Paper: arXiv 2401.08302

Authors: Andrew W. Macpherson

Abstract

We study a new “laminated” queueing model for orders on batched trading venues such as decentralised exchanges. The model aims to capture and generalise transaction queueing infrastructure that has arisen to organise MEV activity on public blockchains such as Ethereum, providing convenient channels for sophisticated agents to extract value by acting on end-user order flow by performing arbitrage and related HFT activities. In our model, market orders are interspersed with orders created by arbitrageurs that under idealised conditions reset the marginal price to a global equilibrium between each trade, improving predictability of execution for liquidity traders. If an arbitrageur has a chance to land multiple opportunities in a row, he may attempt to manipulate the execution price of the intervening market order by a probabilistic blind sandwiching strategy. To study how bad this manipulation can get, we introduce and bound a price manipulation coefficient that measures the deviation from global equilibrium of local pricing quoted by a rational arbitrageur. We exhibit cases in which this coefficient is well approximated by a “zeta value’ with interpretable and empirically measurable parameters.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 7.5/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper presents a formal queueing model with probabilistic analysis and a derived ‘zeta value’ for price manipulation, indicating high mathematical complexity. However, it lacks backtesting, datasets, or code, focusing on theoretical bounds and conceptual models rather than implementation-heavy empirical validation.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal<br>Do backrun auctions protect traders?<br>Assess price manipulation in laminated queues"] --> B["Key Methodology<br>Introduce Laminated Queueing Model<br>Arbitrageurs reset price to equilibrium<br>Market orders interspersed"]
  B --> C["Data/Inputs<br>Batched trading venues<br>Decentralized exchanges<br>MEV activity & order flow data"]
  C --> D["Computational Processes<br>Define Blind Sandwiching Strategy<br>Bound Price Manipulation Coefficient<br>Approximate with Zeta Value"]
  D --> E["Key Findings/Outcomes<br>Manipulation bounded by 'zeta value'<br>Arbitrageurs can manipulate local prices<br>Improves liquidity trader predictability"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper proposes a laminated queueing model for batched trading venues and introduces a price manipulation coefficient to bound deviations from global equilibrium, with an exponential approximation for its value.

Source sentence
We study a new "laminated" queueing model for orders on batched trading venues such as decentralised exchanges. To study how bad this manipulation can get, we introduce and bound a price manipulation coefficient that measures the deviation from global equilibrium of local pricing quoted by a rational arbitrageur.

Assumes 6

  • All markets are frictionless, i.e., without transaction fees. market
    Source sentence
    I(ri) := price impact of trade sell(ri). • All markets are frictionless, that is, without transaction fees. • Arbitrageurs can trade instantly on a reference market O with zero price impact. • The target venue M as a whole is a price taker from O. That is, M is sufficiently small compared to O that order flow on M does not influence the reference price pO ←O. • Batches are committed instantaneously from the perspective
  • Arbitrageurs can trade instantly on a reference market with zero price impact. model
    Source sentence
    I(ri) := price impact of trade sell(ri). • All markets are frictionless, that is, without transaction fees. • Arbitrageurs can trade instantly on a reference market O with zero price impact. • The target venue M as a whole is a price taker from O. That is, M is sufficiently small compared to O that order flow on M does not influence the reference price pO ←O. • Batches are committed instantaneously from the perspective
  • The target venue is a price taker from the reference market, so its order flow does not influence the reference price. model
    Source sentence
    I(ri) := price impact of trade sell(ri). • All markets are frictionless, that is, without transaction fees. • Arbitrageurs can trade instantly on a reference market O with zero price impact. • The target venue M as a whole is a price taker from O. That is, M is sufficiently small compared to O that order flow on M does not influence the reference price pO ←O. • Batches are committed instantaneously from the perspective
  • Batches are committed instantaneously from the perspective of the reference market, keeping the global equilibrium price constant during a batch. execution
    Source sentence
    so the global equilbrium price pO during the execution of a single batch is constant.
Show 2 more
  • Arbitrageurs are myopic, treating each arbitrage opportunity in isolation with a one‑trade time horizon. model
    Source sentence
    Passthrough arbitrage Suppose that each arbitrageur is myopic, so that they treat each ar-bitrage opportunity in complete isolation — that is, they have a strategy time horizon of just one trade. This models an idealised situation in which arbitrage is so competitive that each agent treats as negligible their chances of being able to land multiple spots.
  • Sizes are normalised so that equilibrium liquidity depth is unity (xO = 1). other
    Source sentence
    We also assume in this section that sizes are normalised so that equilibrium liquidity depth is unity xO = 1.

Data

No dataset named in the text.

Costs

Unclear - sources disagree The platform classifier and the paper-text extraction give different answers, so no value is asserted.

Platform classifier: Not applicable

Paper text extraction: Not modeled

Source sentence (the authors' words)
I(ri) := price impact of trade sell(ri). • All markets are frictionless, that is, without transaction fees. • Arbitrageurs can trade instantly on a reference market O with zero price impact. • The target venue M as a whole is a price taker from O. That is, M is sufficiently small compared to O that order flow on M does not influence the reference price pO ←O. • Batches are committed instantaneously from the perspective

Finds 4

  • When arbitrageurs are myopic, the dominant strategy is passthrough pricing, i.e., setting prices to the reference price pO, which yields global price equilibrium for each liquidity order. theoretical
    Source sentence
    1.4 Corollary (Myopic arbitrageurs provide passthrough pricing, 2.18). Then the dominant strategy for each arbitrageur is to set prices to pO.
  • The price manipulation coefficient can be bounded and is well approximated by a zeta‑type value with empirically measurable parameters. theoretical
    Source sentence
    To study how bad this manipulation can get, we introduce and bound a price manipulation coefficient that measures the deviation from global equilibrium of local pricing quoted by a rational arbitrageur. We exhibit cases in which this coefficient is well approximated by a "zeta value' with interpretable and empirically measurable parameters.
  • An exponential approximation of price impact yields a very small error in practice and leads to a closed‑form expression for the manipulation factor. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Instead, we proceed under an exponential approximation that turns out to have very small error in practice. Then setting RHS of equation (15) splits the product E( ¯φ(s+ r)) = ¯φ(s)·E( ¯φ(xO + r)) of the manipulation factor by the expected price impact factor at equilibrium of the order flow r.
  • Sufficient privacy in order flow reduces the effectiveness of targeted sandwiching strategies. theoretical
    Source sentence
    As we confirm in §3.1, sufficient privacy does indeed hobble some of the most pow-erful targeted value extraction strategies.

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 10 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Code

https://github.com/flashbots/mev-research — the authors' own repository

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.