Paper: arXiv 2503.16890
Authors: Cuong Le Van, Ngoc-Sang Pham
Abstract
We study the existence of equilibrium when agents’ preferences may not beconvex. For some specific utility functions, we provide a necessary and sufficientcondition under which there exists an equilibrium. The standard approach cannot be directly applied to our examples because the demand correspondence of some agents is neither single-valued nor convex-valued.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 9.0/10
- Empirical Rigor: 1.0/10
- Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing
Why this score: The paper presents a theoretical general equilibrium model with non-convex preferences, featuring dense mathematical derivations, lemmas, and proofs, but includes no data, backtests, or implementation details for trading strategies.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD A["Research Goal<br>Existence of equilibrium with<br>non-convex preferences"] --> B["Key Methodology<br>Modified General Equilibrium Approach"] B --> C["Computational Process<br>Demand Correspondence Analysis"] C --> D["Analysis: Non-single-valued &<br>Non-convex-valued demand"] D --> E["Key Finding<br>Necessary & Sufficient Condition<br>for Equilibrium Existence"] E --> F["Outcome<br>Case-Specific Equilibrium Established"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper studies the existence of equilibrium when agents have non‑convex preferences and provides a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium existence for specific utility functions.
Source sentence
We study the existence of equilibrium when agents' preferences may not beconvex. For some specific utility functions, we provide a necessary and sufficientcondition under which there exists an equilibrium.
Assumes 2
- Agent A’s demand for good 1 is singleton and continuous in the relative price and endowments. model
Source sentence
This holds if the utility function of agent A is strictly concave. Assumption 2. The demand of agent A is singleton and continuous in the relative price p and endowments eA 1 , eA 2 .
- Agent B’s utility is UB(c1,c2)=c2^{1/2}+D ln(c2) with D>0, making preferences neither quasiconcave nor quasiconvex. model
Source sentence
(4) 3.1 A tractable case For the sake of tractability, we assume that agent B has utility function U B(c1, c2) = c2 1 2 + D ln(c2), where D > 0.
Data
No dataset named in the text.
Costs
Not applicable
Finds 5
- A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a general equilibrium is derived for the considered utility specifications. theoretical
Source sentence
For some specific utility functions, we provide a necessary and sufficientcondition under which there exists an equilibrium. Proposition 1 ((non)existence of equilibrium).
- Even when agent B’s endowment of good 2 is very high, equilibrium may not exist. negative
Source sentence
More interestingly, we show there does not exist an equilibrium even when the good 2 endowment of the agent B (who is neither risk lover nor risk averter) is very high.
- If agent B strongly prefers the risk‑averse good, a unique equilibrium exists and B does not consume the risk‑loving good. theoretical
Source sentence
Given a distribution of endowments, when the agent B strongly wants to consume the risk averse good, then there exists a unique equi-librium. Moreover, in this equilibrium, agent B does not consume the risk loving good.
- When agent B strongly prefers the risk‑loving good, a unique interior equilibrium exists. theoretical
Source sentence
By contrast, if agent B strongly wants the risk loving good, then there exists a unique equilibrium, and this equilibrium is interior.
- Despite uniqueness of equilibrium, the demand correspondence of agent B can be multiple‑valued. theoretical
Source sentence
Although we have the uniqueness of equilibrium, the demand of agent B may be multiple-valued.
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 19 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.