Paper: arXiv 2408.11255

Authors: Jonah Burian, Davide Crapis, Fahad Saleh

Abstract

We provide an economic model of Execution Tickets and use it to study the ability of the Ethereum protocol to capture MEV from block construction. We demonstrate that Execution Tickets extract all MEV when all buyers are homogeneous, risk neutral and face no capital costs. We also show that MEV capture decreases with risk aversion and capital costs. Moreover, when buyers are heterogeneous, MEV capture can be especially low and a single dominant buyer can extract much of the MEV. This adverse effect can be partially mitigated by the presence of a Proposer Builder Separation (PBS) mechanism, which gives ET buyers access to a market of specialized builders, but in practice centralization vectors still persist. With PBS, ETs are concentrated among those with the highest ex-ante MEV extraction ability and lowest cost of capital. We show how it is possible that large investors that are not builders but have substantial advantage in capital cost can come to dominate the ET market.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 7.0/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 3.0/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper presents a formal economic model with equilibrium analysis, Propositions, and theoretical derivations about MEV capture under risk aversion and heterogeneity, indicating high mathematical complexity. However, it lacks empirical validation, backtesting, or implementation-heavy data, focusing instead on a theoretical framework without real-world datasets or performance metrics.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal:<br>Evaluate Execution Ticket (ET)<br>MEV capture and decentralization"] --> B["Methodology:<br>Economic Model & Game Theory"]
  
  B --> C["Key Inputs & Assumptions:<br>• Homogeneous vs. Heterogeneous Buyers<br>• Risk Neutrality/Aversion<br>• Capital Costs<br>• PBS Mechanism"]
  
  C --> D["Computational Process:<br>• Model MEV extraction incentives<br>• Analyze equilibrium strategies<br>• Simulate ET market dynamics"]
  
  D --> E
  
  subgraph E ["Key Findings/Outcomes"]
      F["Homogeneous Buyers:<br>ETs extract 100% MEV<br>(w/o risk/capital costs)"]
      G["Heterogeneity & Costs:<br>MEV capture drops;<br>Dominant buyers emerge"]
      H["PBS Mitigation & Limits:<br>Partial solution but<br>centralization persists<br>(High MEV/Low Cost capital wins)"]
  end

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper proposes an economic equilibrium model of Execution Tickets to analyze how the Ethereum protocol can capture Maximal Extractable Value (MEV).

Source sentence
We provide an economic model of Execution Tickets and use it to study the ability of the Ethereum protocol to capture MEV from block construction.

Assumes 6

  • All Execution Ticket buyers are homogeneous, risk‑neutral, and face no capital costs. model
    Source sentence
    We demonstrate that Execution Tickets extract all MEV when all buyers are homogeneous, risk neutral and face no capital costs.
  • Buyers may be risk‑averse and incur a positive cost of capital, which reduces their valuation of ETs. model
    Source sentence
    We also show that MEV capture decreases with risk aversion and capital costs.
  • MEV extraction for each builder is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across time. statistical
    Source sentence
    This latter point follows from {kb}b∈B being time-invariant and MEV extraction across buyers being i.i.d. Assumption For simplicity, we assumed that MEV extraction for each builder is i.i.d. across time and thus the endogenous stationary price of ETs is time-invariant.
  • In the baseline analysis, the model abstracts from MEV‑Boost and other market frictions. model
    Source sentence
    12 In our initial results, we abstract from MEV-Boost and, in this case, Rb,t represents the value extracted directly by buyer b in slot t.
Show 2 more
  • The number of Execution Tickets in the lottery pool is fixed at n in steady state. execution
    Source sentence
    In the steady state, there are n tickets. The winning ticket is removed from the pool (burned), and a new one is sold, maintaining the invariant of there always being n tickets in the lottery pool.
  • Buyers’ ex‑ante valuations drive purchase decisions; ex‑post performance does not affect primary market outcomes. model
    Source sentence
    That is, even if a second buyer would be better at extracting MEV in a particular slot ex post, the sample path of events from the slot is not known when the ET is issued (or even when the ET is assigned to a slot). As a consequence, purchase decisions in the primary market are necessarily driven by ex ante valuations and thus so long as one buyer has a higher expected MEV value for a block, that buyer would

Data

No dataset named in the text.

