Paper: arXiv 2512.11765

Authors: Marcel Nutz, Alessandro Prosperi

Abstract

We study the high-frequency limit of an \(n\)-trader optimal execution game in discrete time. Traders face transient price impact of Obizhaeva–Wang type in addition to quadratic instantaneous trading costs \(θ(ΔX_t)^2\) on each transaction \(ΔX_t\). There is a unique Nash equilibrium in which traders choose liquidation strategies minimizing expected execution costs. In the high-frequency limit where the grid of trading dates converges to the continuous interval \([“0,T”]\), the discrete equilibrium inventories converge at rate \(1/N\) to the continuous-time equilibrium of an Obizhaeva–Wang model with additional quadratic costs \(\vartheta_0(ΔX_0)^2\) and \(\vartheta_T(ΔX_T)^2\) on initial and terminal block trades, where \(\vartheta_0=(n-1)/2\) and \(\vartheta_T=1/2\). The latter model was introduced by Campbell and Nutz as the limit of continuous-time equilibria with vanishing instantaneous costs. Our results extend and refine previous results of Schied, Strehle, and Zhang for the particular case \(n=2\) where \(\vartheta_0=\vartheta_T=1/2\). In particular, we show how the coefficients \(\vartheta_0=(n-1)/2\) and \(\vartheta_T=1/2\) arise endogenously in the high-frequency limit: the initial and terminal block costs of the continuous-time model are identified as the limits of the cumulative discrete instantaneous costs incurred over small neighborhoods of \(0\) and \(T\), respectively, and these limits are independent of \(θ>0\). By contrast, when \(θ=0\) the discrete-time equilibrium strategies and costs exhibit persistent oscillations and admit no high-frequency limit, mirroring the non-existence of continuous-time equilibria without boundary block costs. Our results show that two different types of trading frictions – a fine time discretization and small instantaneous costs in continuous time – have similar regularizing effects and select a canonical model in the limit.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 9.5/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 1.0/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper is highly theoretical, focusing on discrete-time Nash equilibria, high-frequency limits, and convergence rates (1/N), requiring advanced stochastic calculus, PDEs, and game theory. Empirical rigor is low as it presents no backtests, datasets, or implementation details, relying solely on mathematical derivations and asymptotic analysis.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal: Analyze high-frequency limit<br>of n-trader optimal execution game<br>with transient impact & quadratic costs"] --> B["Model Setup"]
  B --> C["Methodology:<br>Solve discrete Nash equilibrium<br>in high-frequency limit"]
  C --> D["Key Mechanism:<br>Cumulative discrete costs over<br>small neighborhoods converge"]
  D --> E{"Continuum of Trading?"}
  E -- Yes: θ > 0 --> F["Key Findings:<br>1. Converges to CW with θ0=(n-1)/2, θT=1/2<br>2. Endogenous boundary costs<br>3. θ-independent limit"]
  E -- No: θ = 0 --> G["No Limit: Oscillations &<br>non-existence without block costs"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper proposes that in the high‑frequency limit the discrete‑time Nash equilibrium inventories converge at rate 1/N to the continuous‑time equilibrium of an Obizhaeva–Wang model with endogenous initial and terminal block‑trade costs ϑ₀=(n‑1)/2 and ϑ_T=1/2.

Source sentence
In the high-frequency limit where the grid of trading dates converges to the continuous interval $[0,T]$, the discrete equilibrium inventories converge at rate $1/N$ to the continuous-time equilibrium of an Obizhaeva--Wang model with additional quadratic costs $\vartheta_0(ΔX_0)^2$ and $\vartheta_T(ΔX_T)^2$ on initial and terminal block trades, where $\vartheta_0=(n-1)/2$ and $\vartheta_T=1/2$.

