Paper: arXiv 2502.04097

Authors: Abe Alexander, Guillaume Lambert, Lars Fritz

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between impermanent loss (IL) and loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR) in automated market makers (AMMs). Our main focus is on statistical properties, the impact of fees, the role of block times, and, related to the latter, the continuous time limit. We find there are three relevant regimes: (i) very short times where LVR and IL are identical; (ii) intermediate time where LVR and IL show distinct distribution functions but are connected via the central limit theorem exhibiting the same expectation value; (iii) long time behavior where both the distribution functions and averages are distinct. Subsequently, we study how fees change this dynamics with a special focus on competing time scales like block times and ‘arbitrage times’.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 7.5/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 3.0/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper uses advanced stochastic calculus (Brownian motion, SDEs) and statistical theory (distributions, CLT) to model AMM dynamics, but relies on conceptual numerical simulations rather than real-world data or specific backtesting protocols.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal:<br>Investigate IL vs. LVR in AMMs<br>featuring fees & block times"] --> B["Methodology:<br>Theoretical Modeling &<br>Statistical Analysis"]
  B --> C["Computational Processes:<br>Simulate Discrete Block<br>vs. Continuous Time Regimes"]
  B --> D["Data Inputs:<br>Market Volatility,<br>Fee Parameters, Block Times"]
  C --> E{"Analysis of<br>Time Regimes"}
  D --> E
  E --> F["Outcome 1:<br>Three distinct regimes identified:<br>Identical (Short), Dist. but same mean (Int.),<br>Different mean (Long)"]
  E --> G["Outcome 2:<br>Fee dynamics & Arbitrage<br>Time Scales analysis"]
  F & G --> H["Key Finding:<br>LVR & IL coincide at t=0,<br>diverge over time; Fees bridge<br>block time vs. continuous limits"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper proposes to analyze the relationship between impermanent loss (IL) and loss‑versus‑rebalancing (LVR) in automated market makers, identifying three time‑regime behaviors and studying how fees alter these dynamics.

Source sentence
This paper examines the relationship between impermanent loss (IL) and loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR) in automated market makers (AMMs). We find there are three relevant regimes: (i) very short times where LVR and IL are identical; (ii) intermediate time where LVR and IL show distinct distribution functions but are connected via the central limit theorem exhibiting the same expectation value; (iii) long time behavior

Assumes 6

  • Asset prices follow a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) or Brownian motion for analytical convenience. model
    Source sentence
    Fur-thermore, we introduce the concept of Brownian motion and geometric Brow-nian motion to discuss the price dynamics of an asset pair. In contrast, Brownian motion can result in negative prices.
  • There is an infinite external liquidity source (oracle) that the AMM price tracks with a one‑step lag (block time). market
    Source sentence
    We assume that the price of the AMM follows an external infinite liquidity source/oracle at a distance of one time step (block time is a natural candidate for this). Additionally, the arbitrageur does not pay any transaction fees.
  • Arbitrageurs do not pay any transaction fees in the baseline arbitrage analysis. execution
    Source sentence
    Additionally, the arbitrageur does not pay any transaction fees. This is an unrealistic assumption but for a general modeling we take that approach.
  • No additional uninformed trading activity is present. market
    Source sentence
    Furthermore, we assume there is no additional uninformed trading activity.
Show 2 more
  • A natural time scale Δt (e.g., block time) exists for price changes. statistical
    Source sentence
    We assume that there is a natural time scale ∆t for a price change, for instance the block time.
  • Simulations use discrete GBM updates with volatility σ = 0.001 (or 0.004 in later experiments) and a base fee of 0.02%. other
    Source sentence
    The price evolution follows a discrete geometric Brownian motion with volatility σ = 0.001. The base fee is set to 0.02%.

Data

  • Synthetic AMM simulation synthetic unknown
    Source sentence
    We have made a simulation of the key metrics, shown in Figure. 12. The AMM is initialized with 1000 tokens of asset A and an equivalent value of asset B at an initial price of 100.

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result; the cost the extractor found is a model parameter.

The paper-text extraction found a cost parameter inside a model (Base fee set to 0.02% (0.0002) applied to trades in the simulation; fees reduce average LVR substantially more than average IL.); the classifier found no reported trading result, so costs are not applicable.

