Paper: arXiv 2507.13099

Authors: Cuong Le Van, Ngoc-Sang Pham, Thi Kim Cuong Pham, Binh Tran-Nam

Abstract

This paper explores the interplay between transfer policies, R&D, corruption, and economic development using a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and a government. The government collects taxes, redistributes fiscal revenues, and undertakes public investment (in R&D, infrastructure, etc.). Corruption is modeled as a fraction of tax revenues that is siphoned off and removed from the economy. We first establish the existence of a political-economic equilibrium. Then, using an analytically tractable framework with two private agents, we examine the effects of corruption and evaluate the impact of various policies, including redistribution and innovation-led strategies.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 8.0/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper is mathematically dense, featuring a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and rigorous proofs of equilibrium existence using fixed point theorems, while empirical rigor is low as it relies on a theoretical framework with only two private agents and lacks backtesting, datasets, or statistical metrics.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal<br>Interplay of fiscal policy, R&D,<br>corruption, and economic development"] --> B["Methodology<br>General Equilibrium Model"]
  B --> C["Data/Inputs<br>Heterogeneous Agents &<br>Government Parameters"]
  C --> D["Computational Process<br>Existence of Equilibrium Analysis"]
  D --> E["Computational Process<br>Policy Simulations<br>(Redistribution, Innovation, Anti-Corruption)"]
  E --> F["Key Outcomes<br>Corruption reduces productivity<br>Innovation-led growth outperforms pure redistribution"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper develops a two‑period general‑equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, government taxation, transfers, public investment (including R&D) and a corruption sector, and uses it to analyze the macroeconomic effects of redistribution, innovation and corruption.

Source sentence
Our paper makes three main contributions. Our first one (Proposition 2) is to establish the existence of a political-economic equilibrium with externality related to transfers and innovation.

Assumes 6

  • Productivity function A(·) is continuous, increasing and satisfies A(0)>0. model
    Source sentence
    The function A(·) : R+ →R+ is continuous and increasing. Ai(0) > 0.
  • Public investment D0 is exogenous to agents and determines individual productivity Ai = Ai(D0). model
    Source sentence
    We assume that the productivity Ai depends on the public investment in the sense that Ai = Ai(D0) where D0 represents the public investment which includes investment in R&D, educa-tion, public infrastructure, etc.
  • Tax rates and transfers are individualized and time‑dependent. model
    Source sentence
    Both tax rates and transfers are individualized and time-dependent.
  • A fraction of collected tax revenue disappears and is defined as corruption. model
    Source sentence
    We refer to this lost fraction as corruption.
Show 2 more
  • F_i is strictly concave, F'_i(0)=∞ and u'_i(c)+c u''_i(c)≥0 for any c>0 (ensuring uniqueness of competitive equilibrium). model
    Source sentence
    To obtain the uniqueness of competitive equilibrium, we require the following assumption. Assumption 3. Assume that, for any i, Fi is strictly concave, F ′ i(0) = ∞and u′ i(c)+ cu′′ i (c) ≥0 for any c > 0. Proposition 1.
  • World Bank macro data on gross savings and tax revenue are accurate representations of the economies studied. data
    Source sentence
    According to the database of the World Bank,10 the gross savings (% of GDP) of China and Viet Nam in 2023 is 42% and 35% respectively. According to the database of the World Bank, the tax revenue (% of GDP) of Brazil, China, France in 2023 is 14%, 7.6%, 23.1%, respectively.

Data

  • World Bank gross savings (% of GDP) and tax revenue (% of GDP) · World Bank macro public
    Source sentence
    According to the database of the World Bank,10 the gross savings (% of GDP) of China and Viet Nam in 2023 is 42% and 35% respectively. According to the database of the World Bank, the tax revenue (% of GDP) of Brazil, China, France in 2023 is 14%, 7.6%, 23.1%, respectively.

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result.

Finds 5

  • Corruption consistently reduces economic development. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Our findings indicate that corruption consistently is detrimental to economic development.
  • Policy inaction (no redistribution and no public investment) can lead to worse outcomes than scenarios where corruption coexists with innovation‑led policies. theoretical
    Source sentence
    However, policy inaction, de-fined as the absence of both redistribution and public investment, may lead to worse outcomes than scenarios in which corruption coexists with innovation-led policies.
  • Public investment and R&D efficiency have a positive impact on aggregate output, while corruption exerts a negative effect. theoretical
    Source sentence
    After computing the equilibrium outcomes, we show that public investment and R&D efficiency have a positive impact on aggregate output, while corruption exerts a negative effect.
  • The existence of a political‑economic equilibrium with transfers and innovation is established via a two‑step fixed‑point argument. theoretical
    Source sentence
    The existence of equilibrium is established using a two-step fixed-point argument.
  • When R&D investment is sufficiently efficient, the economy can achieve higher output than the no‑intervention benchmark even in the presence of corruption. theoretical
    Source sentence
    When the efficiency a2 is high enough, we have Y1 −Y ∗ 1 > 0. The results demonstrate that under certain conditions, such as high efficiency of R&D investment or well-targeted redistribution strategies, the gains from public inter-vention can compensate for the losses due to corruption.

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings. Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.