Liberal Radicalism: A Flexible Design For Philanthropic Matching Funds

ArXiv ID: ssrn-3243656 “View on arXiv”

Authors: Unknown

Abstract

We propose a design for philanthropic or publicly-funded seeding to allow (near) optimal provision of a decentralized, self-organizing ecosystem of public goods

Keywords: public goods, decentralized ecosystems, mechanism design, seeding strategies, self-organization, Fixed Income / Public Sector

Complexity vs Empirical Score

• Math Complexity: 8.5/10
• Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10
• Quadrant: Lab Rats
• Why: The paper proposes a formal economic mechanism (Liberal Radicalism) based on quadratic funding, involving squareroot sums and nonlinear optimization, which is mathematically dense. However, it lacks empirical backtesting, datasets, or implementation details, focusing instead on theoretical models and philosophical implications.

  flowchart TD
    A["Research Question: How to optimally seed<br>decentralized public goods ecosystems?"] --> B["Method: Mechanism Design &<br>Mathematical Modeling"]
    B --> C{"Key Components"}
    C --> D["Input: Liberal Radicalism<br>Design Formula"]
    C --> E["Input: Community<br>Matching Funds"]
    D --> F["Process: Maximize Social<br>Welfare Function"]
    E --> F
    F --> G["Outcome: Near-Optimal<br>Public Goods Provision"]
    G --> H["Key Finding: Self-Organizing<br>Decentralized Seeding Strategy"]