Paper: arXiv 2405.14418

Authors: Michail Anthropelos, Constantinos Stefanakis

Abstract

We consider an Ito-financial market at which the risky assets’ returns are derived endogenously through a market-clearing condition amongst heterogeneous risk-averse investors with quadratic preferences and random endowments. Investors act strategically by taking into account the impact that their orders have on the assets’ drift. A frictionless market and an one with quadratic transaction costs are analysed and compared. In the former, we derive the unique Nash equilibrium at which investors’ demand processes reveal different hedging needs than their true ones, resulting in a deviation of the Nash equilibrium from its competitive counterpart. Under price impact and transaction costs, we characterize the Nash equilibrium as the (unique) solution of a system of FBSDEs and derive its closed-form expression. We furthermore show that under common risk aversion and absence of noise traders, transaction costs do not change the equilibrium returns. On the contrary, when noise traders are present, the effect of transaction costs on equilibrium returns is amplified due to price impact.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 9.0/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper is heavily mathematical, employing stochastic calculus, Itô processes, FBSDEs, and Nash equilibrium analysis, which scores high on math complexity. However, it presents a purely theoretical model with no backtesting, data analysis, or implementation details, placing it in the Lab Rats quadrant.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal<br>Determine equilibrium returns with price impact & transaction costs"] --> B["Model Setup<br>Continuous-time Ito market"]
  B --> C{"Model Configuration"}
  C --> C1["Frictionless Market"]
  C --> C2["Quadratic Transaction Costs"]
  C1 --> D["Solve Nash Equilibrium<br>FBSDEs / Strategic Pricing"]
  C2 --> D
  D --> E["Key Outcomes"]
  E --> E1["Frictionless: Investors' demand differs from true hedging needs<br>Nash ≠ Competitive equilibrium"]
  E --> E2["Costs & Impact: Closed-form solution derived<br>Costs amplify returns via price impact when noise traders exist"]
  E --> E3["No Noise Traders: Transaction costs do not alter equilibrium returns"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper proposes a continuous‑time equilibrium model with endogenous asset returns, incorporating investors' price impact and quadratic transaction costs, and derives a closed‑form Nash equilibrium characterized as the unique solution of a system of FBSDEs.

Source sentence
Under price impact and transaction costs, we characterize the Nash equilibrium as the (unique) solution of a system of FBSDEs and derive its closed-form expression.

Assumes 6

  • Investors are heterogeneous risk‑averse agents with quadratic preferences over terminal wealth. model
    Source sentence
    We consider an Ito-financial market at which the risky assets' returns are derived endogenously through a market-clearing condition amongst heterogeneous risk-averse investors with quadratic preferences and random endowments. We consider N investors with quadratic preferences over their wealth at time terminal time T and risk tolerance coefficients denoted by δm > 0 for each m ∈I := {1, 2, ..., N}.
  • Investors act strategically, taking into account the impact of their orders on asset drifts. model
    Source sentence
    Investors act strategically by taking into account the impact that their orders have on the assets' drift.
  • Risky assets follow Itô dynamics with drifts endogenously determined at equilibrium. market
    Source sentence
    More precisely, we assume that risky assets follow Itˆo dynamics, with drifts that are endogenously derived at the equilibrium.
  • Quadratic transaction costs are imposed on the rate of trading. execution
    Source sentence
    As mentioned in the introductory section, we consider market’s transaction costs and more precisely in the form of quadratic costs on the rate of trading. In words, investors face the same costs that are proportional to the square of their trading rate.
Show 2 more
  • Noise traders may be present, providing exogenous random demand. model
    Source sentence
    The presence of noise traders is allowable in the model, while the main market’s participants are mean-variance investors endowed with heterogeneous random income processes.
  • When all investors share a common risk aversion and no noise traders are present, transaction costs do not affect equilibrium returns. other
    Source sentence
    We furthermore show that under common risk aversion and absence of noise traders, transaction costs do not change the equilibrium returns.

Data

No dataset named in the text.

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result; the cost the extractor found is a model parameter.

The paper-text extraction found a cost parameter inside a model (Quadratic costs on the trading rate (cost proportional to the square of the trading speed).); the classifier found no reported trading result, so costs are not applicable.

Finds 5

  • Under common risk aversion and absence of noise traders, frictional and frictionless Nash equilibria coincide, implying transaction costs do not change equilibrium returns. theoretical
    Source sentence
    We furthermore show that under common risk aversion and absence of noise traders, transaction costs do not change the equilibrium returns.
  • When noise traders are present, transaction costs amplify their effect on equilibrium returns due to price impact. theoretical
    Source sentence
    On the contrary, when noise traders are present, the effect of transaction costs on equilibrium returns is amplified due to price impact.
  • The Nash equilibrium with price impact and quadratic transaction costs is uniquely characterized by a system of forward‑backward SDEs and admits a closed‑form expression. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Under price impact and transaction costs, we characterize the Nash equilibrium as the (unique) solution of a system of FBSDEs and derive its closed-form expression. Under price impact and transaction costs, we characterize the Nash equilibrium through the (unique) solution of a system of FBSDEs and derive its closed-form expression.
  • Investors' price impact increases the component of equilibrium return that stems from transaction costs when more than two strategic investors participate. theoretical
    Source sentence
    On the other hand, we show that investors’ price impact increases the part of the equilibrium return that stems from transaction costs (when more than two investors participate in the market).
  • In the special case of only two strategic investors, the effect of transaction costs on equilibrium returns is the same under competitive and non‑competitive market structures. theoretical
    Source sentence
    In the special case of only two strategic investors, the effect of transaction costs on equilibrium returns is equal between competi-tive and non-competitive market’s structure.

