Paper: arXiv 2406.12417
Authors: Abe Alexander, Lars Fritz
Abstract
In the ever evolving landscape of decentralized finance automated market makers (AMMs) play a key role: they provide a market place for trading assets in a decentralized manner. For so-called bluechip pairs, arbitrage activity provides a major part of the revenue generation of AMMs but also a major source of loss due to the so-called ‘informed orderflow’. Finding ways to minimize those losses while still keeping uninformed trading activity alive is a major problem in the field. In this paper we will investigate the mechanics of said arbitrage and try to understand how AMMs can maximize the revenue creation or in other words minimize the losses. To that end, we model the dynamics of arbitrage activity for a concrete implementation of a pool and study its sensitivity to the choice of fee aiming to maximize the revenue for the AMM. We identify dynamical fees that mimic the directionality of the price due to asymmetric fee choices as a promising avenue to mitigate losses to toxic flow. This work is based on and extends a recent article by some of the authors.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 7.5/10
- Empirical Rigor: 6.0/10
- Quadrant: Holy Grail — high math complexity, high empirical rigor
Why this score: The paper utilizes advanced stochastic processes (random walks, geometric Brownian motion) and detailed analytical derivations, scoring high on math complexity. It also includes concrete simulation setups, sensitivity analyses, and references to implementation details for AMMs, demonstrating a strong empirical foundation for backtesting.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
A["Research Goal: Optimize AMM Fees<br>to minimize losses from informed arbitrage"] --> B{"Key Methodology"}
B --> C["Model Arbitrage Dynamics<br>(e.g., based on Uniswap v4 mechanics)"]
C --> D["Simulate sensitivity to<br>various fee structures (static/dynamic)"]
D --> E["Evaluate results:<br>Maximize revenue / Minimize toxic flow loss"]
E --> F["Key Findings & Outcomes"]
F --> G["Dynamic Fees (directional/adaptive)<br>significantly reduce losses<br>while maintaining uninformed volume"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper models arbitrage dynamics for a concrete AMM pool and studies how fee choice affects AMM revenue, proposing dynamical asymmetric fees to mitigate losses from toxic flow.
Source sentence
In this paper we will investigate the mechanics of said arbitrage and try to understand how AMMs can maximize the revenue creation or in other words minimize the losses. To that end, we model the dynamics of arbitrage activity for a concrete implementation of a pool and study its sensitivity to the choice of fee aiming to maximize the revenue for the AMM.
Assumes 6
- Price discovery occurs on the CEX and the AMM price is slaved to it. market
Source sentence
We assume that price discovery happens on the CEX and the price dynamics of the AMM is ’slaved’ to it.
- Arbitrage can always be performed in an optimal fashion. execution
Source sentence
Furthermore, we assume that arbitrage can always be performed in an optimal fashion.
- The AMM is modeled as a constant function market maker (CFMM). model
Source sentence
3.1 The AMM For simplicity, we model the AMM as a constant function market maker.
- The CEX is assumed to have infinite liquidity and zero price impact. market
Source sentence
It is important here to reiterate that we assume that the CEX is of infinite liquidity and there is no price impact. While in practice the CEX is not of infinite liquidity, it is reasonable to assume that it is of significantly higher liquidity justifying the subsequent approach.
Show 2 more
- Transaction costs other than the AMM fee and flash‑loan fee are negligible (TXN = 0). execution
Source sentence
We are assuming for now that transaction costs are negligible (TXN = 0), meaning we have a condition α 1 −f 1 + piA∆FL(1 −f) −(1 + ffl) > 0 .
- Random walk steps are symmetric with equal up/down probability unless otherwise stated. statistical
Source sentence
Symmetric random walks, i.e. pup = pdown = 1/2, exhibit interesting prop-erties some of which we review here: The average price after n steps is ⟨p⟩= p0 and the variance is ⟨(pn −p0)2⟩= ⟨p2 n⟩−p2 0 = p2 0σ2n. We distinguish two case, one in which the probability of going up and down is balanced, called ’symmetric walk’, and another in which there is a preferential direction, referred to as ’asymmetric walk’.
Data
- Synthetic CEX price simulations via Brownian motion synthetic unknown
Source sentence
To this end, we make the following experiment: we fix the relative volatility of the CEX price per time step at 0.001. Consequently, we evolve the CEX price for 1000 time steps and arbitrage the AMM.
- Random walk simulations (σ = 0.02, 10,000 runs) synthetic unknown
Source sentence
Symmetric walk: pup = pdown In this case, we made a simulation in the following way: in all cases we use σ = 0.02 (which is a rather big value) and run 10000 simulations.
