Investor Protection and Corporate Governance

ArXiv ID: ssrn-183908 “View on arXiv”

Authors: Unknown

Abstract

Recent research on corporate governance has documented large differences between countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth a

Keywords: corporate governance, ownership concentration, legal origin, shareholder rights, firm valuation, Equities

Complexity vs Empirical Score

• Math Complexity: 2.0/10
• Empirical Rigor: 3.0/10
• Quadrant: Philosophers
• Why: The paper presents a conceptual framework and cross-country legal analysis with minimal advanced mathematics, and it relies on institutional data and literature review rather than backtesting or computational implementation.

  flowchart TD
    A["Research Goal: How does investor protection<br>influence ownership concentration?"] --> B["Methodology: Cross-country<br>regression analysis"]
    B --> C["Data Inputs: Legal Origin<br>Shareholder Rights Index"]
    C --> D["Computational Process:<br>OLS Regression of Ownership<br>Concentration vs. Protection"]
    D --> E["Key Finding: Common Law origin<br>countries have lower ownership<br>concentration & higher firm valuation"]