Paper: arXiv 2307.13772

Authors: Alfred Lehar, Christine Parlour, Marius Zoican

Abstract

We investigate how liquidity providers (LPs) choose between high- and low-fee trading venues, in the face of a fixed common gas cost. Analyzing Uniswap data, we find that high-fee pools attract 58% of liquidity supply yet execute only 21% of volume. Large LPs dominate low-fee pools, frequently adjusting out-of-range positions in response to informed order flow. In contrast, small LPs converge to high-fee pools, accepting lower execution probabilities to mitigate adverse selection and liquidity management costs. Fragmented liquidity dominates a single-fee market, as it encourages more liquidity providers to enter the market, while fostering LP competition on the low-fee pool.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 7.5/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 8.0/10
  • Quadrant: Holy Grail — high math complexity, high empirical rigor

Why this score: The paper employs a formal theoretical model with heterogeneous agents, game theory, and analytical derivations to establish equilibrium conditions, which requires advanced mathematics. Additionally, it is backed by empirical analysis of real Uniswap v3 data, analyzing high-frequency liquidity dynamics, volume statistics, and LP behavior across different fee tiers.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal<br>How do LPs choose between high-<br>and low-fee DEX pools?<br>Is fragmented liquidity optimal?"] --> B["Methodology<br>Analyze Uniswap V2 & V3 Data<br>Track LP positions & tx history"]

  B --> C{"Data Inputs"}
  C --> C1["Pool Parameters<br>High fee 1%<br>Low fee 0.05%"]
  C --> C2["Liquidity Supply<br>58% in High Fee<br>42% in Low Fee"]
  C --> C3["Trading Volume<br>21% executed in High Fee<br>79% in Low Fee"]

  C --> D["Computational Analysis<br>1. Correlate LP size vs. pool choice<br>2. Track position rebalancing frequency<br>3. Measure adverse selection costs<br>4. Model gas cost impact"]

  D --> E{"Key Findings"}
  E --> E1["Large LPs dominate Low Fee<br>Frequent adjustments for informed flow"]
  E --> E2["Small LPs prefer High Fee<br>Accept lower execution to mitigate<br>adverse selection & gas costs"]
  E --> E3["Fragmented Liquidity > Single Fee<br>Encourages LP entry & competition"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper proposes a theoretical model and empirical analysis showing that fixed costs of liquidity management drive market fragmentation and create distinct clienteles of liquidity providers.

Source sentence
We show, both theoretically and empirically, that fixed costs of liquidity management promote market fragmentation across decentralized pools and generate clienteles of liquidity providers.

Assumes 5

  • Innovations are sufficiently large so that there is a positive probability that liquidity providers need to re‑balance on the high‑fee pool. model
    Source sentence
    Assumption 1: The size of innovations are sufficiently large so that there is a positive probability that liquidity providers need to re‑balance on the high‑fee pool.
  • All participants pay a fixed transaction (gas) cost to access the markets. execution
    Source sentence
    Importantly, all participants pay a transaction cost (called a“gas fee”) to access the markets.
  • Liquidity providers can rebalance their position following each swap. model
    Source sentence
    First, liquidity providers can rebalance their position following each swap.
  • Price impact generated by the bonding curve does not remunerate liquidity suppliers. model
    Source sentence
    The posted liquidity is subject to a bonding curve and hence generates a price impact cost for the liquidity demanders (we emphasize that this does not remunerate the liquidity suppliers).
Show 1 more
  • Liquidity suppliers have heterogeneous endowments representing different capital constraints. model
    Source sentence
    Liquidity suppliers have heterogeneous endowments, interpretable as different capital constraints — low‑endowment liquidity providers are akin to retail traders, whereas high‑endowments stand in for large institutional investors or quantitative funds.

Data

  • Uniswap V3 Subgraph hourly liquidity snapshots · Uniswap crypto-onchain public
    May 4, 2021 to July 15, 2023 · 32 fragmented asset pairs
    Source sentence
    We obtain hourly liquidity snapshots from the Uniswap V3 Subgraph to calculate impermanent loss for a theoretical symmetric liquidity position.
  • Panel data of pool‑day observations · Uniswap crypto-onchain public
    May 4, 2021 to July 15, 2023 · 32 fragmented pairs
    Source sentence
    we build a panel data set for the 32 fragmented pairs in our sample where the unit of observation is pool‑day.
  • Gas cost data for mint/burn transactions · Uniswap V3 crypto-onchain public
    Source sentence
    The figure illustrates the daily average gas cost on mint/burn transactions in Uniswap v3 pools.

Recognised sources: Kaiko Binance

Costs

Unclear - sources disagree The platform classifier and the paper-text extraction give different answers, so no value is asserted.

Platform classifier: Not applicable

Paper text extraction: Modeled - All traders incur a fixed execution cost Γ > 0 and variable gas price; regressions include GasPrice and its interaction with low‑fee dummy.

Source sentence (the authors' words)
In addition, consistent with gas costs on Ethereum, all traders incur a fixed execution cost Γ di > 0 to interact with the market.

Finds 5

  • High‑fee pools attract 58% of liquidity supply but only 21% of trading volume. statistical
    Source sentence
    high‑fee pools attract 58% of liquidity supply yet execute only 21% of volume.
  • Price‑impact measures (LVR and impermanent loss) are significantly larger in low‑fee pools, indicating higher barriers to arbitrageurs. statistical
    Source sentence
    all price impact measures — that is, the immediate and one‑hour horizon LVR and the impermanent loss — are significantly larger in low‑fee pools.
  • Low‑fee dummy coefficient is positive and significant (e.g., dlow‑fee 6.39***), showing higher price impact in low‑fee pools. statistical
    Source sentence
    dlow-fee 6.39*** 6.39*** 29.78*** 29.67*** 1.08*** 1.13***
  • Two thirds of trading volume interacts with less than half of the capital locked on Uniswap V3. statistical
    Source sentence
    Since large liquidity providers can churn their position at a faster pace, two thirds of the trading volume interacts with less than half the capital locked on Uniswap V3.
  • Fixed costs of liquidity management hinder small market makers’ participation, pushing them to high‑fee markets with lower execution probability but reduced adverse selection and gas costs. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Our findings indicate that substantial fixed costs can hinder the participation of small market makers in the forefront of liquidity provision, where active order management is crucial.

Checked by others

Supported by

  • Model-free Hedging of Impermanent Loss in Geometric Mean Market Makers (2023)
    On the question: How do fee levels affect impermanent loss in AMM pools?
    Compare the findings

    This paper: Price‑impact measures (LVR and impermanent loss) are significantly larger in low‑fee pools, indicating higher barriers to arbitrageurs.

    That paper: In simulations, higher fees lead to lower impermanent loss.

    Both findings agree: higher fees reduce impermanent loss, while low‑fee pools exhibit larger price‑impact (LVR) and impermanent loss.

Cited by 3 papers in the archive (3 by independent authors)

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.