Paper: arXiv 2401.01427

Authors: Liam Welsh, Sebastian Jaimungal

Abstract

One approach to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is to incentivize carbon capturing and carbon reducing projects while simultaneously penalising excess GHG output. In this work, we present a novel market framework and characterise the optimal behaviour of GHG offset credit (OC) market participants in both single-player and two-player settings. The single player setting is posed as an optimal stopping and control problem, while the two-player setting is posed as optimal stopping and mixed-Nash equilibria problem. We demonstrate the importance of acting optimally using numerical solutions and Monte Carlo simulations and explore the differences between the homogeneous and heterogeneous players. In both settings, we find that market participants benefit from optimal OC trading and OC generation.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 8.5/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 7.0/10
  • Quadrant: Holy Grail — high math complexity, high empirical rigor

Why this score: The paper employs advanced stochastic control, optimal stopping, and game theory (e.g., solving QVIs via finite-difference schemes) and is validated through Monte Carlo simulations and numerical solutions for market behavior.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal<br>Optimize GHG Offset Credit<br>Market Participation"] --> B["Key Methodology<br>Optimal Stopping & Control<br>Game Theory (Nash Equilibrium)"]
  B --> C["Data & Inputs<br>Simulation Parameters<br>Player Characteristics"]
  C --> D["Computational Process<br>Monte Carlo Simulations"]
  D --> E["Key Outcomes<br>Optimal OC Trading Strategies<br>Value of Acting Optimally<br>Homogeneous vs Heterogeneous Players"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper proposes a novel greenhouse gas offset credit market framework that characterises optimal behaviour of participants using stochastic control and game theory, and provides numerical solutions for single‑player and two‑player settings.

Source sentence
In this work, we present a novel market framework and characterise the optimal behaviour of GHG offset credit (OC) market participants in both single-player and two-player settings. Here, we develop a novel framework that characterises player behaviour in a multi-player GHG OC market in the form of a bi-matrix game.

Assumes 6

  • Regulated firms must hold a deterministic OC requirement R at the end of the compliance period. market
    Source sentence
    In our setting, we assume that a regulated firm has an emission limit in units of MtCO2e at the end of a regulatory period at time T. Excess emissions over this limit, denoted by R, must be covered using OCs. We assume R to be deterministic and exogenously determined.
  • The penalty for shortfall is linear and given by G(x)=−p(R−x)+. model
    Source sentence
    The penalty structure implemented in Canada is linear and the penalty value per emission excess is growing each year (Sadikman et al., 2022). Thus, we impose a penalty structure at the end of a compliance period of G(x) := −p (R −x)+ , (1) where y+ := max(y, 0) and x represents a firm’s OC inventory.
  • The OC spot price follows a Brownian bridge that converges to the penalty value p at the terminal time. model
    Source sentence
    In particular, we choose to model the price as a Brownian bridge, such that at T the spot price equals the marginal price of an OC induced by the penalty given in (1). The choice of dynamics for the OC price forces the value of the OC spot price at time t = T to be equal to the penalty value p and the OC price also converges to the penalty value p as t →T, thus avoiding any potential arbitrage opportunity that firms
  • Trading incurs a quadratic stylised transaction cost κ/2∫ν_t^2 dt. model
    Source sentence
    We further apply a trading friction in the form of a stylised transaction cost of κ 2 R T 0 ν2 t dt. This results in firms mitigating the speed at which they trade, and it may represent a combination of real and fictitious costs.
Show 2 more
  • No trading or generation can occur at the terminal time T. execution
    Source sentence
    We assume that no trading or generating can take place at the terminal time t = T, hence any OCs that are to be used for regulatory purposes must be procured prior to the regulatory date.
  • Firms have a fixed generation capacity ξ and incur a constant cost c per generation event. model
    Source sentence
    We assume that a firm has a fixed generation capacity of ξ, such that if a firm chooses to generate at time τ ∈[0, T], their inventory jumps by ξ, so that Xτ = Xτ −+ ξ, where Xt−:= lims↑t Xs. The cost of generating these OCs is denoted c.

Data

  • Synthetic OC price and inventory simulation synthetic unknown
    Source sentence
    Specifically, in this single-10 player environment we take ξ = 0.1 OCs, c = $0.25, R = 5, and the penalty p = $2.50 per OC below the requirement R. The model parameters are provided in Table 1. We use 100 time steps between the initial time t = 0 and the terminal time t = T and set the compliance period to be one month, T = 1/12 years.

Costs

Modeled Costs are part of the reported headline results.

Quadratic transaction cost of κ/2∫ν_t^2 dt with κ=0.03 (see Table 1).

Source sentence
We further apply a trading friction in the form of a stylised transaction cost of κ 2 R T 0 ν2 t dt. T (years) σ κ η ξ c S0 R Penalty 1/12 0.5 0.03 0.05 0.1 0.25 2.5 5 2.5 Table 1: Simulation parameters for single-player market.

Finds 5

  • Market participants benefit from optimal OC trading and generation, achieving better terminal PnL than incurring the full penalty. performance
    Source sentence
    We demonstrate the importance of acting optimally using numerical solutions and Monte Carlo simulations and explore the differences between the homogeneous and heterogeneous players. For both players, the terminal PnL is always better than incurring the full penalty and their downside risk is completely eliminated.
  • Players interacting with heterogeneous counterparts (different generation capacities) achieve higher mean PnL and lower downside risk than homogeneous counterparts. performance
    Source sentence
    Player one achieves slightly better terminal statistics than player two, which we attribute to their lower costs to generate OCs. Both players achieve superior terminal statistics than their homogeneous counterparts however, demonstrating the mutual benefits of interacting with players with larger generation capacity.
  • The scale of a player’s OC generating projects critically determines their optimal strategy and influences the Nash equilibria in the two‑player game. theoretical
    Source sentence
    We found the scale of a player’s OC generating projects plays a vital role in determining their behaviour and heavily influences the Nash equilibria of the two-player game. In the instances of the two-player game we analysed, players had well defined decision boundaries between trading OCs and generating OC.
  • Investing in GHG‑reducing and capturing projects completely mitigates downside risk even when marginal generation cost equals the penalty value. performance
    Source sentence
    All simulations we performed demonstrated the importance of investing in GHG reducing and capturing projects from a financial perspective by completely mitigating downside risk, even under the strict choice that the marginal cost to generate one OC is equal to the penalty value.
  • The explicit‑implicit finite‑difference scheme successfully computes value functions and Nash equilibria without numerical instability caused by the OC price dynamics. other
    Source sentence
    The explicit-implicit FD scheme constructed for the numerical implementation allowed us to estimate the players’ value functions and Nash equilibria avoiding numerical instabilities that would have been caused by the OC price’s dynamics in an entirely explicit scheme. This choice of OC price dynamics allowed for a more realistic and arbitrage-free market model due to the convergence to the penalty value at the end

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 21 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Cited by 1 paper in the archive

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.

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0 of 59 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.