Paper: arXiv 2310.06844
Authors: Priyanka Bose, Dipanjan Das, Fabio Gritti, Nicola Ruaro, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna
Abstract
As cryptocurrency evolved, new financial instruments, such as lending and borrowing protocols, currency exchanges, fungible and non-fungible tokens (NFT), staking and mining protocols have emerged. A financial ecosystem built on top of a blockchain is supposed to be fair and transparent for each participating actor. Yet, there are sophisticated actors who turn their domain knowledge and market inefficiencies to their strategic advantage; thus extracting value from trades not accessible to others. This situation is further exacerbated by the fact that blockchain-based markets and decentralized finance (DeFi) instruments are mostly unregulated. Though a large body of work has already studied the unfairness of different aspects of DeFi and cryptocurrency trading, the economic intricacies of non-fungible token (NFT) trades necessitate further analysis and academic scrutiny. The trading volume of NFTs has skyrocketed in recent years. A single NFT trade worth over a million US dollars, or marketplaces making billions in revenue is not uncommon nowadays. While previous research indicated the presence of wrongdoings in the NFT market, to our knowledge, we are the first to study predatory trading practices, what we call opportunistic trading, in depth. Opportunistic traders are sophisticated actors who employ automated, high-frequency NFT trading strategies, which, oftentimes, are malicious, deceptive, or, at the very least, unfair. Such attackers weaponize their advanced technical knowledge and superior understanding of DeFi protocols to disrupt trades of unsuspecting users, and collect profits from economic situations that are inaccessible to ordinary users, in a “supposedly” fair market. In this paper, we explore three such broad classes of opportunistic strategies aiming to realize three distinct trading objectives, viz., acquire, instant profit generation, and loss minimization.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 2.5/10
- Empirical Rigor: 6.0/10
- Quadrant: Street Traders — empirical and applied, lower math complexity
Why this score: The paper relies primarily on conceptual analysis of blockchain mechanics and opportunistic strategies, with minimal advanced mathematical derivations. However, it is highly data/implementation-heavy, involving the collection and analysis of real NFT market data, categorization of trading strategies, and plans to release code, making it practical and backtest-ready.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
A["Research Goal"] --> B["Identify Opportunistic Trading Strategies"]
B --> C["Analyze Blockchain Transaction Data"]
C --> D["Heuristic Analysis & Pattern Detection"]
D --> E["Classify Strategies: Acquire, Profit, Loss Minimization"]
E --> F["Key Findings"]
subgraph F ["Outcomes"]
F1["Quantified predatory behavior"]
F2["Economic impact on users"]
F3["Market inefficiencies exploited"]
end
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper identifies three broad classes of opportunistic trading strategies in NFT markets: acquire, instant profit generation, and loss minimization.
Source sentence
we identify three broad classes of opportunistic trading strategies, viz., acquire, instant profit generation, and loss minimization.
Assumes 2
- An attacker is a trader with solid financial and technical knowledge and access to high-frequency, bot-driven trades. model
Source sentence
In our model, an attacker is a trader (buyer or seller) in the NFT market with solid financial and technical knowledge, and have access to the capital and computing resources required to perform high-frequency, bot-driven trades.
- NFTs that hold market value should have been traded at least once within the last three months; otherwise price is set to zero. model
Source sentence
We expect an NFT that holds its market value should be traded at least once within last three months. If not, then we treat p=0.
Data
- ERC‑721 and ERC‑1155 token contracts dataset crypto-onchain public
Source sentence
We built a dataset of ERC-721 and ERC-1155 token contracts for our analyses.
- 152,478 ERC‑721 contracts crypto-onchain public
Source sentence
For the 152,478 ERC-721 contracts, we identified 86,698 minting methods.
CoinGecko
Costs
Unclear - sources disagree
Source sentence (the authors' words)
transactions mined through FLASHBOTS paid 11 times higher fees per transaction than the ones mined through mempool.
Finds 3
- Frontrunners sold 206,497 NFTs (63.55%); 131,419 were sold for a cumulative profit of 26,513.35 ETH, while the remaining 75,078 incurred a loss of 17,518.57 ETH. performance
Source sentence
frontrunners could sell 206,497 (63.55%) NFTs, of which 131,419 (63.64%) were sold for a cumulative profit of 26,513.35 ETH. Sales of the remaining 75,078 (36.36%) NFTs incurred a total loss of 17,518.57 ETH.
- Flashbots frontrunning attempts had a success rate of 87.07% versus 32.85% for mempool‑based attempts. performance
Source sentence
frontrunning attempts through FLASHBOTS have a noticeably higher success rate (87.07%) than the ones mined through the mempool (32.85%).
- Detected 3,974 loss‑minimizing trades across five NFT marketplaces. performance
Source sentence
We detected 3,974 instances of loss minimizing trades in five NFTMs (Table I).
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 12 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
1 paper in the archive
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.