Paper: arXiv 2410.18432

Authors: Bingzheng Chen, Zongxia Liang, Shunzhi Pang

Abstract

This paper analyzes the equilibrium of insurance market in a dynamic setting, focusing on the interaction between insurers’ underwriting and investment strategies. Three possible equilibrium outcomes are identified: a positive insurance market, a zero insurance market, and market failure. Our findings reveal why insurers may rationally accept underwriting losses by setting a negative safety loading while relying on investment profits, particularly when there is a negative correlation between insurance gains and financial returns. Additionally, we explore the impact of regulatory frictions, showing that while imposing a cost on investment can enhance social welfare under certain conditions, it may not always be necessary.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 8.0/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper employs advanced stochastic control and dynamic equilibrium modeling with heavy mathematical derivations, but lacks any mention of backtesting, datasets, or statistical implementation details.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal: Analyze dynamic insurance market equilibrium"]
  B["Methodology: Dynamic Programming & Equilibrium Analysis"]
  C["Data/Inputs: Insurance gains & financial returns correlation"]
  D["Computation: Solving for underwriting & investment strategies"]
  E["Outcome 1: Positive Insurance Market (Profitable)"]
  F["Outcome 2: Zero Insurance Market (Break-even)"]
  G["Outcome 3: Market Failure"]
  
  A --> B
  B --> C
  C --> D
  D --> E
  D --> F
  D --> G

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper develops a dynamic equilibrium model of the insurance market that jointly determines insurers' underwriting and investment strategies, allowing for negative safety loadings when insurance and financial returns are negatively correlated.

Source sentence
This paper analyzes the equilibrium of insurance market in a dynamic setting, focusing on the interaction between insurers' underwriting and investment strategies. While these studies all conclude that insurers should realize positive expected profits in policies 4 due to a positive safety loading in equilibrium, we propose that the equilibrium loading can naturally become negative under certain parameter settings

Assumes 6

  • The financial market is assumed to be frictionless, with no transaction costs, taxes, or trading constraints, and assets are infinitely divisible. model
    Source sentence
    In this setup, the financial market is assumed to be frictionless, implying that there are no transaction costs, taxes, or other trading constraints, and that assets are infinitely divisible.
  • The correlation coefficient between insurance and financial market risks is restricted to exclude perfect correlation (ρ ≠ ±1). model
    Source sentence
    Here we exclude the possibility of ρ = ±1 to simplify our analysis.
  • Regulatory frictions are introduced as a quadratic cost of investment capital. model
    Source sentence
    To capture this, we introduce a quadratic form of regulatory-induced investment costs into the insurer’s capital flow process and similarly solve for the equilibrium.
  • Insurers have a CARA (or more generally risk‑averse) utility function with U′>0 and U′′<0. model
    Source sentence
    2.3 Optimization Objective Assume that the representative insurer has a utility function U(m), which satisfies U′(m) > 0 and U′′(m) < 0, reflecting risk aversion.
Show 2 more
  • Insurers can freely adjust their portfolio holdings based on market conditions. market
    Source sentence
    This assumption simplifies the analysis and allows insurers to freely adjust their portfolios based on market conditions.
  • Data limitations prevent a detailed empirical investigation; the paper relies on cited statistics and a representative insurer’s data rather than rigorous empirical validation. data
    Source sentence
    Empirically, due to data limitations, we do not provide a detailed investigation into the relationship between the profitability of insurers’ business and investment activities.

Data

  • China Insurance Security Fund information · China Insurance Security Fund (state‑owned enterprise) other public
    Source sentence
    4The China Insurance Security Fund is a state-owned enterprise responsible for managing the insurance security fund and monitoring risk in the insurance industry. This conclusion is derived from its report China Insurance Industry Risk Assessment Report 2022.
  • Annual information disclosure reports of Chinese insurers · Company annual reports (publicly available) other public
    Source sentence
    5The data is sourced from the company’s annual information disclosure reports, which are publicly available and can be downloaded from https://www.cjbx.com.cn/ndxxplbg/index.jhtml.
  • Representative insurer investment and underwriting data (Figure 1.1) other public
    Source sentence
    2 Figure 1.1: Investment Gains and Underwriting Losses of a Representative Insurer over 90% reported positive investment returns in 2023.6 Specifically, the insurer in Figure 1.1 achieved investment gains over the past five years, although the gains were insufficient to fully offset underwriting losses.

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result; the cost the extractor found is a model parameter.

The paper-text extraction found a cost parameter inside a model (Regulatory investment cost is modeled as a quadratic function of investment capital, reducing net cash flow.); the classifier found no reported trading result, so costs are not applicable.

