Paper: arXiv 2507.13023
Authors: Fei Wu, Danning Sui, Thomas Thiery, Mallesh Pai
Abstract
This paper provides a comprehensive empirical analysis of the economics and dynamics behind arbitrages between centralized and decentralized exchanges (CEX-DEX) on Ethereum. We refine heuristics to identify arbitrage transactions from on-chain data and introduce a robust empirical framework to estimate arbitrage revenue without knowing traders’ actual behaviors on CEX. Leveraging an extensive dataset spanning 19 months from August 2023 to March 2025, we estimate a total of 233.8M USD extracted by 19 major CEX-DEX searchers from 7,203,560 identified CEX-DEX arbitrages. Our analysis reveals increasing centralization trends as three searchers captured three-quarters of both volume and extracted value. We also demonstrate that searchers’ profitability is tied to their integration level with block builders and uncover exclusive searcher-builder relationships and their market impact. Finally, we correct the previously underestimated profitability of block builders who vertically integrate with a searcher. These insights illuminate the darkest corner of the MEV landscape and highlight the critical implications of CEX-DEX arbitrages for Ethereum’s decentralization.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 3.5/10
- Empirical Rigor: 6.0/10 (capped from 8.0: no out-of-sample test; see penalty flags)
- Quadrant: Street Traders — empirical and applied, lower math complexity (effective empirical rigor capped from 8.0)
Why this score: The paper relies primarily on large-scale empirical data analysis, heuristics, and statistical estimation, with minimal heavy theoretical derivations or formulas. It demonstrates high empirical rigor through extensive data collection (19 months), detailed methodology for transaction identification, and concrete profit/loss calculations.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD A["Research Goal:<br>Quantify CEX-DEX arb economics & searcher profitability"] --> B["Methodology: Empirical on-chain analysis"] B --> C["Data: 19 months on Ethereum (Aug 2023 - Mar 2025)"] C --> D["Identification: Refined heuristics for CEX-DEX arb txs"] D --> E["Computation: Estimate revenue without CEX trade data"] E --> F["Analysis: Searcher concentration & builder relationships"] F --> G["Key Findings:<br>• $233.8M extracted by 19 searchers<br>• Top 3 searchers capture 75% volume<br>• Vertical integration boosts builder profitability<br>• Exclusive searcher-builder relationships exist"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper refines heuristics for identifying CEX‑DEX arbitrage transactions and introduces an empirical framework to estimate arbitrage revenue without observing the CEX leg.
Source sentence
We refine existing heuristics for identifying CEX-DEX arbitrage transactions [41, 51], signifi‑cantly expanding coverage and accuracy.
Assumes 6
- Searchers first establish token inventory on‑chain before hedging on off‑chain CEX venues. execution
Source sentence
We assume that searchers first establish token inventory positions through on-chain DEX trades before subsequently hedging these accumulated positions on off-chain CEX venues.
- Searchers hedge both directions on CEX within a very short window after confirming on‑chain trade execution. execution
Source sentence
In addition, we assume that searchers execute the hedge for both directions on CEX within a short timeframe or even instantaneously after confirming successful on-chain trade.
- 1 USDT is equal to 1 USD for pricing purposes. model
Source sentence
We assume 1 USDT = 1 USD, as most tokens are priced in USDT on Binance.
- Uniform hedge execution timing across all trades for each searcher. model
Source sentence
Our revenue estimation method—based on empirically derived optimal execution horizons across historical trades for each searcher—introduces approximation errors by assuming uniform hedge execution timing across all trades for each searcher.
Show 2 more
- Price impact of hedging is neglected, especially for low‑liquidity tokens. model
Source sentence
neglecting the price impact of hedging, particularly relevant for low‑liquidity tokens.
- Off‑chain rebates or Orderflow Auction refunds are not accounted for. other
Source sentence
Finally, we do not account for potential off-chain rebates or Orderflow Auction refunds, which might underestimate actual searcher PnL and overstate builder profits.
Data
- CEX‑DEX arbitrage transaction dataset crypto-onchain unknown
Source sentence
Leveraging an extensive dataset spanning 19 months from August 2023 to March 2025, we estimate a total of 233.8M USD extracted by 19 major CEX‑DEX searchers from 7,203,560 identified CEX‑DEX arbitrages.
- Binance USDT‑pair historical quote data market-prices public
Source sentence
by leveraging the superior liquidity of USDT pairs on Binance. To derive accurate USD prices for each token
- MEV‑Boost auction data crypto-onchain unknown
Source sentence
Integrating DEX trades data, CEX pricing, and MEV‑Boost data over 19 months from August 2023 to March 2025…
Binance Etherscan Tardis.dev CoinMarketCap
Costs
Unclear
Finds 4
- Searchers extracted an estimated total of 233.8 M USD from CEX‑DEX arbitrages over the sample period. performance
Source sentence
we estimate a total of 233.8M USD extracted by 19 major CEX‑DEX searchers from 7,203,560 identified CEX‑DEX arbitrages.
- Three searchers captured roughly three‑quarters of both volume and extracted value, indicating increasing centralization. statistical
Source sentence
Our analysis reveals increasing centralization trends as three searchers captured three‑quarters of both volume and extracted value.
- Pattern 1 searchers trade large (>10,000 USD) major‑token volumes with single‑digit bps gross returns; Pattern 2 searchers trade smaller (<5,000 USD) ALT tokens with higher (20‑120 bps) returns. performance
Source sentence
resulting in markedly higher gross returns ranging from 20 to 120 bps per trade.