Costs
Modeled
Swap fee f charged by the AMM and flash‑loan fee ffl are included; transaction cost TXN is set to zero in the main analysis.
Source sentence
For that, ARB has to pay the feeffl meaning in total it costs ∆FLffl. Additionally, the AMM charges a fee f for swaps, meaning the actual ∆B entering the pool will be ∆B = ∆FL(1 −f) .
Finds 5
- For sideways (no‑drift) price motion the AMM revenue from fees does not depend on the fee level in the long‑time limit. theoretical
Source sentence
We find that for sideways motion without preferential direction the revenue generation does not depend on the fee setting in the long time limit.
- When price drift is present, revenue depends strongly on fee directionality, suggesting asymmetric fees can capture more arbitrage gains. theoretical
Source sentence
However, in the case with drift there is a strong dependence that is directional.
- Fees roughly three times the per‑block volatility yield the highest fee return in simulations of symmetric price walks. performance
Source sentence
The main observation is that fees compared small to the per block volatility lead to suboptimal fee generation whereas fees on the order three times the per block volatility seem to make a good return. though, meaning the fees per arbitrage attempt will be moderate. The main observation is that fees compared small to the per block volatility lead to suboptimal fee generation whereas fees on the order three times the
- For larger static fees the probability of a successful arbitrage event scales approximately as 1/f. statistical
Source sentence
The main finding is that for larger fees, the probability of having an arbitrage event follows ∝1/f.
- In a drift scenario the revenue for the majority token grows linearly with the fee level, while the minority token’s revenue saturates or decays. theoretical
Source sentence
Since the revenue per arbitrage still scales linear in f, overall we find a linear in f behavior, explaining the numerical findings/ Summary of this subsection: In a situation with constant volatility and preferential movement/drift, the revenue depends linearly on the fees for the majority token. We find that the probability of having an arbitrage event becomes constant while the revenue per trade grows linearly
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 20 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
2 papers in the archive
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.
Cited References (36)
- Automated Market Making and Loss-Versus-Rebalancing (2022) — link
- An Economic Model of a Decentralized Exchange with Concentrated Liquidity (2023)
- Automated Market Making and Arbitrage Profits in the Presence of Fees — → 2305.14604
- Automated Market Makers: A Practical Guide to Decentralized Exchanges and Cryptocurrency Trading (2023) — link
- A theoretical framework for dynamical fee choice in AMMs — → 2404.03976
- Theory and Practice of Revenue Management (2005)
- Decentralized exchanges (2021)
- The adoption of blockchain-based decentralized exchanges (2021) — link
and 28 more
- The need for fees at a dex: How increases in fees can increase dex trading volume (2022)
- Uniswap v1 Core (2018) — link
- Uniswap v2 Core (2020) — link
- Uniswap v3 Core (2021) — link
- Uniswap v4 Core [Draft] (2023) — link
- JOE v2.1 Liquidity Book (2022) — link
- ALGEBRA Ecosystem: Decentralized exchange (2022) — link
- Automatic market-making with dynamic peg (2021) — link
- Mooniswap by 1inch.exchange (2020) — link
- MEV capturing AMM (McAMM) (2022) — link
- Censorship Resistance in On-Chain Auctions (2023) — link
- Flash boys 2.0: Frontrunning in decentralized exchanges, miner extractable value, and consensus instability (2020)
- The Costs of Swapping on the Uniswap Protocol — → 2309.13648
- Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules (2022) — link
- High-frequency trading on decentralized on-chain exchanges (2021)
- The centralizing effects of private order flow on proposer-builder separation (2023) — link
- Logarithmic markets coring rules for modular combinatorial information aggregation (2007)
- A practical liquidity-sensitive automated market maker (2013)
- Twitter thread (2023) — link
- UniswapX (2023) — link
- Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society (2018)
- Triangle Fees — → 2306.17316
- Predictable Losses of Liquidity Provision in Constant Function Markets and Concentrated Liquidity Markets (2023) — link
- Decentralised Finance and Automated Market Making: Predictable Loss and Optimal Liquidity Provision — → 2309.08431
- Automated Market Makers Designs Beyond Constant Functions (2023)
- Automated Market Making and Loss-Versus-Rebalancing (2024) — link
- Optimal Dynamic Fees for Blockchain Resources (2023) — link
- Multidimensional Blockchain Fees are (Essentially) Optimal (2024) — link
5 of 36 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.