Finds 5

  • Three regimes are identified: very short times where IL and LVR are identical, intermediate times where they share the same expectation value but have distinct distributions, and long times where both expectations and distributions differ. theoretical
    Source sentence
    We find there are three relevant regimes: (i) very short times where LVR and IL are identical; (ii) intermediate time where LVR and IL show distinct distribution functions but are connected via the central limit theorem exhibiting the same expectation value; (iii) long time behavior where both the distribution functions and averages are distinct. 12 IL, on the other hand, is not sensitive to the elementary step
  • In the intermediate regime, IL and LVR have the same expectation value (⟨IL⟩ ∝ p²σ²T) despite hugely different distribution shapes. statistical
    Source sentence
    12 IL, on the other hand, is not sensitive to the elementary step within the period ∆t, only to the difference from start to finish, called ∆P = pf −p. Therefore, we can estimate it using the same formula we used for LVR and find that for a period of length T we get ⟨IL(T)⟩∝∆P 2 = p2σ2T , (7) as an expectation value, just like LVR, see Appendix. We find that LVR has a normal shaped distribution while IL has a
  • Fees reduce the average LVR substantially more than the average IL while having relatively little effect on the shape of the LVR distribution. performance
    Source sentence
    The first is that LVR in absence of fees accounted still follows a relatively narrow distribution around an average value. However, the average LVR, is largely reduced compared to the case in the absence of fees (more on that later).
  • LVR distribution tends toward a normal (Gaussian) shape, whereas IL distribution exhibits a power‑law singularity for small IL. statistical
    Source sentence
    We find that LVR has a normal shaped distribution while IL has a distribu-tion that becomes power-law singular for small IL. However, both distributions have the same average value (shown analytically in the Appendix), and the distribution function of LVR can be constructed from the sum of many values of infinitesimal IL drawn from its distribution function in accordance with the central limit theorem.
  • For infinitesimal price changes, IL and LVR are mathematically identical, but over longer periods they diverge significantly. theoretical
    Source sentence
    6 Conclusion This paper has explored the intricate relationship between impermanent loss (IL), loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR), and the role of fees in automated market makers (AMMs). For infinitesimal price changes, IL and LVR are mathematically identical, despite their different interpretations.

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 34 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.

Cited References (44)

  1. Automated Market Making and Loss-Versus-Rebalancing (2022) — link
  2. An Economic Model of a Decentralized Exchange with Concentrated Liquidity (2023)
  3. Automated Market Making and Arbitrage Profits in the Presence of Fees — → 2305.14604
  4. Automated Market Makers: A Practical Guide to Decentralized Exchanges and Cryptocurrency Trading (2023) — link
  5. Theory and Practice of Revenue Management (2005)
  6. Decentralized exchanges (2021)
  7. The adoption of blockchain-based decentralized exchanges (2021) — link
  8. The need for fees at a dex: How increases in fees can increase dex trading volume (2022)
and 36 more
  1. Uniswap v1 Core (2018) — link
  2. Uniswap v2 Core (2020) — link
  3. Uniswap v3 Core (2021) — link
  4. Uniswap v4 Core [Draft] (2023) — link
  5. JOE v2.1 Liquidity Book (2022) — link
  6. ALGEBRA Ecosystem: Decentralized exchange (2022) — link
  7. Automatic market-making with dynamic peg (2021) — link
  8. Mooniswap by 1inch.exchange (2020) — link
  9. MEV capturing AMM (McAMM) (2022) — link
  10. Censorship Resistance in On-Chain Auctions (2023) — link
  11. Flash boys 2.0: Frontrunning in decentralized exchanges, miner extractable value, and consensus instability (2020)
  12. The Costs of Swapping on the Uniswap Protocol — → 2309.13648
  13. Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules (2022) — link
  14. High-frequency trading on decentralized on-chain exchanges (2021)
  15. The centralizing effects of private order flow on proposer-builder separation (2023) — link
  16. Logarithmic markets coring rules for modular combinatorial information aggregation (2007)
  17. A practical liquidity-sensitive automated market maker (2013)
  18. Twitter thread (2023) — link
  19. CEX/DEX arbitrage, transaction fees, block times, and LP profits (2024) — link
  20. UniswapX (2023) — link
  21. Radical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Society (2018)
  22. Triangle Fees — → 2306.17316
  23. Predictable Losses of Liquidity Provision in Constant Function Markets and Concentrated Liquidity Markets (2023) — link
  24. Decentralised Finance and Automated Market Making: Predictable Loss and Optimal Liquidity Provision — → 2309.08431
  25. Automated Market Makers Designs Beyond Constant Functions (2023)
  26. Automated Market Making and Loss-Versus-Rebalancing (2024) — link
  27. Optimal Dynamic Fees for Blockchain Resources (2023) — link
  28. Multidimensional Blockchain Fees are (Essentially) Optimal (2024) — link
  29. A theoretical framework for dynamical fee choice in AMMs — → 2404.03976
  30. Role of fee choice in revenue generation of AMMs: A quantitative study — → 2406.12417
  31. Impermanent loss and loss-vs-rebalancing I: some statistical properties — → 2410.00854
  32. Optimal Fees for Geometric Mean Market Makers (2021) — link
  33. A Note on Optimal Fees for Constant Function Market Makers (2021) — link
  34. Arbitrageurs’ profits, LVR, and sandwich attacks: batch trading as an AMM design response (2024) — link
  35. Measuring Arbitrage Losses and Profitability of AMM Liquidity — → 2404.05803
  36. MEV Capture Through Time-Advantaged Arbitrage (2024) — link

8 of 44 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.