Paper: arXiv 2410.13583

Authors: Neil A. Chriss

Abstract

This is the third paper in a series concerning the game-theoretic aspects of position-building while in competition. The first paper set forth foundations and laid out the essential goal, which is to minimize implementation costs in light of how other traders are likely to trade. The majority of results in that paper center on the two traders in competition and equilibrium results are presented. The second paper, introduces computational methods based on Fourier Series which allows the introduction of a broad range of constraints into the optimal strategies derived. The current paper returns to the unconstrained case and provides a complete solution to finding equilibrium strategies in competition and handles completely arbitrary situations. As a result we present a detailed analysis of the value (or not) of trade centralization and we show that firms who naively centralize trades do not generally benefit and sometimes, in fact, lose. On the other hand, firms that strategically centralize their trades generally will be able to benefit.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 8.5/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 3.0/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper is highly theoretical, relying on Nash equilibrium concepts, closed-form solutions for multi-trader competition, and market impact modeling, which indicates dense mathematical analysis. However, the excerpt focuses entirely on theoretical models and strategic implications without any mention of backtesting, specific datasets, or empirical validation of the strategies.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal: Find equilibrium strategies for competing traders"] --> B["Method: Game-theoretic analysis"]
  B --> C["Model: N traders competing on position building"]
  C --> D{"Centralization?"}
  D -- Naive --> E["Outcome: No benefit, often losses"]
  D -- Strategic --> F["Outcome: Potential gains"]
  E --> G["Key Finding: Centralization requires strategy, not just scale"]
  F --> G

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper provides a complete solution for equilibrium trading strategies in competition and analyzes the value of trade centralization, showing that naive centralization can be detrimental while strategic centralization can yield benefits.

Source sentence
The current paper returns to the unconstrained case and provides a complete solution to finding equilibrium strategies in competition and handles completely arbitrary situations. As a result we present a detailed analysis of the value (or not) of trade centralization and we show that firms who naively centralize trades do not generally benefit and sometimes, in fact, lose.

Assumes 6

  • There is a small number of informed traders competing to buy a stock. market
    Source sentence
    2.4 Market impact and implementation cost Here and throughout, we assume as usual that there is a small number of informed traders competing to buy a stock.
  • Each trader acts independently with no communication or coordination with others. model
    Source sentence
    We can model this situation without regard to the firm itself, that is, we can treat each trader as independent and detached from the others.
  • Temporary and permanent market impact are modeled as linear functions of the net trading rate and cumulative quantity. model
    Source sentence
    Trading strategies, derivatives and the market strategy We use the same temporary and permanent impact models as in [AC97], [AC01] and [Chr24a]. In brief, temporary market impact is the immediate and incremental cost of trading due to transient, liquidity driven effects.
  • Implementation cost equals the sum of temporary and permanent impact components. model
    Source sentence
    Since our concern is always to minimize the total cost of trading, we focus on the sum of the temporary and permanent components of market impact.
Show 2 more
  • Cost-minimizing strategies are obtained via the Euler‑Lagrange equation from the calculus of variations. other
    Source sentence
    Specifically the tool we use to find cost-minimizing strategies is the Euler-Lagrange equation.
  • All traders start simultaneously at time t = 0 and target quantities sum to the total quantity. execution
    Source sentence
    2.2 Trading strategies We study an idealized situation and assume there are n traders seeking to buy the same stock starting simultaneously at a time designated as time t = 0. The traders are referenced by the indexes i = 1, . . . , n.

Data

No dataset named in the text.

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result; the cost the extractor found is a model parameter.

The paper-text extraction found a cost parameter inside a model (Cost is modeled as the integral of (˙m + κ m) ˙m, combining temporary impact (proportional to net rate) and permanent impact (proportional to cumulative quantity).); the classifier found no reported trading result, so costs are not applicable.

