Paper: arXiv 2407.10561
Authors: Álvaro Cartea, Sebastian Jaimungal, Leandro Sánchez-Betancourt
Abstract
We study the perfect information Nash equilibrium between a broker and her clients – an informed trader and an uniformed trader. In our model, the broker trades in the lit exchange where trades have instantaneous and transient price impact with exponential resilience, while both clients trade with the broker. The informed trader and the broker maximise expected wealth subject to inventory penalties, while the uninformed trader is not strategic and sends the broker random buy and sell orders. We characterise the Nash equilibrium of the trading strategies with the solution to a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). We solve this system explicitly and study the effect of information, profitability, and inventory control in the trading strategies of the broker and the informed trader.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 9.0/10
- Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10
- Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing
Why this score: The paper heavily employs advanced mathematical concepts including forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) and matrix Riccati differential equations to characterize the Nash equilibrium, resulting in a high math complexity score. In contrast, it lacks code, statistical metrics, or backtesting details, relying instead on theoretical derivations and generic simulations, which gives it a low empirical rigor score.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD A["Research Goal:<br>Nash Equilibrium between Broker & Clients"] --> B["Key Methodology:<br>Forward-Backward SDEs (FBSDE)"] B --> C["Model Setup:<br>Broker, Informed &<br>Uninformed Traders"] C --> D["Market Assumption:<br>Transient Price Impact with<br>Exponential Resilience"] C --> E["Client Behavior:<br>Informed (Optimal) vs.<br>Uninformed (Random)"] D & E --> F["Computational Process:<br>Derive Coupled FBSDE System"] F --> G["Solution Strategy:<br>Explicit Closed-Form<br>Nash Equilibrium"] G --> H["Key Findings:<br>Equilibrium Strategies,<br>Impact of Info, Profit, Inventory"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper proposes a perfect‑information Nash equilibrium model between a broker and an informed trader, characterises the equilibrium via a coupled system of forward‑backward stochastic differential equations and provides an explicit closed‑form solution.
Source sentence
We study the perfect information Nash equilibrium between a broker and her clients -- an informed trader and an uniformed trader. We characterise the Nash equilibrium of the trading strategies with the solution to a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs).
Assumes 6
- The broker trades on a lit exchange with instantaneous and transient price impact that decays exponentially. market
Source sentence
In our model, the broker trades in the lit exchange where trades have instantaneous and transient price impact with exponential resilience, while both clients trade with the broker.
- The uninformed trader sends random buy and sell orders and is not strategic. model
Source sentence
The informed trader and the broker maximise expected wealth subject to inventory penalties, while the uninformed trader is not strategic and sends the broker random buy and sell orders.
- Trading speeds ν, η, ξ belong to the square‑integrable space H². execution
Source sentence
The broker trades with speed (νt)t∈T, the informed trader trades with speed (ηt)t∈T, and the uninformed trader trades with speed (ξt)t∈T. We assume that ν, η, ξ ∈H2 where H2 = n (γt)t∈T | γ is F−progressively measurable, and ∥γ∥2 := E hR T 0 (γs)2 d[MS, MS]s i < +∞ o ,
- The decay coefficient p is non‑negative and the instantaneous impact parameter h is non‑negative. model
Source sentence
2 We made the simplifying assumption that the signal enters the price as R t 0 αs ds as opposed to having it as a 3 p ≥0 is a decay coefficient, and h ≥0 is the parameter controlling the instantaneous effect of the broker’s trading on the transient impact.
Show 2 more
- The broker’s inventory penalty parameter φ satisfies φ ≥ 0 and a > p h T². model
Source sentence
We let φ = ϕ −1 2 h , (2.10) and we assume that φ ≥0 and that a > p h T 2. These are non-restrictive technical assumptions which are sufficient conditions to guarantee strict concavity of JB up to null sets, and that we also use to prove existence of a non-symmetric matrix Riccati differential equation that arises in the closed-form solution to Nash equilibrium of the problem.
- The signal process α_t is square‑integrable and progressively measurable. model
Source sentence
(2.1) where (MS t )t∈T is a square-integrable martingale with respect to (Ft)t∈T. The midprice process is denoted by (St)t∈T and is given by St = S0 + Z t 0 αs ds | {z } signal + Yt |{z} impact +MS t , (2.2) where the broker’s price price impact (Yt)t∈T satisfies dYt = (h νt −p Yt) dt , Y0 ∈R , (2.3) and the trading signal process (αt)t∈T is square-integrable and progressively measurable.2 Here,
Data
No dataset named in the text.
Costs
Modeled
Instantaneous transaction costs a, b, c appear in the cash dynamics and inventory penalties φ, ψ, r_I, r_B are included in the performance criteria.
Source sentence
The inventory process QB and cash process XB of the broker satisfy the equations dQB t = (νt −ηt −ξt) dt , QB 0 = qB ∈R , (2.4) dXB t = −(St + a νt) νt dt + (St + b ηt) ηt dt + (St + c ξt) ξt dt , XB 0 = 0 , (2.5) where the positive constants a, b, c represent instantaneous transaction costs. The performance criterion of the informed trader is JI(ν, η), given by JI(ν, η) = E XI T + QI T ST −ψ �QI T 2 −rI Z T 0
Finds 3
- A unique solution to the Nash‑equilibrium FBSDE exists if and only if a corresponding matrix Riccati differential equation admits a solution. theoretical
Source sentence
We show that there is a unique solution to the FBSDE that characterises the Nash equilibrium if and only if there is a solution to a matrix Riccati differential equation.
- The equilibrium strategies are strictly concave in each player’s control, guaranteeing well‑defined best responses. theoretical
Source sentence
We show that for a large set of admissible controls: (i) for fixed trading speed ν of the broker, the map η →JI(ν, η) is strictly concave, and (ii) for fixed trading speed η of the informed trader, the map ν →JB(ν, η) is strictly concave.
- In simulations the informed trader’s mean mark‑to‑market improves by about 37 basis points while the broker’s mean mark‑to‑market falls by about 91 basis points when moving from a two‑stage optimisation to the perfect‑information Nash equilibrium. performance
Source sentence
The mean mark-to-market (MtM) of the informed trader increases by roughly 37 basis points (bps) when going from the two-stage optimisation in Cartea and S´anchez-Betancourt (2022) to the Nash equilibrium, whereas the broker decreases their mean MtM by 91 bps. A t-test shows, with 90% confidence, that the average MtM of the samples generated by both the Nash and two-stage optimisation are statistically different (for
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 16 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
11 papers in the archive : When a Correct Reward Is Not Enough: Diagnosing and Guiding … ; Regulation or Competition: Major-Minor Optimal Liquidation …
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.
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- Unwinding Toxic Flow with Partial Information — → 2407.04510
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- Equilibrium in Functional Stochastic Games with Mean-Field Interaction — → 2306.05433
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5 of 47 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.