Paper: arXiv 2311.01086
Authors: Miryana Grigorova, Marie-Claire Quenez, Yuan Peng
Abstract
In this paper, we study a non-zero-sum game with two players, where each of the players plays what we call Bermudan strategies and optimizes a general non-linear assessment functional of the pay-off. By using a recursive construction, we show that the game has a Nash equilibrium point.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 9.5/10
- Empirical Rigor: 1.0/10
- Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing
Why this score: The paper presents a highly abstract, theoretical stochastic game framework with advanced tools like backward stochastic differential equations and nonlinear risk measures, but contains no empirical data, code, or backtesting results.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD A["Research Goal: Find Nash Equilibrium in<br>Non-Zero-Sum Dynkin Games with<br>Bermudan Strategies & Non-Linear Payoffs"] --> B["Methodology: Recursive Construction"] B --> C["Input: General Non-Linear<br>Assessment Functionals"] C --> D["Computational Process:<br>Value Iteration &<br>Fixed Point Analysis"] D --> E["Outcome: Proven Existence<br>of Nash Equilibrium"] E --> F["Application: Pricing<br>Derivatives/Contingent Claims"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper proposes a non-zero-sum Dynkin game with two players using Bermudan stopping strategies and shows that, under general non‑linear assessment functionals, the game admits a Nash equilibrium point.
Source sentence
In this paper, we study a non-zero-sum game with two players, where each of the players plays what we call Bermudan strategies and optimizes a general non-linear assessment functional of the pay-off. In Section 3, we present our main results and show that the non-linear non-zero-sum game with Bermudan strategies has a Nash equilibrium point.
Assumes 3
- A fixed finite terminal horizon T > 0 is given. model
Source sentence
2 The framework Let T ą 0 be a fixed finite terminal horizon.
- The evaluation operators ρ1 and ρ2 satisfy properties (i)–(ix) (admissibility, knowledge preservation, monotonicity, consistency, generalized zero‑one law, monotone Fatou, LUSC, etc.). other
Source sentence
We assume that both ρ1 and ρ2 satisfy the properties (i) - (ix). We will investigate the problem of existence of a Nash equilibrium strategy pτ ˚ 1 , τ ˚ 2 q. Definition 2.
- The probability space (Ω,ℱ,ℙ) is complete with a right‑continuous filtration. model
Source sentence
Let pΩ, F, Pq be a (complete) probability space equipped with a right-continuous complete filtration F “ tFt: t P r0, Tsu.
Data
No dataset named in the text.
Costs
Not applicable
Finds 2
- Under the stated assumptions, there exists a Nash equilibrium point for the non‑linear non‑zero‑sum Dynkin game with Bermudan strategies. theoretical
Source sentence
Under assumptions (i) - (ix) on ρ1 and ρ2, there exists a Nash equilibrium point pτ ˚ 1 , τ ˚ 2 q for the game described above.
- A recursive construction yields a sequence of stopping times that converges to a Nash equilibrium. theoretical
Source sentence
We will construct a sequence pτ2n`1, τ2nqnPN (by induction), for which we will show that it converges to a Nash equilibrium point. We set τ1 :“ T and τ2 :“ T. We suppose that τ2n´1 P Θ and τ2n P Θ have been defined.
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 12 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.