Paper: arXiv 2402.09129

Authors: Michael J. Curry, Zhou Fan, David C. Parkes

Abstract

The role of a market maker is to simultaneously offer to buy and sell quantities of goods, often a financial asset such as a share, at specified prices. An automated market maker (AMM) is a mechanism that offers to trade according to some predetermined schedule; the best choice of this schedule depends on the market maker’s goals. The literature on the design of AMMs has mainly focused on prediction markets with the goal of information elicitation. More recent work motivated by DeFi has focused instead on the goal of profit maximization, but considering only a single type of good (traded with a numeraire), including under adverse selection (Milionis et al. 2022). Optimal market making in the presence of multiple goods, including the possibility of complex bundling behavior, is not well understood. In this paper, we show that finding an optimal market maker is dual to an optimal transport problem, with specific geometric constraints on the transport plan in the dual. We show that optimal mechanisms for multiple goods and under adverse selection can take advantage of bundling, both improved prices for bundled purchases and sales as well as sometimes accepting payment “in kind.” We present conjectures of optimal mechanisms in additional settings which show further complex behavior. From a methodological perspective, we make essential use of the tools of differentiable economics to generate conjectures of optimal mechanisms, and give a proof-of-concept for the use of such tools in guiding theoretical investigations.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 8.5/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 1.5/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper is heavily theoretical, employing advanced mathematics such as optimal transport duality, differentiable economics, and complex geometric constraints, with no empirical data, backtests, or implementation details provided.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal:<br>Optimal Multi-Good AMM Design"] --> B["Methodology:<br>Differentiable Economics & Optimal Transport Duality"]
  B --> C{"Data: Multi-good Markets<br>with Adverse Selection"}
  C --> D["Computational Process:<br>Train Neural Network Policies"]
  D --> E{"Outcome 1: Bundling Benefit<br>Optimal AMMs use complex bundles"}
  D --> F{"Outcome 2: In-Kind Payment<br>Accepting goods directly is optimal"}
  D --> G{"Outcome 3: New Conjectures<br>Generated optimal mechanisms"}
  E & F & G --> H["Key Finding:<br>Strong Duality connects AMM to Transport"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper proposes that finding an optimal market maker is dual to an optimal transport problem and uses differentiable economics to search for and conjecture optimal multi‑good market‑making mechanisms.

Source sentence
In this paper, we show that finding an optimal market maker is dual to an optimal transport problem, with specific geometric constraints on the transport plan in the dual. To search through the space of mechanisms and develop our theoretical results and additional conjectures on optimal designs, we make use of differentiable economics [17], which employs the tools of modern machine learning to search through the

Assumes 6

  • Traders are additive and quasilinear. model
    Source sentence
    Under a deliberately simple model of additive and quasilinear traders, and considering an objective for the market maker that can take into account the possibility of adverse selection (following that of Milionis et al. [32]), we ask how much of the full space of possible mechanisms will a market maker want to use?
  • The market maker has an initial belief vector c over the values of d goods. market
    Source sentence
    2.1 Mechanism Design Objectives We assume that the market maker has some initial belief vector c ∈X = [0, b]d, for some maximum value b > 0, on the value for each of d ≥1 goods.
  • Trader types are drawn from a known distribution with density f(x). model
    Source sentence
    The trader’s value is, in mechanism design terms, their type, drawn from some distribution with probability density function, f(x).
  • After observing a trader, the market maker updates beliefs via π(c,x) = λc + (1−λ)x. model
    Source sentence
    To capture this possibility, following Milionis et al. [32], we adopt an update function, π(c, x) : X × X →X. When the market maker observes a trader with value x, they update their own belief about the value of the goods from c to π(c, x) (note that, as in Milionis et al. [32], we require that π(c, c) = c).
Show 2 more
  • The market maker can buy or sell up to one unit of each good. market
    Source sentence
    We assume that the market maker is willing to buy or sell up to one unit of each good.
  • Mechanisms considered are strategyproof and individually rational direct‑revelation mechanisms or menus of lottery bundles. other
    Source sentence
    These correspond to either 4 strategyproof and individually rational (defined below) direct-revelation mechanisms with feasible allocation rules, or menus of (lottery) bundles at associated prices.1 An important detail of the market setting is that we also need to handle adverse selection, reflecting that the trader may be better informed than the market maker.

Data

  • Uniform distribution on [0,1] for two goods synthetic unknown
    Source sentence
    5.2 A new family of optimal mechanisms We consider the case of two kinds of goods, with values uniformly distributed on [0, 1], a market maker with initial valuation of c = ( 1 2, 1 2), and a linear update model, π(c, x) = λc + (1 −λ)x.

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result.

Finds 5

  • The market‑making profit maximization problem under adverse selection is dual to an optimal transport problem. theoretical
    Source sentence
    In this paper, we show that finding an optimal market maker is dual to an optimal transport problem, with specific geometric constraints on the transport plan in the dual. We show that the problem of maximizing profit under adverse selection is dual to an optimal transport problem.
  • Optimal multi‑good mechanisms can bundle trades and accept payments in kind, offering better prices than separate bid‑ask spreads. theoretical
    Source sentence
    We show that optimal mechanisms for multiple goods and under adverse selection can take advantage of bundling, both improved prices for bundled purchases and sales as well as sometimes accepting payment "in kind." However, they also offer bundled trades at better prices than the separate bids and asks.
  • Learned mechanisms exhibit mixed bundling and sometimes a continuum of allocations, confirming the richness of the mechanism space. theoretical
    Source sentence
    We find that some of the learned mechanisms make use of mixed bundling; i.e., trading in goods separately at one price, but also offering bundle discounts or taking payments in kind (accepting a sale of one good to discount the purchase of another). Other mechanisms offer a continuum of allocations in certain regions.
  • In a two‑good uniform setting with linear adverse‑selection update, the optimal mechanism improves profit by about 10 % (up to 11.4 % for certain λ). performance
    Source sentence
    For λ = 1 this gives about a 10% increase in profit; for λ = √ 2 3 the increase is highest at 11.4% – a fairly substantial improvement in profit.
  • The conjectured optimal mechanisms require bundling and in‑kind trades, contrasting with the simple bid‑ask spread optimal in the single‑good case. theoretical
    Source sentence
    From an economics perspective, our results establish that in some cases, the optimal mechanism for market makers who work across multiple goods must involve making use of their capacity to bundle and to accept goods “in kind”, resulting in significant improvements in profit. This is by contrast with the single-good case, where a much simpler bid-ask spread is optimal.

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 21 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Cited by 1 paper in the archive (1 by independent authors)

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.