Finds 5

  • Three equilibrium outcomes are possible: a positive insurance market, a zero insurance market, or market failure. theoretical
    Source sentence
    n the parameter conditions (mainly the price bounds and correlation coefficient), three outcomes are possible: (1) a positive insurance market (with positive equilibrium underwriting), (2) a zero insurance market (with zero equilibrium underwriting), and (3) market failure (where no equilibrium exists).
  • When insurance and financial returns are negatively correlated, the equilibrium safety loading can become negative, allowing insurers to accept underwriting losses and rely on investment profits. theoretical
    Source sentence
    insurers may be incentivized to offer negative loading premiums to attract policyholders, as the expected returns from investments outweigh the underwriting losses. By leveraging premiums as investment capital, insurers can maintain profitability despite incurring underwriting deficits.8 In our setting, introducing a correlation between risks in insurance and financial markets is both natural and necessary, as
  • Regulatory costs do not affect underwriting, equilibrium or welfare in an uncorrelated market, but when markets are correlated they influence outcomes and the welfare‑maximizing cost is generally non‑zero. theoretical
    Source sentence
    In a positive insurance market, regulatory costs do not affect underwriting strategy, market equilibrium, or social welfare when the two markets are uncorrelated. However, when the two markets are correlated, regulatory costs would affect these outcomes, and the optimal cost that maximizes social welfare can be derived, which is not necessarily zero.
  • The investment Sharpe ratio lowers insurance prices and raises underwriting and welfare when markets are negatively correlated, but reverses these effects under positive correlation. theoretical
    Source sentence
    When the two markets are correlated, comparative static analysis shows that the investment Sharpe ratio significantly affects market equilibrium. Specifically, the insurance price decreases (increases) as the Sharpe ratio rises when the two market risks are negatively (positively) correlated.
  • Numerical simulations show that with negative correlation the equilibrium insurance price can become negative over time, investment increases convexly, and welfare rises concavely; higher Sharpe ratios amplify these effects. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Figure 5.1 shows that as time progresses, the equilibrium insurance price decreases and eventually becomes negative, consistent with Proposition 5. The investment amount increases convexly, while the underwriting amount and social welfare increase concavely.

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings. Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Cited by 3 papers in the archive

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.

Cited References (37)

  1. A Study on the Risk-Adjusted Insurance Market Equilibrium and Regulation Coordination (2013)
  2. The dynamics of insurance prices (2016)
  3. Understanding the ownership structure of corporate bonds (2023)
  4. Generalized robustness and dynamic pessimism (2020)
  5. Super contact and related optimality conditions (1991)
  6. Insurance pricing in an equilibrium model (2023)
  7. Optimal investment for insurer with jump-diffusion risk process (2005)
  8. Insurers’ Investments and Insurance Prices (2024)
and 29 more
  1. Risk Management and Insurance (2004)
  2. The dynamics of competitive insurance markets (1994)
  3. The determination of fair profits for the property-liability insurance firm (1982)
  4. Robust investment for insurers with correlation ambiguity (2024)
  5. Financial Economics of Insurance (2023)
  6. The cost of financial frictions for life insurers (2015)
  7. The fragility of market risk insurance (2022)
  8. Shadow insurance (2016)
  9. Regulatory limits to risk management (2023)
  10. How do financial constraints affect product pricing? E vidence from weather and life insurance premiums (2022)
  11. Conflicting interests and the effect of fiduciary duty: E vidence from variable annuities (2022)
  12. Insurers as asset managers and systemic risk (2022)
  13. Life insurance convexity (2023)
  14. Aggregate lapsation risk (2024)
  15. A demand system approach to asset pricing (2019)
  16. Investor-driven corporate finance: Evidence from insurance markets (2021)
  17. Optimal investment for an insurer to minimize its probability of ruin (2004)
  18. Robust optimal reinsurance and investment strategies for an AAI with multiple risks (2019)
  19. Robust optimal control for an insurer with reinsurance and investment under H eston’s stochastic volatility model (2013)
  20. Optimal time-consistent investment and reinsurance policies for mean-variance insurers (2011)
  21. Robust equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy for a mean–variance insurer in a model with jumps (2016)
  22. Dynamic pricing of general insurance in a competitive market (2007)
  23. Pricing general insurance using optimal control theory (2005)
  24. Underwriting strategy in a competitive insurance environment (1986)
  25. Equilibrium pricing of general insurance policies (2012)
  26. Insurance with multiple insurers: A game-theoretic approach (2018)
  27. A dynamic pricing game for general insurance market (2021)
  28. The Supply of Insurance (2021)
  29. Alpha-maxmin mean-variance reinsurance-investment strategy under negative risk dependence between two markets (2025)

0 of 37 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.