Paper: arXiv 2406.00113

Authors: Ciamac C. Moallemi, Dan Robinson

Abstract

Milionis et al.(2023) studied the rate at which automated market makers leak value to arbitrageurs when block times are discrete and follow a Poisson process, and where the risky asset price follows a geometric Brownian motion. We extend their model to analyze another popular mechanism in decentralized finance for onchain trading: Dutch auctions. We compute the expected losses that a seller incurs to arbitrageurs and expected time-to-fill for Dutch auctions as a function of starting price, volatility, decay rate, and average interblock time. We also extend the analysis to gradual Dutch auctions, a variation on Dutch auctions for selling tokens over time at a continuous rate. We use these models to explore the tradeoff between speed of execution and quality of execution, which could help inform practitioners in setting parameters for starting price and decay rate on Dutch auctions, or help platform designers determine performance parameters like block times.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 8.0/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper presents a theoretical model for Dutch auctions on blockchains using geometric Brownian motion and Poisson-distributed block times, deriving closed-form analytical expressions for expected losses and time-to-fill, which indicates high mathematical density. However, the analysis is purely theoretical and simulation-based with no real-world backtesting, empirical data analysis, or implementation details for trading, placing it low on empirical rigor.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal"] -->|"Analyze"| B["Model Extension"]
  B -->|"Incorporate"| C["Key Parameters"]
  C -->|"Apply to"| D["Computational Analysis"]
  
  subgraph A ["Research Goal"]
      A1["Trade-off: Speed vs Quality<br>in Dutch Auctions"]
  end
  
  subgraph B ["Methodology"]
      B1["Extend Milionis et al.<br>Discrete-time AMM Model"]
      B2["Analyze Standard<br>Dutch Auctions"]
      B3["Analyze Gradual<br>Dutch Auctions"]
  end
  
  subgraph C ["Key Parameters"]
      C1["Starting Price"]
      C2["Volatility<br>(GBM)"]
      C3["Decay Rate"]
      C4["Poisson Block Time<br>Δt"]
  end
  
  subgraph D ["Computational Processes"]
      D1["Expected Loss to<br>Arbitrageurs"]
      D2["Expected<br>Time-to-Fill"]
  end
  
  subgraph E ["Findings"]
      E1["Parameter Trade-offs:<br>Speed vs Execution Quality"]
      E2["Practical Guidelines for<br>Platform Designers & Users"]
  end

  B --> C
  C --> D
  D --> E

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper extends the Milionis et al. model to Dutch and gradual Dutch auctions, deriving closed‑form expressions for expected loss to arbitrageurs and expected time‑to‑fill as functions of auction parameters.

Source sentence
We extend their model to analyze another popular mechanism in decentralized finance for onchain trading: Dutch auctions. In this paper, we apply a similar model to Dutch auctions and gradual Dutch auctions.

Assumes 6

  • Block generation times follow a Poisson process with mean inter‑block time Δt. statistical
    Source sentence
    For analytic tractability, block generation times are assumed to be from a Poisson process, an assumption we also make here. Contributions. We assume that blocks are generated according to a Poisson process5 of rate ∆t−1, where ∆t > 0 is the mean interblock time.
  • The underlying risky asset price follows a geometric Brownian motion with drift μ and volatility σ>0. model
    Source sentence
    Following the model of Milionis et al. [2023], we assume there exists the common fundamental value or price Pt at time t that follows a geometric Brownian motion price process, dPt Pt = µ dt + σ dWt, (1) where {Wt} is a Brownian motion, and the process is parameterized by drift µ and volatility σ > 0.
  • The ask price decays exponentially at a constant rate λ (i.e., dA_t/A_t = -λ dt). model
    Source sentence
    We assume At decreases exponentially according to4 dAt At = −λ dt, (2) with decay constant λ > 0.
  • Arbitrageurs are fully informed about the fundamental price and can only act at block generation times. market
    Source sentence
    We assume there is a population of “arbitrageurs”, or traders informed about the fundamental price Pt, who will buy from the agent at any discount to this price. Thus, if τ is a block generation time, and6 Aτ−< Pτ−, arbs trade until there is no marginal profit, and so that the ask price updates with Aτ = Pτ and zτ = 0.
Show 2 more
  • δ ≜ λ + μ – ½σ² > 0 to ensure trade occurs with probability 1 and finite expected time‑to‑trade. model
    Source sentence
    Assume that δ ≜λ + µ −1 2σ2 > 0.
  • Block proposers are independent short‑term profit‑maximizing agents. execution
    Source sentence
    We assume that each block proposer is independent and short-term profit-maximizing,7 and hence they would include and prioritize the top priority-fee-paying transaction in the block, allowing that buyer to win the trade.

