Paper: arXiv 2609.37963
Authors: Agathe Sadeghi, Dingyue Liu, Ciamac Moallemi, Xin Wan, Brian Zhu
Abstract
Liquidity provision in automated market makers is typically analyzed at the pool level, implicitly assuming LP homogeneity. This aggregate view can hide how liquidity provision outcomes differ between LP strategies, particularly as concentrated liquidity AMM designs operating on high-performance blockchains allow liquidity to be actively repositioned around trades. We develop a markout-based framework to decompose Uniswap LP profitability into active and passive components using two complementary methods: a LIFO subtraction method that matches short-lived mint-burn positions and attributes swap-level markouts by liquidity share; and an infinitesimal LP benchmark that estimates the performance of a fully passive, always-in-range marginal LP directly from the AMM price path. We apply these methods to Uniswap v2, v3, and v4 pools on Ethereum, Arbitrum, and Base chains, and find passive profitability can materially differ from aggregate pool profitability.In Uniswap v2, with liquidity distributed evenly and active LP behavior nearly absent, the overall and passive markouts are almost the same. In contrast, concentrated-liquidity pools have a systematic active-passive gap: passive LPs tend to underperform aggregate pool-level measures. The gap is wider on Ethereum than on L2s, consistent with active liquidity provision being more useful when block times and ordering conditions allow LPs to react to incoming flow. In general, passive LPs perform better on higher fee pools. The LIFO and infinitesimal estimates are generally consistent directionally across most pools, providing evidence of the robustness of the decomposition. The results suggest that adverse selection in AMMs is not evenly distributed among LPs, with important implications for LP strategy, fee-tier design and measurement of DEX market quality.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 6.5/10
- Empirical Rigor: 6.0/10 (capped from 8.0: no out-of-sample test; see penalty flags)
- Quadrant: Holy Grail — high math complexity, high empirical rigor (effective empirical rigor capped from 8.0)
Why this score: This paper introduces a novel markout-based framework to decompose LP profitability, addressing a significant gap in AMM research. Its empirical application across multiple Uniswap versions and chains, using two complementary methods, demonstrates strong rigor. The findings have important implications for LP strategy and DEX market quality.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
A["Research Goal: Decompose LP Profitability in AMMs & Quantify Active-Passive Gap"] --> B{"Methodology: Decompose LP Profitability"};
B --> C{"Data/Inputs: Uniswap v2, v3, v4 Pool Data (Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base)"};
C --> D["Computational Processes: LIFO Subtraction & Infinitesimal LP Benchmark"];
D --> E["Key Findings: Passive LPs Underperform Aggregate Pool (Active-Passive Gap)"];
E --> F["Further Findings: Gap Wider on Ethereum, Passive LPs Better in Higher Fee Pools, Adverse Selection Unevenly Distributed"];
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper proposes a markout‑based framework that decomposes Uniswap liquidity provider profitability into active and passive components using a LIFO subtraction method and an infinitesimal LP benchmark.
Source sentence
We develop a markout‑based framework to decompose Uniswap LP profitability into active and passive components using two complementary methods: a LIFO subtraction method that matches short‑lived mint‑burn positions and attributes swap‑level markouts by liquidity share; and an infinitesimal LP benchmark that estimates th
Assumes 6
- Profitability is measured as fee‑inclusive, short‑horizon LP profit and loss via markout. model
Source sentence
Throughout, profitability means fee‑inclusive, short‑horizon LP profit and loss measured through markout: the value transferred through…
- Events are ordered lexicographically by block number, transaction index, and log index to preserve execution sequence. execution
Source sentence
We order events lexicographically by block number, transaction index, and log index. This ordering preserves the execution sequence of swaps and liquidity events within a block even when several transactions share the same block timestamp.
- The LIFO classification operates at the on‑chain address level, making multi‑address strategies a lower‑bound on active share. data
Source sentence
Our LIFO classification operates at the on‑chain address level (Section 4), so multi‑address strategies and pooled vaults are misclassified and the LIFO active share is a lower bound on strategic provision.
- The infinitesimal benchmark corresponds to a full‑range (always‑in‑range) passive LP position. model
Source sentence
The infinitesimal benchmark corresponds to a full‑range position; finite‑width passive LPs face more adverse selection per unit of liquidity, making the estimate a floor on their markout cost.
