Paper: arXiv 2609.39264
Authors: Massimiliano Sala, Daniela Visetti
Abstract
Many of the thousands of existing cryptocurrencies suffer from declining adoption, low liquidity and weak security, and merging two of them into a single ecosystem is a natural alternative to abandonment. No rigorous framework exists, however, for determining a fair exchange rate in such a merger. Unlike that of a corporation, the value of a cryptocurrency is driven by network effects, so the exchange rate itself influences the value of the merged asset. We extend the exchange-ratio framework of Mainini, Moretto and Visetti [7] by making the merged value endogenous: the exchange rate determines community migration, migration determines (up to user overlap) the post-merger network state, and an axiomatised valuation function assigns a value to that state. The resulting synergy has no predetermined sign, and the bounds of the bargaining region become self-referential in the exchange rate. We prove that no exchange rate at which the merger destroys value preserves wealth, and that the pre-merger price ratio preserves wealth exactly when the merger does not destroy value at that rate. In that case, under explicit threshold conditions, the price ratio satisfies all five of our fairness conditions – wealth, adoption, security, governance and liquidity preservation – and, under strict versions of these conditions, the admissible set contains a nondegenerate interval around it, the wealth-admissible set one of explicit width. The network-value laws proposed in the literature, from the linear law to Metcalfe’s and its generalised power-law forms, share a convexity property that yields the Lipschitz control behind these estimates. Liquidity emerges as the only non-wealth condition that can disconnect the admissible set.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 8.5/10
- Empirical Rigor: 3.0/10
- Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing
Why this score: This paper presents a highly novel and mathematically sophisticated framework for cryptocurrency mergers, extending existing corporate finance models. While strong in theory and formal proofs, it lacks empirical validation or backtesting, which is acknowledged as future work. The clarity is good for a theoretical paper, but the lack of empirical application limits its immediate practical rigor.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
A["Research Goal: Fair Exchange Rate for Crypto Mergers?"] --> B{"Methodology: Extended Mainini et al. Framework"};
B --> C["Inputs: Cryptocurrencies, Network States, Valuation Axioms, User Overlap"];
C --> D{"Computational Process: Endogenous Merged Value & Network Effects"};
D --> E["Key Findings: Wealth Preservation, Fairness Conditions, Admissible Set"];
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper extends the Mainini et al. exchange‑ratio framework by making the merged cryptocurrency’s value endogenous: the exchange ratio determines migration, which determines the post‑merger state and thus the merged value µM(r).
Source sentence
We extend the exchange-ratio framework of Mainini, Moretto and Visetti [7] by making the merged value endogenous: the exchange rate determines community migration, migration determines (up to user overlap) the post-merger network state, and an axiomatised valuation function assigns a value to that state. In the notation recalled below, the merged entity’s equity value µM is treated by [7] as an exogenous quantity
Assumes 5
- Migration functions τA and τB are continuous, with τA non‑increasing, τB non‑decreasing, and they saturate at the extremes (τA→1 as r→0, τA→0 as r→∞, τB→0 as r→0, τB→1 as r→∞). model
Source sentence
Assumption 5.2 (Migration monotonicity and boundary behaviour). The migration functions τA, τB are continuous, with τA non-increasing and τB non-decreasing.
- The price‑ratio exchange rate r* = pB/pA is also a migration‑balancing exchange rate (r* ∈ Z) with positive common retention rate τ0. model
Source sentence
Exchange Rate Determination for Cryptocurrency Mergers 7 Assumption 5.3 (Alignment of price and migration neutrality). The exchange ratio r∗= pB pA is also a migration-balancing exchange ratio, i.e. r∗∈Z. We denote the common retention rate by τ 0 := τA(r∗) = τB(r∗) and we assume τ 0 > 0.
- The same migration fraction τi(r) governs both users and liquidity contributed by community i, and security and governance aggregate as migrated‑user‑weighted means. model
Source sentence
Assumption 5.4 embodies two modelling choices. First, the same migration fraction τi(r) governs the users and liquidity contributed by community i.
- The valuation function has the structured form F(U,L,S,G)=f(U)·ψ(L,S,G) with f in the network‑convex class C and ψ continuous, non‑decreasing, and zero only if any of L,S,G is zero. model
Source sentence
Assumption 8.1 (Structured valuation). We assume that F(U, L, S, G) = f(U) ψ(L, S, G) , where: (i) f belongs to the network-convex class C defined in Definition 8.1; (ii) ψ : R≥0 × [0, 1]2 →[0, 1] is continuous, nondecreasing in each argument, and ψ(L, S, G) = 0 if and only if L = 0, S = 0 or G = 0.
Show 1 more
- The blockchain value depends only on four state parameters (U, L, S, G) as defined in the state set D. model
Source sentence
As a first approximation, in this paper we assume that the blockchain value depends only on four parameters, that live in the following state set D, with R+ denoting the nonnegative real numbers, D := R+ × R+ × [0, 1] × [0, 1], where, for a state σ = (U, L, S, G) ∈D, U is the number of active users, L is a measure of network liquidity, S ∈[0, 1] is a normalised security or validator-participation score, and G ∈[0,
Data
No dataset named in the text.
Costs
Not applicable
Finds 5
- No exchange rate at which the merger destroys value is wealth‑admissible; the pre‑merger price ratio preserves wealth exactly when the merger does not destroy value at that rate. theoretical
Source sentence
We prove that no exchange rate at which the merger destroys value preserves wealth, and that the pre-merger price ratio preserves wealth exactly when the merger does not destroy value at that rate.
- When the price‑ratio r* satisfies explicit threshold conditions, it meets all five fairness conditions (wealth, adoption, security, governance, liquidity) and, under strict versions, the admissible set contains a non‑degenerate interval around r*. theoretical
Source sentence
In that case, under explicit threshold conditions, the price ratio satisfies all five of our fairness conditions -- wealth, adoption, security, governance and liquidity preservation -- and, under strict versions of these conditions, the admissible set contains a nondegenerate interval around it, the wealth-admissible set one of explicit width. Under reasonable assumptions, r∗satisfies all five fairness conditions
- Liquidity is the only non‑wealth condition that can cause the admissible set to disconnect, e.g., a low retention rate can thin the merged liquidity pool. theoretical
Source sentence
Liquidity emerges as the only non-wealth condition that can disconnect the admissible set. Liquidity is the one (non-wealth) channel through which the admissible set can disconnect: a low retention rate can leave the merged pool thinner.
- The synergy s(r)=µM(r)−µA−µB has no predetermined sign; the bounds of the wealth condition become self‑referential in r. theoretical
Source sentence
The resulting synergy has no predetermined sign, and the bounds of the bargaining region become self-referential in the exchange rate. The synergy s(r) = µM(r)−µA −µB has no predetermined sign, and the bounds of the wealth condition become self-referential in r.
- Under reasonable assumptions, the price‑ratio r* satisfies all fairness conditions simultaneously (Theorem 7.1) and, with strict admissibility and s0>0, the admissible set has explicit wealth half‑widths in s0, µA, µB and Λ (Theorem 8.1). theoretical
Source sentence
Under reasonable assumptions, r∗satisfies all five fairness conditions simultane-ously (Theorem 7.1); under strict admissibility and s0 > 0, the admissible set contains a nondegenerate interval around r∗, with wealth half-widths explicit in s0, µA, µB and Λ (Theorem 8.1).
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 19 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.