Assumes 6

  • There are n strategic traders who are risk‑neutral. model
    Source sentence
    We study the high-frequency limit of an $n$-trader optimal execution game in discrete time. Each agent i is risk-neutral and chooses an admissible strategy to minimize the expected execution cost (2.1), where we may assume S0 t ≡0 without loss of generality.
  • The unaffected price process is a martingale (assumed zero without loss of generality). market
    Source sentence
    The unaffected price S = (St)t≥0 is a càdlàg local martingale with E[[S, S]T ] < ∞. By risk-neutrality (see [3, Proposition 2.2] for a detailed proof), we may assume S ≡0.
  • Price impact follows the transient Obizhaeva–Wang dynamics with exponential decay. model
    Source sentence
    The most tractable formulation is the Obizhaeva–Wang model [17], which uses an exponential decay kernel. As in the discrete-time model, trading generates transient impact I = (It)t≥0 with the Obizhaeva–Wang dynamics dIt = −ρIt dt + λ n X i=1 dXi t, I0−= 0.
  • Each trade incurs quadratic instantaneous (temporary) costs θ(ΔX_t)^2 with θ>0. execution
    Source sentence
    Traders face transient price impact of Obizhaeva--Wang type in addition to quadratic instantaneous trading costs $θ(ΔX_t)^2$ on each transaction $ΔX_t$. Starting with [9, 11], numerous works have added quadratic instantaneous costs on the trading rate to the Obizhaeva–Wang impact cost.
Show 2 more
  • Quadratic boundary block costs ϑ₀ and ϑ_T are imposed at times 0 and T. execution
    Source sentence
    In addition to the cost of transient impact, we charge quadratic boundary block costs at t = 0 and t = T with coefficients ϑ0, ϑT ≥0. Given opponents’ strategies X−i, the execution cost of Xi is then defined as (3.1) C (Xi | X−i) = E   Z T 0 SX t−dXi t + 1 2 X t∈[0,T] ∆St ∆Xi t + 1 2 �ϑ0(∆Xi 0)2 + ϑT (∆Xi T )2  .
  • Trading strategies are admissible càdlàg, predictable processes with bounded total variation and zero terminal inventory. model
    Source sentence
    There are n traders with inventory processes Xi = (Xi t)t∈[0,T]. An admissible inventory Xi is càdlàg, predictable, has (essentially) bounded total variation, and satisfies Xi 0−= xi ∈R and Xi T = 0.

Data

No dataset named in the text.

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result; the cost the extractor found is a model parameter.

The paper-text extraction found a cost parameter inside a model (Quadratic instantaneous costs θ(ΔX)^2 on each transaction and quadratic block costs ϑ₀(ΔX₀)^2 and ϑ_T(ΔX_T)^2 at the boundaries.); the classifier found no reported trading result, so costs are not applicable.

Finds 5

  • A unique Nash equilibrium exists for the discrete‑time game with transient impact and quadratic instantaneous costs. theoretical
    Source sentence
    There is a unique Nash equilibrium in which traders choose liquidation strategies minimizing expected execution costs.
  • As the trading grid becomes finer, the discrete equilibrium inventories converge at rate 1/N to the continuous‑time equilibrium of the Obizhaeva–Wang model with block costs. theoretical
    Source sentence
    In the high-frequency limit where the grid of trading dates converges to the continuous interval $[0,T]$, the discrete equilibrium inventories converge at rate $1/N$ to the continuous-time equilibrium of an Obizhaeva--Wang model with additional quadratic costs $\vartheta_0(ΔX_0)^2$ and $\vartheta_T(ΔX_T)^2$ on initial and terminal block trades, where $\vartheta_0=(n-1)/2$ and $\vartheta_T=1/2$.
  • The block‑cost coefficients emerge endogenously as ϑ₀=(n‑1)/2 and ϑ_T=1/2, independent of the size of θ>0. theoretical
    Source sentence
    In particular, we show how the coefficients $\vartheta_0=(n-1)/2$ and $\vartheta_T=1/2$ arise endogenously in the high-frequency limit: the initial and terminal block costs of the continuous-time model are identified as the limits of the cumulative discrete instantaneous costs incurred over small neighborhoods of $0$ and $T$, respectively, and these limits are independent of $θ>0$.
  • When θ=0 the discrete‑time equilibrium exhibits persistent oscillations and does not admit a high‑frequency limit. negative
    Source sentence
    By contrast, when $θ=0$ the discrete-time equilibrium strategies and costs exhibit persistent oscillations and admit no high-frequency limit, mirroring the non-existence of continuous-time equilibria without boundary block costs.
  • Fine time discretization and small instantaneous costs have similar regularizing effects, selecting a canonical continuous‑time model with transient impact and endogenous block costs. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Our results show that two different types of trading frictions -- a fine time discretization and small instantaneous costs in continuous time -- have similar regularizing effects and select a canonical model in the limit.

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 17 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.