the region where she spends most of her time – which significantly increases effective liquidity.
- When both exchanges provide incentives, spreads are substantially reduced and quotes become more stable across inventories. theoretical
Source sentence
In the two-contract case, we observe that both market makers reduce their spreads substantially. The quotes become much more stable with respect to inventory and notably lower than the benchmark case without contracts around inventory zero.
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 24 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.