Show 2 more
- The sample covers on‑chain data from February 1 to November 30 2025 on Ethereum, Arbitrum, and Base. data
Source sentence
Our dataset covers Ethereum Mainnet, Arbitrum, and Base over the period from February 1st to November 30th, 2025.
- Only high‑volume pools above a $10M TVL floor are included, excluding the long tail. data
Source sentence
and the sample is restricted to selected high‑volume pools above a $10M floor, excluding the noisier long tail.
Data
- Uniswap v2, v3, v4 pool data (Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base) crypto-onchain public
Source sentence
Our dataset covers Ethereum Mainnet, Arbitrum, and Base over the period from February 1st to November 30th, 2025
Costs
Modeled
Profitability measures are fee‑inclusive, incorporating the AMM trading fees earned by LPs.
Source sentence
Throughout, profitability means fee‑inclusive, short‑horizon LP profit and loss measured through markout
Finds 5
- In Uniswap v2, overall and passive markouts are nearly identical, confirming homogeneity of LPs. performance
Source sentence
The clearest pattern is that v2 is a benchmark case: overall and passive LIFO markouts are nearly identical across all pools, consistent with the lack of concentrated active liquidity provision.
- In v3 and v4 pools, passive LIFO markouts are often worse than overall pool markouts, indicating an active‑passive gap. performance
Source sentence
Aggregate pool‑level profitability can mask passive liquidity performance, as passive LIFO markouts are often different from overall markouts. For some of the Ethereum v3 pools the passive LIFO is much worse than the overall markout.
- Specific example: USDC‑WETH 5 bps v3 pool goes from –1.15 bps overall to –1.51 bps passive LIFO; USDT‑WETH 5 bps from –0.91 bps to –1.31 bps. performance
Source sentence
For example USDC‑WETH 5 bps goes from −1.15 bps overall to −1.51 bps for passive LIFO and USDT‑WETH 5 bps goes from −0.91 bps to −1.31 bps.
- The active‑passive gap is wider on Ethereum than on L2s, and larger in low‑fee tiers where active JIT liquidity can target incoming flow. performance
Source sentence
The gap is wider on Ethereum than on L2s, consistent with active liquidity provision being more useful when block times and ordering conditions allow LPs to react to incoming flow.
- Passive LPs tend to perform better on higher‑fee pools, and the two estimation methods (LIFO and infinitesimal) are directionally consistent across most pools. performance
Source sentence
In general, passive LPs perform better on higher fee pools. The LIFO and infinitesimal estimates are generally consistent directionally across most pools, providing evidence of the robustness of the decomposition.
Checked by others
Supported by
- Generalizing Impermanent Loss on Decentralized Exchanges with Constant Function Market Makers
Compare the findings
This paper: In v3 and v4 pools, passive LIFO markouts are often worse than overall pool markouts, indicating an active‑passive gap.
That paper: In both UniswapV3 and BalancerV2 simulations, the passive pool suffers more from impermanent loss than it gains from fees.
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.
Cited References (19)
- Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders (1985)
- Continuous auctions and insider trading (1985)
- Flow toxicity and liquidity in a high-frequency world (2012)
- Improved price oracles: Constant function market makers (2020)
- Automated market making and loss-versus-rebalancing (2022) — link
- The paradox of just-in-time liquidity in decentralized exchanges: More providers can lead to less liquidity (2024)
- Risks and returns of uniswap v3 liquidity providers (2022)
- Liquidity Math in Uniswap v3 (2021)
and 11 more
- Uniswap v3 Core (2021)
- FLAIR: A metric for liquidity provider competitiveness in automated market makers — → 2306.09421
- Just-in-time Liquidity on the Uniswap Protocol (2022)
- Demystifying Just-in-Time (JIT) Liquidity Attacks on Uniswap V3 (2023)
- Strategic Analysis of Just-In-Time Liquidity Provision in Concentrated Liquidity Market Makers (2025)
- Measuring Arbitrage Losses and Profitability of AMM Liquidity — → 2404.05803
- Quantifying Blockchain Extractable Value: How Dark is the Forest? (2022)
- An economic model of a decentralized exchange with concentrated liquidity (2025)
- Decentralized Exchange: The U niswap Automated Market Maker (2025)
- What Drives Liquidity on Decentralized Exchanges? Evidence from the U niswap Protocol — → 2410.19107
- Strategic Liquidity Provision in U niswap v3 (2023)
3 of 19 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.