Paper: arXiv 2506.02869
Authors: Leonardo Baggiani, Martin Herdegen, Leandro Sánchez-Betancourt
Abstract
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are emerging as a popular decentralised trading platform. In this work, we determine the optimal dynamic fees in a constant function market maker. We find approximate closed-form solutions to the control problem and study the optimal fee structure. We find that there are two distinct fee regimes: one in which the AMM imposes higher fees to deter arbitrageurs, and another where fees are lowered to increase volatility and attract noise traders. Our results also show that dynamic fees that are linear in inventory and are sensitive to changes in the external price are a good approximation of the optimal fee structure and thus constitute suitable candidates when designing fees for AMMs.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 8.5/10
- Empirical Rigor: 6.5/10
- Quadrant: Holy Grail — high math complexity, high empirical rigor
Why this score: The paper formulates and solves complex stochastic control problems with HJB equations and approximate closed-form solutions (high math). It also includes simulations comparing optimal policies to alternatives, validating the theoretical findings against data (moderate-to-high empirical rigor).
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
A["Research Goal<br>Determine Optimal Dynamic Fees in AMMs"] --> B["Methodology<br>Stochastic Control Problem Formulation"]
B --> C{"Data/Inputs<br>Market Price Dynamics & Trading Flow"}
C --> D["Computational Process<br>Approximate Closed-Form Solutions"]
D --> E{"Findings/Outcomes"}
E --> F["Regime 1: High Fees<br>Deter Arbitrageurs"]
E --> G["Regime 2: Low Fees<br>Attract Noise Traders"]
E --> H["Optimal Structure<br>Linear in Inventory & Sensitive to External Price"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper determines the optimal dynamic fees in a constant function market maker and derives approximate closed‑form solutions for the control problem.
Source sentence
In this work, we determine the optimal dynamic fees in a constant function market maker.
Assumes 5
- The quantity of asset Y in the pool takes values in a finite grid and the corresponding quantity of asset X is given by a decreasing convex level function. model
Source sentence
We assume that quantity of asset Y in the pool takes values in a finite grid given by {y−N := y, . . . , y0, . . . , yN := y}, where y and y can be interpreted as reserve constraints satisfying 0 < y < y0 < y < p2.
- The traded amounts Δ⁺(y) and Δ⁻(y) are constant (δ⁺, δ⁻) to enable a quadratic expansion of the exponential terms. model
Source sentence
(5.1) We assume that ∆−(y) and ∆+(y) are constant equal to δ−and δ+, respectively. Remark 5.1.
- For the first approximation the external oracle price is constant (St = S0, i.e., σ = 0). market
Source sentence
4 Constant oracle price To compute the first approximate solution, we take St = S0, which is equivalent to assuming that σ = 0.
- The exponential terms in the HJB equation are approximated by a linear‑quadratic expansion. statistical
Source sentence
Second, we approximate the exponential terms in the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation using a linear-quadratic expansion.
Show 1 more
- The trading function f(x,y) is strictly increasing, twice differentiable, and convex in its level function φ(y) to exclude round‑trip arbitrage. model
Source sentence
Let p2 > 0 denote the depth of the pool and let f : R+ × R+ →R+ be the trading function, which is strictly increasing and twice differentiable in both arguments. The latter is then automatically differentiable and decreasing, and we assume in addition that it is convex in order to exclude roundtrip arbitrage, see Cartea et al. (2024b).
Data
No dataset named in the text.
Costs
Not applicable
Finds 5
- Two distinct fee regimes are optimal: higher fees to deter arbitrageurs and lower fees to increase volatility and attract noise traders. theoretical
Source sentence
We find that there are two distinct fee regimes: one in which the AMM imposes higher fees to deter arbitrageurs, and another where fees are lowered to increase volatility and attract noise traders. In both approximations, we obtain the same insight: the venue finds it optimal to adopts two distinct fee regimes; one in which the AMM imposes higher fees to deter arbitrageurs, and another where fees are lowered to
- Dynamic fees that are linear in inventory and track external price changes closely approximate the optimal fee structure. theoretical
Source sentence
Our results also show that dynamic fees that are linear in inventory and are sensitive to changes in the external price are a good approximation of the optimal fee structure and thus constitute suitable candidates when designing fees for AMMs. Our results also show that dynamic fees that are linear in inventory and that track changes in the external price are a good approximation of the optimal fee structure and
- In simulations with a constant external price, the optimal dynamic fees outperform constant fee strategies by a significant margin. performance
Source sentence
In the case of a constant external price, we find that the optimal fees outperform constant fee strategies by a significant margin.
