Paper: arXiv 2305.04865

Authors: Zlata Tabachová, Christian Diem, András Borsos, Csaba Burger, Stefan Thurner

Abstract

Realistic credit risk assessment, the estimation of losses from counterparty’s failure, is central for the financial stability. Credit risk models focus on the financial conditions of borrowers and only marginally consider other risks from the real economy, supply chains in particular. Recent pandemics, geopolitical instabilities, and natural disasters demonstrated that supply chain shocks do contribute to large financial losses. Based on a unique nation-wide micro-dataset, containing practically all supply chain relations of all Hungarian firms, together with their bank loans, we estimate how firm-failures affect the supply chain network, leading to potentially additional firm defaults and additional financial losses. Within a multi-layer network framework we define a financial systemic risk index (FSRI) for every firm, quantifying these expected financial losses caused by its own- and all the secondary defaulting loans caused by supply chain network (SCN) shock propagation. We find a small fraction of firms carrying substantial financial systemic risk, affecting up to 16% of the banking system’s overall equity. These losses are predominantly caused by SCN contagion. For every bank we calculate the expected loss (EL), value at risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES), with and without accounting for SCN contagion. We find that SCN contagion amplifies the EL, VaR, and ES by a factor of 4.3, 4.5, and 3.2, respectively. These findings indicate that for a more complete picture of financial stability and realistic credit risk assessment, SCN contagion needs to be considered. This newly quantified contagion channel is of potential relevance for regulators’ future systemic risk assessments.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 6.5/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 8.0/10
  • Quadrant: Holy Grail — high math complexity, high empirical rigor

Why this score: The paper employs advanced multi-layer network theory and complex systems modeling (high math), while being heavily data-driven using a unique nationwide micro-dataset with concrete financial metrics like VaR and ES, and practical implications for regulatory stress testing.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal: Impact of SCN Contagion<br>on Financial Stability"] --> B["Data Inputs<br>Nation-wide micro-dataset"]
  B --> C["Methodology: Multi-layer Network Model"]
  C --> D["Computations: Calculate FSRI<br>for each firm"]
  D --> E["Key Finding 1:<br>Small fraction of firms carry<br>substantial systemic risk<br>affecting up to 16% of bank equity"]
  C --> F["Computations: EL, VaR, ES<br>with & without SCN contagion"]
  F --> G["Key Finding 2:<br>SCN contagion amplifies<br>EL: 4.3x, VaR: 4.5x, ES: 3.2x"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper presents a data‑driven computational framework that estimates how an initial firm failure spreads through the supply‑chain network and generates additional firm defaults and bank loan write‑offs.

Source sentence
Here we present a data-driven computational framework for estimating how the initial failure of firms spreads along the supply chain network (SCN) within a country, leading to potentially additional firm defaults.

Assumes 6

  • Revenue and material costs are reduced proportionally to the production loss (hi(T)). model
    Source sentence
    We assume that the non-operational profit stays the same, and that the revenue is reduced to hi(T)ri. We further assume that firms can reduce their material costs proportionally to the production level, i.e. material costs after the cascade are hi(T)ci.
  • Firms have no inventories of inputs or finished goods. model
    Source sentence
    Note, that for simplicity we neglect potential inventories of inputs and finished goods.
  • Firms can reduce material costs exactly in line with reduced production, ignoring long‑term supply contracts. model
    Source sentence
    This assumes that firms only have to buy exactly the amount they need for production and neglects the fact that supply contracts might be long-term. This assumption might be overly optimistic.
  • A firm becomes insolvent if its equity after profit loss falls below zero. model
    Source sentence
    According to The Insolvency Code (Act, 1991) (Section 27 (2f)) firm i becomes insolvent if ˜zi < 0.
Show 2 more
  • If the liquidity measure (short‑term assets minus short‑term liabilities) after profit loss is negative, the firm defaults on its loan and banks write off the loan. model
    Source sentence
    After the shock, firm i has a liquidity of ai −si −∆pi and if it is negative we assume that it declares bankruptcy, defaults on its loan and banks write offall loans extended to i.
  • Default probabilities of firms are drawn independently, neglecting systematic or correlated events. statistical
    Source sentence
    The PDs are estimated by the Central Bank of Hungary, for details see Appendix B. Note that due to data limitations we draw the defaults of firms independently, i.e. we neglect systematic or correlated events like a large crises affecting specific industry sectors.

Data

  • VAT‑based supplier‑buyer relationships (2019) · Central Bank of Hungary alternative commercial
    2019 · practically all Hungarian firms
    Source sentence
    The first dataset is used to reconstruct the supply-chain network, W. It is based on the 2019 value added tax (VAT) reports, reflecting any purchase between two firms exceeding 100,000 HUF tax content (approx-imately 250 Euros) made in Hungary. The resulting network consists of 243, 339 anonymized Hungarian companies.
  • Firm financial statements (balance sheets and income statements) · Central Bank of Hungary fundamentals commercial
    firms in the supply‑chain network
    Source sentence
    The second dataset consists of the financial statements of every firm in the supply chain network. The variables obtained from the balance sheets and income statements, see Table 1, are used to calculate the equity and liquidity buffers of firms, as well as their profits.
  • Credit registry (firm‑bank loan exposures) · Central Bank of Hungary fundamentals commercial
    40,043 firms linked to 269 banks
    Source sentence
    The third dataset, the credit registry, is needed to determine the firm-bank loans, B. It consists of the overall exposures of 40, 043 firms in the supply chain network, W, to 269 banks in Hungary. The remaining 203, 296 companies do not have reported bank loans in Hungary.
  • CET1 equity of banks · Central Bank of Hungary fundamentals commercial
    27 banks after filtering
    Source sentence
    CET1 equity of banks. We remove 247 small-scale banks for which we do not have Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) values (contained in the fourth data set) available, arriving at 27 banks that cover 84% of the loan volume of the original dataset with 269 banks.

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result.

Finds 5

  • A small fraction of firms carry substantial financial systemic risk, potentially affecting up to 16% of the banking system's overall equity. statistical
    Source sentence
    We find a small fraction of firms carrying substantial financial systemic risk, affecting up to 16% of the banking system's overall equity.
  • Supply‑chain network contagion amplifies expected loss, value‑at‑risk and expected shortfall by factors of 4.3, 4.5 and 3.2 respectively. statistical
    Source sentence
    We find that SCN contagion amplifies the EL, VaR, and ES by a factor of 4.3, 4.5, and 3.2, respectively. The average risk amplification factors are ρEL = 4.3, ρVaR = 4.5, and ρES = 3.2.
  • The riskiest firm has an FSRI of slightly above 15%, implying loan write‑offs equal to about 16% of total CET1 capital of the 27 banks. statistical
    Source sentence
    The riskiest firm has an FSRI value of slightly above 15%, meaning that its failure and the ensuing supply chain disruption cascade would lead to loan write offs equivalent to approximately 16% of the overall CET1 capital of the 27 Hungarian banks in the sample (see Fig.5(a) for how banks are affected individually).
  • Taking into account exposure to the supply‑chain network massively amplifies risk measures for all banks. statistical
    Source sentence
    Taking into account the exposure to the SCN massively amplifies risks for all banks.
  • Direct loss distribution is concentrated at low values (max ~2.5% equity loss), whereas contagion‑adjusted losses are substantially larger. statistical
    Source sentence
    One clearly sees that the two distributions differ substantially. The direct loss distribution is concentrated at low values and has only scenarios where a maximum of around 2.5% is reached.

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 21 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Cited by 2 papers in the archive (2 by independent authors)

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.