- Searchers trading major tokens experience slower and smaller declines in gross returns after peak, reflecting lower price impact. statistical
Source sentence
We find a strong negative correlation, confirming that searchers predominantly trading major tokens experience slower and smaller gross return declines, reflective of reduced price impact.
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 27 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
4 papers in the archive : Arbitrage with bounded Liquidity ; Impact of Volatility on Time-Based Transaction Ordering …
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.
Cited References (96)
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- Mempool Hygrometer — link
- $\alpha$-rank: Multi-agent evaluation by evolution (2019)
- Strategic Bidding Wars in On-chain Auctions (2024) — link
- Time to Bribe: Measuring Block Construction Market (2023) — link
- Time is Money: Strategic Timing Games in Proof-of-Stake Protocols (2023) — link
- Game-theoretic Model for MEV-boost Auctions (MMA)
- Empirical analysis of Builders’ Behavioral Profiles (BBPs)
and 88 more
- Bid cancellations considered harmful
- Order flow, auctions and centralisation I - a warning
- Order flow, auctions and centralisation II - order flow auctions
- Illuminating The Order Flow Landscape
- The Centralizing Effects of Private Order Flow on Proposer-Builder Separation (2023)
- The cost of artificial latency in the PBS context — → 2312.09654
- Timing Games: Implications and Possible Mitigations
- Structural Advantages for Integrated Builders in MEV-Boost (2023) — link
- Flash boys 2.0: Frontrunning, transaction reordering, and consensus instability in decentralized exchanges (2019) — link
- Unity is Strength: A Formalization of Cross-Domain Maximal Extractable Value (2021) — link
- Quantifying blockchain extractable value: How dark is the forest? (2022)
- MEV-Boost
- The Influence of CeFi-DeFi Arbitrage on Order-Flow Auction Bid Profiles
- Time Moves Faster When There is Nothing You Anticipate: The Role of Time in MEV Rewards (2023) — link
- Latency is Money: Timing Games
- Honest Validator - Ethereum Consensus Specifications
- Decentralization of Ethereum’s Builder Market (2025) — link
- MEV Blocker
- MEV-Share
- The Future of MEV is SUAVE
- The MEVM, SUAVE Centauri, and Beyond
- MEV-Boost Analytics - Relay Scan
- Who Wins Ethereum Block Building Auctions and Why? (2024)
- Non-Atomic Arbitrage in Decentralized Finance — → 2401.01622
- Atomic MEV table — link
- DEX trading bot table — link
- dex.trades table on Ethereum — link
- Usage of Markout to Calculate LP Profitability in Uniswap V3
- Usage of Markout to Calculate LP Profitability in Uniswap V3
- Spot Trading Fee Rate
- Binance Spot historical data
- Cross-Chain Arbitrage: The Next Frontier of MEV in Decentralized Finance (2025) — link
- CEX-DEX transaction dataset Aug 2023 to Dec 2024
- DEX pool autocorrelation Aug 2023 to Dec 2024
- Zeromev
- Etherscan.io
- CoinMarketCap
- Empirical Analysis of Cross Domain CEX-DEX Arbitrage on Ethereum
- Dune Analytics
- High-frequency trading on decentralized on-chain exchanges (2021)
- CEX-DEX bots label list
- A new game in town
- A Tale of Two Arbitrages
- Aestus Timing Games as a Services
- Arkham
- Searcher-Builder Relationship Dashboard
- League of Legends Dashboard
- LVR.wtf
- mevboost.pics
- Ultra Sound Relay Bid Adjustment
- Builder Dominance and Searcher Dependence
- MEV Bid Data Explorer
- Available Token price data on Binance
- Proof-of-Stake (PoS) (2022)
- An empirical study of defi liquidations: Incentives, risks, and instabilities (2021)
- Automated market making and loss-versus-rebalancing (2022) — link
- Automated Market Making and Arbitrage Profits in the Presence of Fees — → 2305.14604
- From Competition to Centralization: The Oligopoly in Ethereum Block Building Auctions (2024) — link
- Ethereum’s Proposer-Builder Separation: Promises and Realities (2023)
- Dex Aggregator Trades table
- Uniswap X Fillers
- Atomic Arbitrages
- MEV Sandwich Trades
- Execution Welfare Across Solver-based DEXes (2025) — link
- BuilderNet
- Committee-driven MEV smoothing
- MEV Burn — a simple design
- Angstrom
- Blockchain censorship (2024)
- Censorship Resistance in On-Chain Auctions (2023) — link
- libMEV
- Stealth trading and volatility: Which trades move prices? (1993) — link
- Optimal Execution of Portfolio Transactions (2000)
- Performance of Algorithmic Trading Orders: Size, Speed, and Volume (2019)
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- Optimal control of execution costs (1998)
- Loss-Versus-Rebalancing under Deterministic and Generalized block-times — → 2505.05113
- MEV Capture and Decentralization in Execution Tickets — → 2408.11255
- CEX-DEX Transactions 202308-202503
- Becoming Immutable: How Ethereum is Made (2025) — link
- RediSwap: MEV Redistribution Mechanism for CFMMs (2024) — link
- Quantifying Arbitrage in Automated Market Makers: An Empirical Study of Ethereum ZK Rollups (2024)
- Statistical arbitrage on AMMs and block building on Ethereum (2024) — link
- Measuring Arbitrage Losses and Profitability of AMM Liquidity — → 2404.05803
- The Limits of Arbitrage (1997)
- Does a central clearing counterparty reduce counterparty risk? (2011)
- Competition for retail order flow and market quality (2022)
- EIP-7782: Reduce Block Latency
6 of 96 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.