Finds 5

  • Firms that naively centralize trades do not generally benefit and can lose. negative
    Source sentence
    As a result we present a detailed analysis of the value (or not) of trade centralization and we show that firms who naively centralize trades do not generally benefit and sometimes, in fact, lose.
  • Firms that strategically centralize trades can obtain cost savings. performance
    Source sentence
    On the other hand, firms that strategically centralize their trades generally will be able to benefit.
  • The market‑wide central trading desk that minimizes aggregate costs follows the risk‑neutral strategy m(t)=t, yielding an implementation cost of 1 + κ/2. theoretical
    Source sentence
    If a "market-wide" central trading desk minimizes aggregate costs, it will trade the risk-neutral strategy m(t) = t and the implementation cost (the aggregate cost) will be the integral of ( ˙m + κm) ˙m and since ˙m = 1 we have Cost (market-wide strategy) = Z 1 0 1 + κt dt = 1 + κ 2 (3.4) As this represents the implementation cost to a kind-of benevolent market-wide central trading desk,
  • Equilibrium trading strategies are given by ai(t)=Bi(e^{κt}−1)+Di(1−e^{−αt}) with explicit constants, and these strategies simultaneously minimize total implementation cost. theoretical
    Source sentence
    elow represent an equilibrium with respect to the cost functions C1, . . . , Cn defined in Eq. (2.5): ai(t) = Bi(eκt −1) + Di(1 −e−αt) (5.1) with the constants Bi, Di and α as follows: Bi = λin −1 λin(eκ −1), Di = 1 λin(1 −e−α), α = κn −1 n + 1 (5.2) and further the resultant market strategy m(t) = Pn i=1 λiai(t) derived by summing the ai in Eq. (5.1) again yields the eager strategy given in Proposition 4.1.
  • Increasing alpha‑decay leads lower‑quantity traders to adopt a “bucket” strategy, acquiring more than their target early and then selling later to exploit permanent impact. theoretical
    Source sentence
    We see that as the level of alpha-decay increases from 1 on the left to 20 on the right, strategy 1 with 20% of the total quantity evolves toward a "bucket" strategy, acquiring more than 100% of its target quantity in 20% of the 13 A PREPRINT - OCTOBER 29, 2024 time and then selling (at a profit) toward the end to take advantage of the permanent impact due to the other two traders.

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 14 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Cited by 1 paper in the archive

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.

Cited References (28)

  1. Optimal execution of portfolio transactions (2001)
  2. Optimal liquidation (1997)
  3. Calculus of variations (2000)
  4. Differential Games: A Mathematical Theory with Applications to Warfare and Pursuit, Control and Optimization (1999)
  5. Market reaction to temporary liquidity crises and the permanent market impact (2006)
  6. Direct estimation of equity market impact (2005)
  7. No-dynamic-arbitrage and market impact (2010)
  8. Optimal trade execution under geometric Brownian motion in the Almgren and Chriss framework (2011)
and 20 more
  1. Optimal trading strategy and supply/demand dynamics (2013)
  2. Three models of market impact and Data, High-Frequency (2010)
  3. Handbook of price impact modeling (2023)
  4. Dynamical models of market impact and algorithms for order execution (2013)
  5. The market impact of a limit order (2012)
  6. Optimal Execution: A Review (2022) — link
  7. Mathematica, V ersion 14.1 — link
  8. Optimal position-building in competition — → 2409.03586
  9. Theory of games and economic behavior: 60th anniversary commemorative edition (2007)
  10. Equilibrium points in n-person games (1950)
  11. The Nash Equilibrium: A Perspective (2004) — link
  12. Two-person cooperative games (1953)
  13. Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games (1950) — link
  14. Non-Cooperative Games (1951) — link
  15. Position-building in competition with real-world constraints — → 2409.15459
  16. Worst-case equilibria (1999)
  17. How markets slowly digest changes in supply and demand (2009)
  18. Market efficiency and the long-memory of supply and demand: Is price impact variable and permanent or fixed and temporary? (2006)
  19. Beyond the square root: Evidence for logarithmic dependence of market impact on size and participation rate (2015)
  20. Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players, I–III Part I. The basic model (1967)

2 of 28 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.