Paper: arXiv 2309.08431

Authors: Álvaro Cartea, Fayçal Drissi, Marcello Monga

Abstract

Constant product markets with concentrated liquidity (CL) are the most popular type of automated market makers. In this paper, we characterise the continuous-time wealth dynamics of strategic LPs who dynamically adjust their range of liquidity provision in CL pools. Their wealth results from fee income, the value of their holdings in the pool, and rebalancing costs. Next, we derive a self-financing and closed-form optimal liquidity provision strategy where the width of the LP’s liquidity range is determined by the profitability of the pool (provision fees minus gas fees), the predictable losses (PL) of the LP’s position, and concentration risk. Concentration risk refers to the decrease in fee revenue if the marginal exchange rate (akin to the midprice in a limit order book) in the pool exits the LP’s range of liquidity. When the drift in the marginal rate is stochastic, we show how to optimally skew the range of liquidity to increase fee revenue and profit from the expected changes in the marginal rate. Finally, we use Uniswap v3 data to show that, on average, LPs have traded at a significant loss, and to show that the out-of-sample performance of our strategy is superior to the historical performance of LPs in the pool we consider.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 9.0/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 7.0/10
  • Quadrant: Holy Grail — high math complexity, high empirical rigor

Why this score: The paper utilizes advanced stochastic control, continuous-time wealth dynamics, and closed-form derivations, indicating high mathematical complexity, while it validates the theoretical strategy with out-of-sample backtesting on real Uniswap v3 data, demonstrating strong empirical rigor.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal:<br>Characterise LP Wealth Dynamics &<br>Develop Optimal Strategy for CL Pools"] --> B["Methodology Step 1:<br>Continuous-Time Wealth Modelling<br>(Fees, Holdings, Rebalancing Costs)"]
  B --> C["Methodology Step 2:<br>Derive Closed-Form Optimal Strategy<br>Width = f(Profitability, PL, Concentration Risk)"]
  C --> D["Methodology Step 3:<br>Stochastic Drift Extension<br>Optimal Skewing of Liquidity Range"]
  D --> E["Data Input & Validation:<br>Uniswap v3 Historical Data"]
  E --> F["Computational Process:<br>Backtesting & Out-of-Sample<br>Performance Comparison"]
  F --> G["Key Findings & Outcomes:<br>1. LPs historically traded at significant loss<br>2. Optimal strategy outperforms historical LPs"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper derives a self‑financing closed‑form optimal liquidity provision strategy that determines the liquidity range width based on pool profitability, predictable losses, and concentration risk.

Source sentence
we derive a self‑financing and closed‑form optimal liquidity provision strategy where the width of the LP’s liquidity range is determined by the profitability of the pool (provision fees minus gas fees), the predictable losses (PL) of the LP’s position, and concentration risk.

Assumes 5

  • The profitability threshold η follows ηt = σ²/8 − µt/4 (µt − σ²/2) + ε/4. model
    Source sentence
    Assumption 1 The profitability threshold η in the dynamics (17) is given by ηt = σ2 8 −µt 4 ( µt −σ2 2 ) + ε 4 .
  • The asymmetry function ρ is given by equation (14). model
    Source sentence
    Assume the asymmetry function ρ is as in (14) and that U(x) = log(x).
  • Liquidity providers pay a flat gas fee of 84.8 USD per operation. execution
    Source sentence
    The LP pays a flat fee of 84.8 USD per operation when implementing the strategy in the pool we consider.
  • The pool fee rate π is independent of the marginal exchange rate Z over the considered time scales. market
    Source sentence
    Here, we assume that π is independent of the rate Z over the time scales we consider.
Show 1 more
  • Liquidity providers can adjust their range continuously and without frictions other than gas fees. other
    Source sentence
    we characterise the continuous‑time wealth dynamics of strategic LPs who dynamically adjust their range of liquidity provision in CL pools.

Data

  • Uniswap v3 ETH/USDC pool · Uniswap crypto-onchain public
    5 May 2021 to 18 August 2022 · ETH/USDC pair
    Source sentence
    To analyse the dynamics of the pool fee rate π, we use historical LT transactions in Uniswap v3 as a measure of activity and to estimate the total fee income generated by the pool; Appendix A describes the data.
  • Table A.4 statistics · Uniswap crypto-onchain public
    5 May 2021 to 18 August 2022 · ETH/USDC pool
    Source sentence
    Table A.4: LT and LP activity in the ETH/USDC pool between 5 May 2021 and 18 August 2022: Total and average daily count of LT transactions and LP operations...

Costs

Modeled Costs are part of the reported headline results.

Flat gas fee of 84.8 USD per liquidity provision operation (deposit, withdraw, adjust).

Source sentence
The LP pays a flat fee of 84.8 USD per operation when implementing the strategy in the pool we consider, so the LP strategy is profitable, on average, if

Finds 4

  • Out‑of‑sample performance of the optimal strategy exceeds the historical performance of LPs in the same pool. performance
    Source sentence
    Finally, we use Uniswap v3 data to show that, on average, LPs have traded at a significant loss, and to show that the out‑of‑sample performance of our strategy is superior to the historical performance of LPs in the pool we consider.
  • Liquidity providers on average incur a significant loss when providing liquidity in the ETH/USDC pool. negative
    Source sentence
    on average, LPs have traded at a significant loss
  • The optimal spread is independent of time and depends on volatility, liquidity‑taking activity, and drift of the marginal rate. theoretical
    Source sentence
    the volatility of the rate, the liquidity taking activity in the pool, and the drift of the rate.
  • A profitability condition must hold: potential fee gains net of gas fees and concentration costs must exceed predictable losses. theoretical
    Source sentence
    the potential gains from fees, net of gas fees and concentration costs, must exceed PL.

Checked by others

Supported by

  • Measuring Arbitrage Losses and Profitability of AMM Liquidity (2024)
    On the question: Do liquidity providers incur net losses due to arbitrage in major Uniswap pools?
    Compare the findings

    This paper: Liquidity providers on average incur a significant loss when providing liquidity in the ETH/USDC pool.

    That paper: Fees earned by liquidity providers are generally smaller than the arbitrage losses they incur, meaning LPs lose money in most large Uniswap pools.

    Both findings report that LPs lose money: A finds a significant loss in the ETH/USDC pool, and B shows fees are smaller than arbitrage losses, causing losses in most large pools.

  • Liquidity provision in CLMMs: evidence from transactions data (2026)
    On the question: Does providing liquidity in AMM/CLMM pools generate profit for liquidity providers?
    Compare the findings

    This paper: Liquidity providers on average incur a significant loss when providing liquidity in the ETH/USDC pool.

    That paper: Standalone liquidity provision is profitable only for a minority of LPs, suggesting other motives beyond pool rewards.

    Both findings show most LPs lose money: A reports a significant loss in the ETH/USDC pool, while B finds only a minority of LPs are profitable.

Cited by 17 papers in the archive (16 by independent authors): Measuring Arbitrage Losses and Profitability of AMM … (uses its method or data); Fee Implied Volatility on Uniswap v3: A DEX Native Proxy and … (uses its method or data)

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.