Data

No dataset named in the text.

Costs

Unclear - sources disagree The platform classifier and the paper-text extraction give different answers, so no value is asserted.

Platform classifier: Not applicable

Paper text extraction: Not modeled

Source sentence (the authors' words)
This means that failed bidders typically do not need to pay transaction fees such as “gas” for their bids or leak any information about their intents.1 Similarly, the seller needs only consider the single, winning bid, resulting in a significant reduction in communication and computation complexity versus other auction formats such as first- or second-price auctions. Our focus in this paper, however, is on

Finds 5

  • Closed‑form expressions are derived for both loss‑versus‑fair (LVF) and expected time‑to‑fill (FT) for regular Dutch auctions as functions of volatility, drift, starting price, decay rate, and mean block time. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Given certain parameters for a Dutch auction — volatility, drift, starting price, decay rate, and average block arrival times — we derive closed-form expressions for both the losses to fair value and expected time-to-fill. For regular Dutch auctions, the amount of time to fill if the starting price of the auction is higher than the current price is given by the following formula, in which z0 is the (log) difference
  • For a starting price 0.1% above the current price, the expected time‑to‑fill is about 23.3 seconds. performance
    Source sentence
    For example, with the same parameters as above, and with starting price 0.1% higher than the current price, the expected time to fill is about 23.3 seconds.
  • Gradual Dutch auctions admit closed‑form expressions for expected loss and sales rate, showing how decay rate affects speed and loss trade‑off. theoretical
    Source sentence
    For gradual Dutch auctions, we find a closed form expression for the rate at which the asset is sold over time. These models show how changing the decay rate of the auction affects both speed of execution and expected loss, helping inform practitioners who want to trade off between those values when choosing auction parameters such as initial price and decay rate.
  • Changing the decay rate shifts the efficient frontier between speed of execution and expected loss, providing guidance for parameter selection. theoretical
    Source sentence
    We use these models to explore the tradeoff between speed of execution and quality of execution, which could help inform practitioners in setting parameters for starting price and decay rate on Dutch auctions, or help platform designers determine performance parameters like block times. These models show how changing the decay rate of the auction affects both speed of execution and expected loss, helping inform
  • A rule‑of‑thumb (Equation 7) suggests that to keep losses below 2 bps for assets with 5% daily volatility, block times must be under 2.75 seconds. performance
    Source sentence
    For example, the rule of thumb in Equation (7) suggests that if a platform wants to support Dutch auctions that lose less than 2 basis points for assets with daily volatility of 5%, it will need to have block times of less than 2.75 seconds.

Checked by others

Supported by

  • Measuring Arbitrage Losses and Profitability of AMM Liquidity (2024)
    On the question: What block time is needed to limit arbitrage losses on AMM liquidity?
    Compare the findings

    This paper: A rule‑of‑thumb (Equation 7) suggests that to keep losses below 2 bps for assets with 5% daily volatility, block times must be under 2.75 seconds.

    That paper: Faster block times reduce arbitrage losses, with 100 ms blocks cutting losses by 20 % to 70 % relative to Ethereum’s 12 s blocks, depending on the pair.

    Both link shorter blocks to lower losses; A shows 100 ms cuts losses 20‑70 %, B says <2.75 s keeps losses <2 bps for 5 % daily volatility.

Cited by 1 paper in the archive (1 by independent authors)

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.