Paper: arXiv 2307.03935
Authors: Colin Chan
Abstract
Liquidity providers are currently incentivised to provide liquidity through the LP Incentives Programme on dYdX. Based on the various parameters - makerVolume, depths and spreads, they are rewarded accordingly based on their activities. Given the maturity of the BTC and ETH markets, alongside other altcoins which enjoy a consistent amount of liquidity, this paper aims to update the formula to encourage more active and efficient liquidity, improving the overall trading experience. In this research, I begin by providing a basic understanding of spread management, before introducing the methodology with the various metrics and conditions. This includes gathering orderbooks on a minute interval and reconstructing the depths based on historical trades to establish an upper bound. I end off by providing recommendations to update the maxSpread parameter and alternative mechanisms/solutions to improve the existing market structures.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 4.5/10
- Empirical Rigor: 7.0/10
- Quadrant: Street Traders — empirical and applied, lower math complexity
Why this score: The paper uses basic statistical metrics and empirical analysis of order book data to propose changes to a live incentive program, with methodology focused on data collection and implementation rather than advanced mathematical theory.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD A["Research Goal: Update LP Incentive Formula<br>to improve liquidity efficiency"] --> B["Data Collection & Preparation"] B --> C["Metric Calculation &<br>Spread Analysis"] C --> D["Reconstructing Depths &<br>Establishing Upper Bounds"] D --> E["Computational Analysis<br>of Market Conditions"] E --> F["Key Findings & Outcomes"] B --> B1["Input: Minute-interval<br>Orderbook Data"] B --> B2["Input: Historical<br>Trade Data"] C --> C1["Metrics:<br>Maker Volume, Depth, Spread"] E --> E1["Parameter Optimization<br>for BTC/ETH Markets"] E --> E2["Altcoin Liquidity<br>Assessment"] F --> F1["Recommendation:<br>Update maxSpread Parameter"] F --> F2["Proposal:<br>Alternative Incentive Mechanisms"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper proposes updating the maxSpread parameter and related LP reward formula to encourage more active and efficient liquidity, including a reward multiplier for volatile periods and a DMM structure for long‑tail markets.
Source sentence
Given the maturity of the BTC and ETH markets, alongside other altcoins which enjoy a consistent amount of liquidity, this paper aims to update the formula to encourage more active and efficient liquidity, improving the overall trading experience. I end off by providing recommendations to update the maxSpread parameter and alternative mechanisms/solutions to improve the existing market structures.
Assumes 6
- Minute‑by‑minute order‑book data from the dYdX API accurately reflects the true market depth. data
Source sentence
4 Methodology 4.1 Data Collection 4.1.1 Orderbook Data Minute by minute orderbook data was collected from the dYdX API for 2 weeks from May 11 (CPI Release) to May 24.
- Trade data retrieved from the dYdX API can be used to reconstruct order‑book depths for analysis. data
Source sentence
ask) * msx = midSpread — where bidSpread = askSpread in a symmetric book * liquiditypre, liquiditypost — depicts the amount of liquidity present before and after the market impact events 4.1.2 Trade Data All trades executed between April 30 and May 24 were retrieved as well from the dYdX API.
- The selected two‑week period (May 11–May 24) is representative of market conditions for evaluating LP incentives. market
Source sentence
This period was deliberately chosen given the harsh regulatory and economic climate (e.g. significant pullback of liquidity on CEXs).
- Liquidity provision risk can be captured by the maxSpread parameter and uptime score raised to the power of 5. model
Source sentence
This influences their uptime scores which is raised to the power of 5.
Show 2 more
- Rebates set at a maximum of 0.0100% will keep the exchange profitable while incentivising LPs. model
Source sentence
Assuming all LPs who provided in these markets receive the maximum 0.0100% rebate, this is equivalent to $627,676.77 (current LP allocation for altcoins = $1,841,096.0 at $2 each). Therefore, an upper bound of rebates is set at this rate to ensure the exchange remains profitable.
- LPs will compete around the best bid‑offer (BBO) when incentives are aligned. other
Source sentence
Ultimately, a LP seeks to position themselves around the tightest spreads possible, thereby influencing other 7 LPs to compete around the BBO spreads to have higher execution rate.
Data
- Historical order‑book depth snapshots for high‑impact events order-book public
Source sentence
Specific events were 8 also identified in which the orders removed a significant amount of liquidity from the market: Table 4: High Market Impact Events Date Event PPI Release Start : 1683804600, End: 1683811800 US initial Jobless Claims Start : 1684409400, End: 1684416600 FOMC Meeting Minutes Release Start : 1684947600,
Costs
Not applicable
Finds 5
- The LP programme currently emits $2,301,370 (1,150,685 DYDX tokens at $2 each) per epoch. performance
Source sentence
In comparison, the LP programme emits $2,301,370 (1,150,685 DYDX tokens at $2 each) per epoch.
- Approximately 80% of maker volume is driven by major assets, making pure rebate schemes for altcoins ineffective. statistical
Source sentence
Figure 2: Epoch 22 Maker Volume Distribution In this case, it is important to recognise that majority of the volume is driven by the ma-jors2(˜80%). As such, a pure rebate scheme for the altcoin markets will likely prove ineffective since these rebates will be significantly lower than the present LP incentives.
- Altcoin fee revenue is about $1.13 M, while allocated LP rewards for altcoins total $1.84 M, indicating a reward shortfall. performance
Source sentence
28 Based on the dYdX API, the fees generated from each market can be seen below (Statistics can be found in Appendix 10.8)4: Table 18: Fees Generated (30 Days) All markets on dYdX Altcoin Markets on dYdX Altcoin markets have brought in a fee revenue of $1.13M over the 30 days. In comparison, the 80% of LP rewards allocated, (at price of $2), stands at $1.84M.
- BBO spreads for certain altcoin markets (e.g., ZRX‑USD, UMA‑USD) are consistently ≥40 bps, suggesting insufficient LP incentives. statistical
Source sentence
It can be seen that the BBO spreads for certain markets such as ZRX-USD and UMA-USD have been consistently ≥40bps and likely suggests that LPs are not incentivised to provide liquidity in these markets.
- Recovery times for depth‑spread at 20 bps exceed 10 minutes for assets like SUSHI, MKR, ICP, whereas at 30 bps recovery is under 5 minutes. performance
Source sentence
For instance, SUSHI, MKR and ICP takes over 10 minutes to recover at 20bps and below but at 30bps, these assets enjoy a less than 5 minute recovery.
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings. Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.