Checked by others

Supported by

  • Heterogenous Macro-Finance Model: A Mean-field Game Approach (2025)
    On the question: How does common market noise combined with financial friction amplify equilibrium returns or mean‑field outcomes?
    Compare the findings

    This paper: When noise traders are present, transaction costs amplify their effect on equilibrium returns due to price impact.

    That paper: When common market noise is present, financial friction amplifies the mean‑field effect, causing capital fire‑sales by experts.

    Both findings report that financial friction (transaction costs in A, frictions in B) amplifies the effect of common market noise—A on returns, B on mean‑field leading to fire‑sales.

Cited by 1 paper in the archive

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.

Cited References (62)

  1. On agent’s agreement and partial-equilibrium pricing in incomplete markets (2010)
  2. Market microstructure: A survey of microfoundations, empirical results, and policy implications (2005)
  3. A general equilibrium analysis of strategic arbitrage (2004)
  4. Strategic supply function competition with private information (2011)
  5. Dynamic thin markets (2015)
  6. Equity market impact (2005)
  7. Central clearing and collateral demand (2015)
  8. Over-the-counter markets (2005)
and 54 more
  1. Decentralized exchange (2017)
  2. Equilibrium Theory of Financial Markets: Recent Developments (2022)
  3. Thin Markets (2016)
  4. A model of dynamic equilibrium asset pricing with heterogeneous beliefs and extraneous risk (2000)
  5. Optimal execution of portfolio transactions (2000)
  6. A Market Impact Game Under Transient Price Impact (2019)
  7. Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading (1985)
  8. Price Manipulation and Quasi-Arbitrage (2004)
  9. Price impact under heterogeneous beliefs and restricted participation (2024)
  10. Strategic Trading and Welfare in a Dynamic Market (1999)
  11. Equilibrium in risk-sharing games (2017)
  12. Derivative pricing based on local utility maximization (2002)
  13. Mean reversion pays, but costs (2011)
  14. Optimal trading with linear costs (2012)
  15. Dynamic trading with predictable returns and transaction costs (2013)
  16. Dynamic portfolio choice with frictions (2016)
  17. Convex Functional Analysis (2005)
  18. Handbook of Price Impact Modeling (2023)
  19. Convex Analysis and Variational Problems (1999)
  20. Optimal execution of portfolio transactions (2001)
  21. Option hedging with smooth market impact (2016)
  22. Hedging with termporary price impact (2017)
  23. Linear quadratic stochastic control problems with singular stochastic terminal constraint (2018)
  24. A closed-form execution strategy to target volume weighted average price (2016)
  25. A dynamic model of portfolio management (2006)
  26. Dynamic trading volume (2017)
  27. Trading with small price impact (2017)
  28. A Demand System Approach to Asset Pricing (2019)
  29. Discriminatory Pricing of Over-the-counter Derivatives (2021)
  30. Transaction Costs (2018)
  31. Calculus of variations (1998)
  32. Calculus of variations (1963)
  33. Measures, Integrals and Martingales (2005)
  34. The effect of market power on risk-sharing (2017)
  35. The Dynamic Properties of Financial-Market Equilibrium with Trading Fees (2019)
  36. Transaction Costs and Asset Prices: A Dynamic Equilibrium Model (1998)
  37. Existence of a Radner equilibrium in a model with transaction costs (2018)
  38. Equilibrium interest rate and liquidity premium with transaction costs (1999)
  39. Equilibrium returns with transaction costs (2018)
  40. Nash Equilibrium for Risk-Averse Investors in a Market Impact Game with Transient Price Impact (2019)
  41. Instabilities in Multi-asset and Multi-agent Market Impact Games (2024)
  42. Equilibrium asset pricing with transaction costs (2021)
  43. Strategic trading and welfare in dynamic way (1999)
  44. Strategic trading in a dynamic noisy market (2001)
  45. Dynamic Thin Markets (2015)
  46. Slow Trading and Stock Return Predictability (2017)
  47. The Effective Risk Aversion in Thin Risk-Sharing Markets (2020)
  48. Predatory trading (2005)
  49. Decentralized Exchange (2017)
  50. Optimal execution of portfolio transactions (2001)
  51. Transactions costs, trading volume, and the liquidity premium (2014)
  52. Liquidity premia and transaction costs (2007)
  53. Stability and analytic expansions of local solutions of systems of quadratic BSDEs with applications to a price impact model (2016)
  54. A system of quadratic BSDEs arising in a price impact model (2016)

0 of 62 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.