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result.

Finds 5

  • When buyers are homogeneous, risk‑neutral, and face no capital costs, the protocol extracts all MEV and ET holdings are decentralized. theoretical
    Source sentence
    We demonstrate that Execution Tickets extract all MEV when all buyers are homogeneous, risk neutral and face no capital costs.
  • MEV capture decreases as buyers become risk‑averse or incur positive capital costs; the protocol no longer captures all MEV. theoretical
    Source sentence
    We also show that MEV capture decreases with risk aversion and capital costs. ial: χ < 1 Nonetheless, in this case, there exists an equilibrium with full decentralization of ET holdings: ∀b ∈B : kb = N B Proposition 3 arises because risk-aversion and non-zero capital costs imply that buyers do not value ETs as equivalent to the MEV value of a single block.
  • With heterogeneous buyers, overall MEV capture can be low and a single dominant buyer can acquire most ETs, extracting a large share of MEV. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Moreover, when buyers are heterogeneous, MEV capture can be especially low and a single dominant buyer can extract much of the MEV. In turn, the best buyer purchases all ETs.
  • A Proposer‑Builder Separation (PBS) mechanism partially mitigates low capture, but centralization vectors persist, with ETs concentrating among buyers with the highest ex‑ante MEV ability and lowest capital costs. theoretical
    Source sentence
    This adverse effect can be partially mitigated by the presence of a Proposer Builder Separation (PBS) mechanism, which gives ET buyers access to a market of specialized builders, but in practice centralization vectors still persist. With PBS, ETs are concentrated among those with the highest ex-ante MEV extraction ability and lowest cost of capital.
  • Large investors with systematically lower capital costs can dominate the ET market even if they are not builders. theoretical
    Source sentence
    We show how it is possible that large investors that are not builders but have substantial advantage in capital cost can come to dominate the ET market. In Proposition 7, we further formalize that large investors with systematically better capital costs might come to dominate the ET buying market.

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 20 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Cited by 2 papers in the archive (2 by independent authors): The Marginal Effects of Ethereum Network MEV Transaction … (discusses its findings)

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.

Cited References (21)

  1. Economics of ethereum (2024)
  2. The Evolution of Decentralized Exchange: Risks, Benefits, and Oversight (2024)
  3. The specter (and spectra) of miner extractable value — → 2310.07865
  4. Flash boys 2.0: Frontrunning in decentralized exchanges, miner extractable value, and consensus instability (2020)
  5. Efficient Rollup Batch Posting Strategy on Base Layer (2022) — link
  6. MEV Documentation (2024)
  7. Ethereum’s Proposer-Builder Separation: Promises and Realities (2023) — link
  8. Centralization in Block Building and Proposer-Builder Separation (2024) — link
and 13 more
  1. Time is Money: Strategic Timing Games in Proof-of-Stake Protocols (2023) — link
  2. The Future of MEV (2024) — link
  3. Economic Analysis of Execution Tickets (2024)
  4. Execution Auctions as an Alternative to Execution Tickets (2024)
  5. Notes on Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) (2024)
  6. MEV-Boost Dashboard (2023) — link
  7. MEV-Boost
  8. Execution Tickets (2023)
  9. EIP-7547: Beacon Chain Withdrawals (2023)
  10. Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity with estimates of the variance of United Kingdom inflation (1982)
  11. Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (1986)
  12. Automated market making and loss-versus-rebalancing (2022) — link
  13. Upgrading Ethereum: A Technical Handbook on Ethereum’s Move to Proof of Stake and Beyond, Edition 0.3: Capella [WIP] (2023) — link

1 of 21 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.