- A linear approximation of the optimal policies yields revenue outcomes nearly identical to the fully optimal fees. performance
Source sentence
Furthermore, a linear approximation of the optimal policies proves to be sufficiently accurate, yielding nearly identical revenue outcomes.
- Both the first and second approximation methods produce similar optimal fee policies and both outperform constant fees. performance
Source sentence
53.02 53.45 53.45 1.01 Constant 35.18 35.18 35.19 0.68 52.29 52.28 52.29 0.99 k = 1 Optimal SA 71.49 35.92 35.93 0.69 106.42 53.46 53.47 1.00 Optimal FA 71.51 35.47 35.44 0.68 106.38 53.46 53.51 1.01 Constant 71.23 35.60 35.61 0.69 105.90 52.91 52.91 1.00 As before, we find that either approximation yields a performance that is almost indistinguishable from the other, and both outperform constant fees substantially.
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 16 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
7 papers in the archive
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.
Cited References (45)
- Equilibrium Reward for Liquidity Providers in Automated Market Makers — → 2503.22502
- A unifying framework for generalised Bayesian online learning in non-stationary environments (2025)
- Efficient online bayesian inference for neural bandits (2022)
- am-AMM: An Auction-Managed Automated Market Maker — → 2403.03367
- Automated Market Making and Arbitrage Profits in the Presence of Fees — → 2305.14604
- Automated Market Making and Loss-versus-Rebalancing (2022) — link
- Decentralized Finance and Automated Market Making: Predictable Loss and Optimal Liquidity Provision (2024)
- Predictable Losses of Liquidity Provision in Constant Function Markets and Concentrated Liquidity Markets (2023)
and 37 more
- Execution and Statistical Arbitrage with Signals in Multiple Automated Market Makers (2023)
- Weighted Variance Swaps Hedge Against Impermanent Loss (2023)
- Optimal Fees for Geometric Mean Market Makers (2021)
- A Note on Optimal Fees for Constant Function Market Makers (2021)
- QLAMMP: A Q-Learning Agent for Optimizing Fees on Automated Market Making Protocols (2023)
- The Adoption of Blockchain-based Decentralized Exchanges (2021) — link
- Finding the Right Curve: Optimal Design of Constant Function Market Makers (2023)
- A Theory of Automated Market Makers in DeFi (2021)
- Improved Price Oracles: Constant Function Market Makers (2020)
- Market Making via Reinforcement Learning (2018)
- Macroscopic Market Making Games — → 2406.05662
- Market Making with Exogenous Competition — → 2407.17393
- Price-aware automated market makers: Models beyond B rownian prices and static liquidity — → 2405.03496
- An Analysis of Uniswap markets (2021)
- Automated Market Makers: Mean-Variance Analysis of LPs Payoffs and Design of Pricing Functions — → 2212.00336
- Replicating Market Makers (2023)
- Strategic Bonding Curves in Automated Market Makers (2024)
- The Case for Variable Fees in Constant Product Markets: An Agent-Based Simulation (2023)
- Uniswap v2 Core (2020)
- Uniswap v3 Core (2021)
- Uniswap v4 Core (2024)
- The Need for Fees at a DEX: How Increases in Fees Can Increase DEX Trading Volume (2022)
- An Overview of Uniswap v4 for Researchers (2025)
- High-Frequency Trading in a Limit Order Book (2008)
- Algorithmic and High-Frequency Trading (2015)
- The financial mathematics of market liquidity. From optimal execution to market making (2016)
- Market Making with Fads, Informed, and Uninformed Traders — → 2501.03658
- Optimal Exiting for Liquidity Provision in Constant Function Market Makers (2025)
- A Structural Model of Automated Market Making (2023)
- Optimal Design of Automated Market Makers on Decentralized Exchanges — → 2404.13291
- Liquidity provision of utility indifference type in decentralized exchanges — → 2502.01931
- Model-Free Hedging of Impermanent Loss in Geometric Mean Market Makers with Proportional Transaction Fees (2024)
- Unified Approach for Hedging Impermanent Loss of Liquidity Provision — → 2407.05146
- ZeroSwap: Data-driven Optimal Market Making in DeFi (2023) — link
- Adaptive curves for optimally efficient market making — → 2406.13794
- Decentralised Finance and Automated Market Making: Execution and Speculation — → 2307.03499
- Option market-making and vol arbitrage (2025)
13 of 45 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.