Paper: arXiv 2508.08152

Authors: Steven Campbell, Philippe Bergault, Jason Milionis, Marcel Nutz

Abstract

Passive liquidity providers (LPs) in automated market makers (AMMs) face losses due to adverse selection (LVR), which static trading fees often fail to offset in practice. We study the key determinants of LP profitability in a dynamic reduced-form model where an AMM operates in parallel with a centralized exchange (CEX), traders route their orders optimally to the venue offering the better price, and arbitrageurs exploit price discrepancies. Using large-scale simulations and real market data, we analyze how LP profits vary with market conditions such as volatility and trading volume, and characterize the optimal AMM fee as a function of these conditions. We highlight the mechanisms driving these relationships through extensive comparative statics, and confirm the model’s relevance through market data calibration. A key trade-off emerges: fees must be low enough to attract volume, yet high enough to earn sufficient revenues and mitigate arbitrage losses. We find that under normal market conditions, the optimal AMM fee is competitive with the trading cost on the CEX and remarkably stable, whereas in periods of very high volatility, a high fee protects passive LPs from severe losses. These findings suggest that a threshold-type dynamic fee schedule is both robust enough to market conditions and improves LP outcomes.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 7.0/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 8.0/10
  • Quadrant: Holy Grail — high math complexity, high empirical rigor

Why this score: The paper employs a sophisticated dynamic reduced-form model with geometric Brownian motion and comparative statics, while also using large-scale simulations calibrated with real market data and providing open-source code for reproducibility.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal:<br>Determine Optimal AMM Fee<br>to Maximize LP Profit"] --> B["Methodology: Dynamic Reduced-Form Model<br>+ Large-Simulations & Real Data"]
  B --> C["Key Inputs:<br>Volatility, Trading Volume<br>CEX Costs, Price Drift"]
  C --> D["Computational Process:<br>Optimal Fee Search<br>over Trading & Arbitrage Constraints"]
  D --> E["Key Outcome 1:<br>Optimal Fee ≈ CEX Cost<br>in Normal Markets"]
  D --> F["Key Outcome 2:<br>Optimal Fee ↑ sharply<br>in High Volatility"]
  E --> G["Recommendation:<br>Adopt Dynamic Fee Schedule<br>(Low in calm, High in volatile periods)"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper proposes a dynamic reduced‑form model of an AMM operating alongside a CEX to study LP profitability and optimal fees.

Source sentence
We study the key determinants of LP profitability in a dynamic reduced-form model where an AMM operates in parallel with a centralized exchange (CEX), traders route their orders optimally to the venue offering the better price, and arbitrageurs exploit price discrepancies.

Assumes 6

  • LPs are passive and pre‑commit liquidity for the entire trading horizon. model
    Source sentence
    Recall that for our model we assume that LPs are passive and precommit liquidity to the pool for the entire trading horizon.
  • The AMM fee η1 is publicly known and fixed to the Uniswap v2 fee (30 bps). data
    Source sentence
    Specifically, we fix η1 to the Uniswap v2 fee for the ETH/USDC pool, i.e., η1 = 30 bps.
  • The trade size ΔB = |ΔS| = ¯Δ is constant over time. model
    Source sentence
    For simplicity, we assume that ∆B = |∆S| =: ¯∆, and that this rate is constant over time.
  • CEX price S0t follows an Ornstein‑Uhlenbeck process. model
    Source sentence
    by modeling S0t as the exponential of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process
Show 2 more
  • Simulation uses discrete periods of equal length δt = T/N. model
    Source sentence
    Trading evolves over a time interval [0, T] and is simulated as N discrete periods of equal length δt = T/N.
  • Fees are disbursed directly to the LP and treated as part of LP PnL. execution
    Source sentence
    We also treat fees as though they are disbursed directly to the LP.

Data

Backtest sample: ETH/USDC on Binance · crypto · intraday

  • Binance ETH/USDC 1‑minute price data · Binance market-prices public
    January 2025 · ETH/USDC pair
    Source sentence
    Binance and Uniswap, we estimate the model’s three core parameters
  • Uniswap v2 ETH/USDC pool data · Uniswap crypto-onchain public
    January 2025 · ETH/USDC pool
    Source sentence
    we fix the liquidity used for calibration to be 2.3·10^7 USDC and 6904 ETH, which roughly corresponds to the average values of the pool.
  • Binance price data reference · Binance market-prices public
    Source sentence
    Binance price data: https://data.binance.vision/?prefix=data/spot/monthly/klines/ETHUSDC/1m/.

Recognised sources: Binance

Costs

Modeled Costs are part of the reported headline results.

CEX fee calibrated near posted taker rates; AMM fee η1 = 30 bps treated as LP revenue.

Source sentence
The calibrated CEX fee converges near posted taker rates, and estimated volatility falls within plausible intraday ranges.

