Paper: arXiv 2511.20606
Authors: Yao Wu
Abstract
Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent’s internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market’s best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 8.5/10
- Empirical Rigor: 7.0/10
- Quadrant: Holy Grail — high math complexity, high empirical rigor
Why this score: The paper presents dense mathematical formalisms including state matrices, threshold impossibility theorems, and dynamic discrete choice models, warranting high math complexity. It also provides numerical experiments, a GitHub code repository, and connects to empirical data, indicating substantial implementation and backtesting components.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
A["Research Goal<br>Microstructure of Matching Markets<br>with Preference Spreads"] --> B["Methodology: Limit Order Book Framework"]
B --> C["Inputs: Latent Preference Matrices<br>Rigid Bid-Ask Spreads"]
C --> D["Computational Process<br>Dynamic Discrete Choice Model"]
D --> E{"Threshold Impossibility Test<br>Linear Compensation ?"}
E -- No --> F["Outcome: Structural Liquidity Constraints<br>Matching Failures & Slippage"]
E -- Yes --> G["Outcome: Identity Shift Required<br>High-Tier Zero Spread Executions"]
F & G --> H["Unified Theory: Microstructure explains<br>Compensation Inefficiency & Regret"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper proposes a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid‑ask spreads and a latent preference state matrix.
Source sentence
This paper proposes a market microstructure framework that formalizes mate selection not as a bargaining game, but as a Limit Order Book (LOB) system characterized by rigid bid–ask spreads.
Assumes 6
- Markets have rigid bid‑ask spreads that create a structural liquidity constraint. market
Source sentence
This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads.
- Individual preferences can be represented by a latent preference state matrix (LPSM). model
Source sentence
Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint.
- Linear compensation is bounded by a Bounded Utility Constraint and cannot close the spread unless it triggers a categorical regime switch. model
Source sentence
We formally demonstrate that this spread is structurally immune to linear compensation. Any financial transfer C intended to close ∆V faces a Bounded Utility Constraint: unless C is large enough to fundamentally reclassify the partner’s categorical identity (a “regime switch”), it functions merely as a price improvement within a rejected asset class, failing to trigger execution.
- Intrinsic values of agents follow a Beta distribution rather than a Gaussian distribution. statistical
Source sentence
4.1.1 Distributional Assumptions Unlike standard models assuming a Gaussian distribution of utility, we model the intrinsic value Vi using a Beta Distribution (mimicking the Gini Conical Structure described in Appendix F).
Show 2 more
- Compensation utility is clipped by a function h(C)=min(C·ε, C*cap), limiting the effect of price improvement. model
Source sentence
The effective utility is ˜Vi = Vi + h(C), where the utility function is subject to a Bounded Constraint: h(C) = min(C · ϵ, C⋆ cap).
- Execution occurs only when the market‑to‑book ratio θ crosses a time‑decaying liquidity threshold T(t). execution
Source sentence
Execution (marriage) occurs only when the market-to-book ratio θ crosses a time-decaying liquidity threshold T: Vreach Vuncond ≥T(t).
Data
- Agent‑based simulation of matching market synthetic unknown
Source sentence
4 Numerical Analysis of Execution Dynamics To evaluate the implications of the Internal Differential Model and the dynamic exe-cution rules, we conduct a series of numerical experiments. These simulations function as an agent-based stress test of the model, asking a core microstructure question: Under what conditions does price improvement (C) trigger execution, and under what conditions is the spread structurally
Costs
Not applicable
Finds 5
- The Threshold Impossibility Theorem is validated: the spread ΔV acts as a hard constraint that linear price improvement cannot bridge. theoretical
Source sentence
Conclusion: This validates the Threshold Impossibility Theorem: The spread ∆V acts as a hard constraint.
- Execution can be achieved via threshold decay (settling) even with a positive spread, as demonstrated in Experiment 2. theoretical
Source sentence
Setup: • Vuncond = 90 • Vreach = 70 • ∆V = 20 (Uncompensated Spread) • Market-to-Book Ratio: θ = 70/90 ≈0.78 We introduce a liquidity threshold T(t) that decays with inventory age (Table 2). Time (proxy for Age) t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 T (Threshold) 0.95 0.88 0.80 0.75 0.70 Equilibrium Snapshot: Time t1: θ(0.78) < T(0.95) ⇒Status: HOLD Time t3: θ(0.78) < T(0.80) ⇒Status: HOLD Time t4: θ(0.78) > T(0.75) ⇒Status: EXECUTE
- Numerical experiments show persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high‑tier zero‑spread executions. theoretical
Source sentence
Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions.
- Post‑match dissatisfaction is structurally isomorphic to execution slippage, i.e., the realized spread between internal ask and executed bid persists. theoretical
Source sentence
The model reveals that post-match dissatisfaction is structurally isomorphic to execution slippage in illiquid markets: the realized spread between the internal Ask and the executed Bid persists due to the invariance of the reference point.
- Liquidity drought imposed by the Gini‑Cone and rigid pricing regimes together bound execution probabilities. theoretical
Source sentence
Ultimately, we show that execution probabilities are bounded by dual structural con-straints: the geometric Liquidity Drought imposed by the “Gini Cone” (Appendix F) and the rigid Pricing Regimes derived from “Prior Liquidity Buckets” (Appendix E).
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 20 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.
Cited References (19)
- A Theory of Marriage: Part I (1973)
- A Theory of Marriage: Part II (1974)
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- Matching with transfers: The economics of love and marriage (2017)
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- Simple heuristics that make us smart (2000)
- The cost of transacting (1968)
- Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders (1985)
and 11 more
- The supply of dealer services in securities markets (1978)
- Limit order markets: A survey (2008)
- The implementation shortfall: Paper versus reality (1988)
- Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread (1986)
- Market Microstructure Theory (1995)
- Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk (1979)
- A model of reference-dependent preferences (2006)
- Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias (1991)
- Job Search and Labor Market Analysis (1986)
- The psychology of curiosity and counterfactual reasoning (2006)
- Utility of Gains and Losses: Measurement-Theoretic and Experimental Approaches (2005)
0 of 19 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.