Paper: arXiv 2503.02722
Authors: Guohui Guan, Jiaqi Hu, Zongxia Liang
Abstract
This paper studies the competition among multiple fund managers with relative performance over the excess logarithmic return. Fund managers compete with each other and have expected utility or mean-variance criteria for excess logarithmic return. Each fund manager possesses a unique risky asset, and all fund managers can also invest in a public risk-free asset and a public risk asset. We construct both an \(n\)-player game and a mean field game (MFG) to address the competition problem under these two criteria. We explicitly define and rigorously solve the equilibrium and mean field equilibrium (MFE) for each criteria. In the four models, the excess logarithmic return as the evaluation criterion of the fund leads to the {" allocation fractions"} being constant. The introduction of the public risky asset yields different outcomes, with competition primarily affecting the investment in public assets, particularly evident in the MFG. We demonstrate that the MFE of the MFG represents the limit of the \(n\)-player game’s equilibrium as the competitive scale \(n\) approaches infinity. Finally, the sensitivity analyses of the equilibrium are given.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 9.0/10
- Empirical Rigor: 3.0/10
- Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing
Why this score: The paper is highly mathematically complex, featuring rigorous derivation of n-player games and mean field games using advanced stochastic control and PDEs, but it is purely theoretical with no backtests, real data, or implementation details provided.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD Start["Research Goal<br>How does competition affect<br>fund manager portfolios?"] --> Method["Methodology<br>N-player Nash Equilibrium &<br>Mean Field Game MFG"] Method --> Inputs["Inputs & Assumptions<br>- Excess Logarithmic Return<br>- Relative Performance<br>- Public Risky Asset &<br>Public Risk-Free Asset"] Inputs --> Process["Computational Process<br>Solve HJB/PDE Equations for<br>1. n-Player Equilibrium<br>2. Mean Field Equilibrium"] Process --> Findings["Key Findings & Outcomes<br>- Optimal Allocation is Constant<br>- Competition shifts investment to<br>Public Risky Asset<br>- MFG is limit of n-player as n→∞"] Findings --> Sensitivity["Sensitivity Analysis<br>Impact of Volatility &<br>Risk Aversion on Allocation"] Sensitivity --> Final["Final Outcomes<br>Rigorous characterization of<br>Equilibrium and MFE"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper constructs both an n‑player game and a mean‑field game for fund managers competing on excess logarithmic returns and provides explicit equilibrium solutions for exponential utility and mean‑variance criteria.
Source sentence
We construct both an $n$-player game and a mean field game (MFG) to address the competition problem under these two criteria. We explicitly define and rigorously solve the equilibrium and mean field equilibrium (MFE) for each criteria.
Assumes 6
- There is only one public risky asset available for investment. model
Source sentence
For simplicity, we assume there is only one public risk asset, S∗.
- The risk‑free asset has a constant positive return rate κ > 0. market
Source sentence
The risk-free asset S0 has a return rate κ > 0.
- Public and private risky assets have higher expected returns than the risk‑free asset (µ > 0, µk > 0). market
Source sentence
Risky assets S∗and Sk are assumed to have higher expected returns than S0 (i.e., µ > 0 and µk > 0), making them attractive to risk-averse investors despite their volatility.
- All market parameters (κ, µ, µk, σ, νk, σk) are constant over time. market
Source sentence
Thus, the k-th fund manager can invest in S0, S∗, and Sk satisfying dS0 t S0 t = κdt, dS∗ t S∗ t = (κ + µ) dt + σdBt, dSk t Sk t = (κ + µk) dt + σkdBt + νkdW k t , k = 1, 2, · · · , n with constant market parameters κ ∈R+, µ ∈R+, µk ∈R+, σ ∈R+, νk ∈R+ and σk ∈R, k = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Show 2 more
- Fund managers evaluate performance by excess logarithmic return relative to a benchmark defined as a proportion of the average log‑return of all managers. model
Source sentence
For the k-th fund manager, the utility function U k(·) is based on the excess logarithmic return at the terminal time T , given by Rk,πk T −ϑ, where ϑ represents a benchmark logarithmic return. Specifically, ϑ = θkRT , RT := 1 n n X i=1 Ri,πi T , 0 ≤θk ≤1.
