Paper: arXiv 2307.08768

Authors: Hamed Amini, Maxim Bichuch, Zachary Feinstein

Abstract

Prediction markets allow traders to bet on potential future outcomes. These markets exist for weather, political, sports, and economic forecasting. Within this work we consider a decentralized framework for prediction markets using automated market makers (AMMs). Specifically, we construct a liquidity-based AMM structure for prediction markets that, under reasonable axioms on the underlying utility function, satisfy meaningful financial properties on the cost of betting and the resulting pricing oracle. Importantly, we study how liquidity can be pooled or withdrawn from the AMM and the resulting implications to the market behavior. In considering this decentralized framework, we additionally propose financially meaningful fees that can be collected for trading to compensate the liquidity providers for their vital market function.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 8.5/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 4.0/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper is mathematically dense, featuring an axiomatic construction, generalizations from finite to general probability spaces, and rigorous proofs of financial properties, while the empirical section focuses on theoretical case studies rather than extensive backtesting or live data implementation.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal: Design Decentralized Prediction Markets<br>using AMMs with Pooled Liquidity"] --> B["Key Methodology: Construct Liquidity-Based AMM<br>with Financial Axioms"]
  B --> C["Input: Betting Outcomes<br>(Sports, Politics, Weather, Economics)"]
  C --> D["Computational Process: Pricing Oracle<br>& Cost of Betting Calculations"]
  D --> E["Process: Liquidity Pooling & Withdrawal<br>Modeling Market Dynamics"]
  E --> F["Process: Fee Structure Design<br>to Compensate Liquidity Providers"]
  F --> G["Key Outcome 1: Solvent Pricing Oracle<br>validating market efficiency"]
  F --> H["Key Outcome 2: Sustainable Market Economics<br>via AMM fees & liquidity incentives"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper proposes a liquidity-based automated market maker (AMM) framework for decentralized prediction markets and a fee structure that charges on the random portion of bets.

Source sentence
Specifically, we construct a liquidity-based AMM structure for prediction markets that, under reasonable axioms on the underlying utility function, satisfy meaningful financial properties on the cost of betting and the resulting pricing oracle.

Assumes 5

  • Utility function u is strictly increasing and Fréchet differentiable (or satisfies the basic axioms). model
    Source sentence
    As discussed above, within this section we wish to study those automated market makers of the form U(π, L) := u(L1 −π) for some utility function u : L∞+ →R ∪{−∞}.
  • Initial cash reserves L0 > 0 for the market maker. market
    Source sentence
    we will demonstrate in Section 3.2 that we can always guarantee that ess inf Π > 0 under the desired axioms (provided that L0 > 0 for the initial cash reserves of the market maker).
  • Liquidity provision is proportional (α∗ = t) and does not change pricing oracles. execution
    Source sentence
    the pricing oracles after the liquidity provision or withdrawal are provided by P b (·; Π)
  • Fees are a fixed non‑negative fraction γ ≤ 1 and are applied only to the random portion of a bet. model
    Source sentence
    we propose that fees are only collected on the (positive) random portion x −ess inf x1 of the bet x ∈L∞. That is, for the fixed fee level γ ≥0, the cost of purchasing x ∈L∞ in the pool Π ∈L∞* is given by Cγ(x; Π) := (1 + γ)C(x −ess inf x1; Π) + ess inf x.
Show 1 more
  • Underlying market price follows a reflected Brownian motion within the bookmaker’s bid‑ask spread. model
    Source sentence
    we assume that the underlying market price follows a Brownian motion, starting from the initial mid‑price of the external market. We constrain the price process to remain within Bookmaker’s bid‑ask spread through a reflection principle.

Data

  • 2023 Super Bowl sports betting data market-prices unknown
    Source sentence
    First, we provide an empirical study of the behavior of an AMM when applied to data on sports betting for the 2023 Super Bowl.

Costs

Modeled Costs are part of the reported headline results.

Fees are modeled as a fraction γ of the cost on the random portion of the bet: Cγ(x;Π) = (1+γ)C(x;Π) − γ ess inf x.

Source sentence
the cost of purchasing x ∈L∞ in the pool Π ∈L∞* is given by Cγ(x; Π) := (1 + γ)C(x −ess inf x1; Π) + ess inf x = (1 + γ)C(x; Π) −γ ess inf x.

Finds 2

  • Optimal fee levels around γ≈1% yield expected profits of 1%–6% over a two‑week period, outperforming the bookmaker’s bid‑ask spread. performance
    Source sentence
    optimal fee levels (roughly around γ ≈1%) – which result in significant expected profits of between 1% and 6% return in a 2 week period – come at a much lower bid‑ask spread than that quoted by Bookmaker.
  • Providing additional liquidity reduces the cost of purchasing bets (cost is non‑increasing in liquidity provision). theoretical
    Source sentence
    The cost of purchasing this bet is nonincreasing in the liquidity provision α, i.e., α ∈(−1, ∞)

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 14 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Cited by 1 paper in the archive (1 by independent authors)

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.