Paper: arXiv 2312.00904

Authors: Christoph Kühn, Christopher Lorenz

Abstract

We present a new discrete time version of Kyle’s (1985) classic model of insider trading, formulated as a generalised extensive form game. The model has three kinds of traders: an insider, random noise traders, and a market maker. The insider aims to exploit her informational advantage and maximise expected profits while the market maker observes the total order flow and sets prices accordingly. First, we show how the multi-period model with finitely many pure strategies can be reduced to a (static) social system in the sense of Debreu (1952) and prove the existence of a sequential Kyle equilibrium, following Kreps and Wilson (1982). This works for any probability distribution with finite support of the noise trader’s demand and the true value, and for any finite information flow of the insider. In contrast to Kyle (1985) with normal distributions, equilibria exist in general only in mixed strategies and not in pure strategies. In the single-period model we establish bounds for the insider’s strategy in equilibrium. Finally, we prove the existence of an equilibrium for the game with a continuum of actions, by considering an approximating sequence of games with finitely many actions. Because of the lack of compactness of the set of measurable price functions, standard infinite-dimensional fixed point theorems are not applicable.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 8.5/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper is highly mathematical, focusing on proving existence of equilibria in a discrete-time Kyle model using game theory, fixed-point theorems, and measure theory, with no empirical data, backtests, or implementation details.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal:<br>Discrete-time Kyle Model<br>Equilibrium Analysis"] --> B["Methodology:<br>Generalised Extensive Form Game<br>Reduction to Debreu Social System"]
  B --> C["Key Setting:<br>Insider, Noise Traders, Market Maker<br>Finite Support Distributions"]
  C --> D["Computational Process:<br>Kreps-Wilson Existence Proof<br>Approximation Sequence for Continuum"]
  D --> E["Key Finding 1:<br>Equilibrium Exists in Mixed Strategies<br>Pure Strategies Not Guaranteed"]
  E --> F["Key Finding 2:<br>Equilibrium Bounds Established for<br>Single-Period Model"]
  F --> G["Key Finding 3:<br>Continuum of Actions Equilibrium Proven<br>via Finite-Action Approximation"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper proposes a new discrete‑time version of Kyle’s classic insider‑trading model formulated as a generalized extensive‑form game.

Source sentence
We present a new discrete time version of Kyle's (1985) classic model of insider trading, formulated as a generalised extensive form game. The model has three kinds of traders: an insider, random noise traders, and a market maker.

Assumes 4

  • The insider and the market maker are risk‑neutral. model
    Source sentence
    In the present paper, we specify the discrete time Kyle model with a risk-neutral insider 2 and market maker as a generalised extensive form game.
  • Noise‑trader demand and the true asset value have probability distributions with finite support. statistical
    Source sentence
    This works for any probability distribution with finite support of the noise trader's demand and the true value, and for any finite information flow of the insider. Rather, our approach works for any probability distribution with finite support of the noise trader’s demand and the true value, and for any finite information flow of the insider.
  • The insider receives a finite amount of private information (finite information flow). model
    Source sentence
    This works for any probability distribution with finite support of the noise trader's demand and the true value, and for any finite information flow of the insider. Rather, our approach works for any probability distribution with finite support of the noise trader’s demand and the true value, and for any finite information flow of the insider.
  • Time is discrete and the game has finitely many periods. other
    Source sentence
    We present a new discrete time version of Kyle's (1985) classic model of insider trading, formulated as a generalised extensive form game. First, we show how the multi-period model with finitely many pure strategies can be reduced to a (static) social system in the sense of Debreu (1952) and prove the existence of a sequential Kyle equilibrium, following Kreps and Wilson (1982).

Data

No dataset named in the text.

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result.

Finds 4

  • A sequential Kyle equilibrium exists for every discrete‑time Kyle game. theoretical
    Source sentence
    The main result of this section is the following. Theorem 2.16. Every Kyle game has a sequential Kyle equilibrium.
  • Equilibria generally exist only in mixed strategies and not in pure strategies. theoretical
    Source sentence
    In contrast to Kyle (1985) with normal distributions, equilibria exist in general only in mixed strategies and not in pure strategies.
  • Bounds for the insider’s equilibrium strategy are established in the single‑period model. theoretical
    Source sentence
    In the single-period model we establish bounds for the insider's strategy in equilibrium.
  • An equilibrium is proved for the game with a continuum of actions via an approximating sequence of finite‑action games. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Finally, we prove the existence of an equilibrium for the game with a continuum of actions, by considering an approximating sequence of games with finitely many actions.

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 16 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.