Paper: arXiv 2306.09421

Authors: Jason Milionis, Xin Wan, Austin Adams

Abstract

This paper aims to enhance the understanding of liquidity provider (LP) returns in automated market makers (AMMs). LPs face market risk as well as adverse selection due to risky asset holdings in the pool that they provide liquidity to and the informational asymmetry between informed traders (arbitrageurs) and AMMs. Loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR) quantifies the adverse selection cost (Milionis et al., 2022a), and is a popular metric to evaluate the flow toxicity to an AMM. However, individual LP returns are critically affected by another factor orthogonal to the above: the competitiveness among LPs. This work introduces a novel metric for LP competitiveness, called FLAIR (short for fee liquidity-adjusted instantaneous returns), that aims to supplement LVR in assessments of LP performance to capture the dynamic behavior of LPs in a pool. Our metric reflects the characteristics of fee return-on-capital, and differentiates active liquidity provisioning strategies in AMMs. To illustrate how both flow toxicity, accounting for the sophistication of the counterparty of LPs, as well as LP competitiveness, accounting for the sophistication of the competition among LPs, affect individual LP returns, we propose a quadrant interpretation where all of these characteristics may be readily visualized. We examine LP competitiveness in an ex-post fashion, and show example cases in all of which our metric confirms the expected nuances and intuition of competitiveness among LPs. FLAIR has particular merit in empirical analyses, and is able to better inform practical assessments of AMM pools.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 6.0/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 7.0/10
  • Quadrant: Holy Grail — high math complexity, high empirical rigor

Why this score: The paper introduces a new metric (FLAIR) with accompanying formulas and a quadrant interpretation framework, requiring moderate mathematical formalism. It is heavily data-driven, analyzing real on-chain AMM pool data to validate the metric against observed behaviors like JIT liquidity, indicating strong empirical implementation potential.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  R["Research Goal<br>Develop a metric for LP<br>competitiveness in AMMs"] --> I["Inputs:<br>LP positions, fee data,<br>rebalancing events"]
  I --> C["Computation:<br>FLAIR metric calculation<br>Fee-Adjusted Instantaneous Returns"]
  C --> A["Analysis:<br>Compare FLAIR vs LVR<br>Quadrant interpretation"]
  A --> F["Key Findings:<br>1. FLAIR captures LP competition<br>2. Supplements LVR analysis<br>3. Differentiates active strategies<br>4. Improves pool assessment"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper introduces a novel metric called FLAIR (fee liquidity‑adjusted instantaneous returns) to measure liquidity‑provider competitiveness in AMMs, supplementing existing flow‑toxicity metrics.

Source sentence
This work introduces a novel metric for LP competitiveness, called FLAIR (short for fee liquidity-adjusted instantaneous returns), that aims to supplement LVR in assessments of LP performance to capture the dynamic behavior of LPs in a pool.

Assumes 6

  • The AMM pool consists of two assets, a risky asset A and a numéraire asset B, and all values are denominated in B. model
    Source sentence
    2 Metric Theory 2.1 Preliminaries Assume a two-asset AMM pool, where, without loss of generality, the first asset 𝐴is a risky asset, and the second asset 𝐵is a num´eraire asset (the unit of account), in the units of which the various portfolio values, fees, profit and loss will be denominated.
  • An external market price trajectory {p_t} is given and ex‑post measures are evaluated against this realized path. market
    Source sentence
    Whenever our measures are ex-post, this means that there exists a specific realized price trajectory {𝑝𝑡}0≤𝑡≤𝑇, and that we are measuring the past performance against that specific sample path.
  • The AMM is a constant‑function market maker (CFMM) defined by a bonding curve f(x,y)=L, with trades constrained to keep f constant. model
    Source sentence
    An AMM in the form of a constant function market maker (CFMM) is represented by a bonding curve 𝑓such that the only allowable trades are those that maintain a constant level set of the curve, i.e., 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝐿.
  • Technical smoothness assumptions on the bonding curve allow definition of an implied pool price as the negative ratio of partial derivatives. model
    Source sentence
    Through this representation, at any state of the pool (𝑥, 𝑦), under suitable 6 technical assumptions, we can define a marginal price, the so-called implied pool (marginal/spot) price that is given by the negative of the ratio of the partial derivatives of 𝑓evaluated at the point (𝑥, 𝑦).
Show 2 more
  • The theory does not require arbitrageurs to rebalance the pool to the external price; mispricing between implied and external prices is allowed. model
    Source sentence
    2For developing the theory of our competitiveness metric, there is no need to assume that arbitrageurs rebalance the pool until the external market price, i.e., as if they would pay no fees for their trades. Our theory works in the completely general case where there is mispricing between the implied pool price ˜𝑝𝑡and the external market price 𝑝𝑡.
  • Liquidity distributions are functions of price (piecewise‑constant) rather than single point values. model
    Source sentence
    In particular, we say that there exists a piecewise-constant liquidity distribution 𝐿(𝑝) that has the property that 𝐿(𝑝) = 𝐿𝑘for all 𝑝∈(𝑝𝑘, 𝑝𝑘+1) for any 𝑘∈ℐsuch that whenever the implied (marginal/spot) pool price 𝑝∈(𝑝𝑘, 𝑝𝑘+1), the valid reserves (𝑥, 𝑦) contained in the pool satisfy the relationships 𝑥= 𝑥⋆(𝑝, 𝐿(𝑝)) and 𝑦= 𝑦⋆(𝑝, 𝐿(𝑝)) for all 𝑝∈(𝑝𝑘, 𝑝𝑘+1) for any 𝑘∈ℐ.

Data

No dataset named in the text.

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result.

Finds 3

  • FLAIR captures fee return on capital relative to the pool and aligns with intuitive notions of LP competitiveness, as shown in quadrant visualisations and example cases. theoretical
    Source sentence
    To illustrate how both flow toxicity, accounting for the sophistication of the counterparty of LPs, as well as LP competitiveness, accounting for the sophistication of the competition among LPs, affect individual LP returns, we propose a quadrant interpretation where all of these characteristics may be readily visualized. FLAIR has particular merit in empirical analyses, and is able to better inform practical
  • In the fully competitive example with two LPs, the aggregate FLAIR equals 2γ(T−t0), demonstrating that perfectly competitive LPs earn fees without excess capital. theoretical
    Source sentence
    As a direct consequence, the aggregate FLAIR for the pool would be CMagg(𝑡0, 𝑇) = ∫︁𝑇 𝑡0 fee𝑡 2fee𝑡 𝛾 𝑑𝑡= ∫︁𝑇 𝑡0 2𝛾𝑑𝑡= 2𝛾(𝑇−𝑡0) .
  • The metric can be applied ex‑post to existing LP positions and for back‑testing prospective strategies, normalising fee income by instantaneous capital deployed. theoretical
    Source sentence
    2.2 FLAIR for Existing LP Positions As mentioned in the introduction, the ex-post competitiveness metric for existing LP positions should assess the backwards-looking profitability of the position, measured by the fee earned in comparison to the rest of the pool, normalized by the instantaneous amount of capital deployed on the AMM, as this position varies its liquidity distribution over time. In other words, the

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 10 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Cited by 6 papers in the archive (3 by independent authors)

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.