- Utility for the exponential‑utility criterion depends only on the excess logarithmic return at the terminal time. model
Source sentence
For the k-th fund manager, the utility function U k(·) is based on the excess logarithmic return at the terminal time T , given by Rk,πk T −ϑ, where ϑ represents a benchmark logarithmic return.
Data
No dataset named in the text.
Costs
Not applicable
Finds 5
- In all four models, using excess logarithmic return as the evaluation criterion leads to constant allocation fractions for each manager. theoretical
Source sentence
In the four models, the excess logarithmic return as the evaluation criterion of the fund leads to the { allocation fractions} being constant. Whether considering fund managers with exponential utility or those with a mean-variance criterion, and whether analyzing the n-player game or the MFG, the introduction of excess logarithmic returns results in a constant investment ratio.
- The mean‑field equilibrium (MFE) coincides with the limit of the n‑player game equilibrium as the number of managers n → ∞. theoretical
Source sentence
We demonstrate that the MFE of the MFG represents the limit of the $n$-player game's equilibrium as the competitive scale $n$ approaches infinity. The MFE of the MFG aligns with the equilibrium limit in the n-player game as n approaches infinity.
- Competition primarily influences investment in the public risky asset, while allocation to private risky assets remains unaffected by other managers' parameters. theoretical
Source sentence
The introduction of the public risky asset yields different outcomes, with competition primarily affecting the investment in public assets, particularly evident in the MFG. The inclusion of public risk assets significantly influences the outcomes, with the impact of competition mainly reflected in the investment in public risk assets.
- When the competition weight parameter θi increases (or risk aversion of others decreases), a manager’s allocation to the public risk asset S* rises. theoretical
Source sentence
An increase in the competition weight parameter θi or a decrease in the risk aversion parameter γi of any other fund manager i will lead to an increase in the allocation fraction of the k-th fund manager’s investment in the public risk asset S∗. 4.2.
- The allocation fraction in the public risky asset can be decomposed into a component that ignores competition and a component that hedges competitive risk. theoretical
Source sentence
The allocation fraction in public risky assets can be divided into two components: one that ignores competition and one that hedges competitive risk.
Checked by others
Supported by
- Predictable Relative Forward Performance Processes: Multi-Agent and Mean Field Games for Portfolio Management
Compare the findings
This paper: When the competition weight parameter θi increases (or risk aversion of others decreases), a manager’s allocation to the public risk asset S* rises.
That paper: The competition‑induced component of the strategy is always positive, implying that relative performance concerns encourage higher risky investment among CARA agents.
Contradicted by
- Mean Field Game of Optimal Tracking Portfolio
Compare the findings
This paper: When the competition weight parameter θi increases (or risk aversion of others decreases), a manager’s allocation to the public risk asset S* rises.
That paper: Numerical sensitivity analysis shows that a higher competition weight λ reduces the expected largest shortfall and leads to more conservative portfolio allocations, while higher market‑index volatility σZ reduces the expected largest shortfall and induces non‑
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Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.
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- Measuring skill in the mutual fund industry (2015)
- Robust portfolio selection problems (2003)
- Investor sentiment and the mean–variance relation (2011)
- Supply chain risk analysis with mean-variance models: A technical review (2016)
- Robust optimization approaches for portfolio selection: a comparative analysis (2024)
- Portfolio selection in stochastic environments (2007)
- How active is your fund manager? A new measure that predicts performance (2009)
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- Continuous-time stochastic control and optimization with financial applications (2009)
- Controlled Markov processes and viscosity solutions (2006)
0 of 31 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.