Finds 5

  • Under normal market conditions the optimal AMM fee is competitive with CEX trading costs and remains remarkably stable. theoretical
    Source sentence
    We find that under normal market conditions, the optimal AMM fee is competitive with the trading cost on the CEX and remarkably stable, whereas in periods of very high volatility, a high fee protects passive LPs from severe losses.
  • Lowering the AMM fee below the effective CEX level improves LP profitability on real price data. performance
    Source sentence
    Importantly, when testing LP performance on real price data, we find that lowering the AMM fee below the effective CEX level improves LP profitability—a conclus…
  • A threshold‑type dynamic fee schedule (low fee in normal times, high fee in extreme volatility) is robust and improves LP outcomes. theoretical
    Source sentence
    These findings suggest that a threshold-type dynamic fee schedule is both robust enough to market conditions and improves LP outcomes.
  • Calibration reproduces the empirical log‑price‑ratio distribution using only three parameters (CEX fee, volatility, fundamental demand). pricing-calibration
    Source sentence
    With only these inputs, the model reproduces a price ratio distribution that closely aligns with empirical observations.
  • Increasing the AMM fee widens the profit region, reduces turnover, and contracts the price‑ratio distribution around its center. statistical
    Source sentence
    As the AMM fee increases, the widening of the profit region and the decline in the AMM’s competitiveness restrict participation to trades that remain viable despite the higher cost.

Checked by others

Contradicted by

  • Decentralized Exchanges: The Profitability Frontier of Constant Product Market Makers (2023)
    On the question: How does changing the AMM transaction fee affect the size of the profitable allocation region?
    Compare the findings

    This paper: Increasing the AMM fee widens the profit region, reduces turnover, and contracts the price‑ratio distribution around its center.

    That paper: Higher relative transaction fees shift the profitability frontier inward, narrowing the set of profitable allocations.

    Finding A reports higher fees shrink the profitable set, while Finding B reports higher fees expand it, so they contradict each other.

Cited by 6 papers in the archive (4 by independent authors): Competition between DEXs through Dynamic Fees (discusses its findings); Growth rate of liquidity provider's wealth in G3Ms (discusses its findings)

Code

https://github.com/JasonSome/cpmm-trading — the authors' own repository

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.

Cited References (142)

  1. Learning from DeFi : Would Automated Market Makers Improve Equity Trading? (2026) — link
  2. The viability of blockchain markets under discrete clearing and paid priority (2026) — link
  3. Optimal Dynamic Fees in Automated Market Makers — → 2506.02869
  4. Liquidity provision and its information content in decentralized markets (2026) — link
  5. The Impact of Market Conditions and Fee Algorithms on the Design of a Competitive AMM (2024) — link
  6. Decentralized Finance and Automated Market Making: Predictable Loss and Optimal Liquidity Provision (2024)
  7. Coexisting Exchange Platforms: Limit Order Books and Automated Market Makers (2025) — link
  8. Optimal Design of Automated Market Makers on Decentralized Exchanges — → 2404.13291
and 134 more
  1. Optimal Exiting for Liquidity Provision in Constant Function Market Makers (2025) — link
  2. Equilibrium Reward for Liquidity Providers in Automated Market Makers — → 2503.22502
  3. Automated Market Making: the case of Pegged Assets — → 2411.08145
  4. Price-Aware Automated Market Makers: Models Beyond Brownian Prices and Static Liquidity — → 2405.03496
  5. Automated market makers: mean-variance analysis of LPs payoffs and design of pricing functions — → 2212.00336
  6. Dealing with the inventory risk: a solution to the market making problem (2013)
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  8. Predictable losses of liquidity provision in constant function markets and concentrated liquidity markets (2023)
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  23. Deep reinforcement learning for market making in corporate bonds: beating the curse of dimensionality (2019)
  24. Closed-form approximations in multi-asset market making (2020) — link
  25. The Cost of Misspecifying Price Impact — → 2306.00599
  26. Internalisation by electronic FX spot dealers (2019)
  27. Complexity-Approximation Trade-Offs in Exchange Mechanisms: AMMs vs. LOBs — → 2302.11652
  28. Extended Abstract: The Effect of Trading Fees on Arbitrage Profits in Automated Market Makers (2023)
  29. Dynamic Fees in Uniswap V4 (2024)
  30. A Structural Model of Automated Market Making (2023) — link
  31. A Myersonian Framework for Optimal Liquidity Provision in Automated Market Makers — → 2303.00208
  32. A Framework for Single-Item NFT Auction Mechanism Design (2022) — link
  33. Optuna: A next-generation hyperparameter optimization framework (2019)
  34. Automated Market Making and Loss-Versus-Rebalancing (2022) — link
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  36. Nash, Conley, and Computation: Impossibility and Incompleteness in Game Dynamics (2022) — link
  37. Differentially Private Regression with Unbounded Covariates (2022) — link
  38. FLAIR: A Metric for Liquidity Provider Competitiveness in Automated Market Makers — → 2306.09421
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  40. Measuring Arbitrage Losses and Profitability of AMM Liquidity — → 2404.05803
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  51. Static Replication of Impermanent Loss for Concentrated Liquidity Provision in Decentralised Markets (2022) — link
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  57. Replicating monotonic payoffs without oracles (2021) — link
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  59. am-AMM: An Auction-Managed Automated Market Maker — → 2403.03367
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  73. Liquidity Provision on Blockchain-Based Decentralized Exchanges (2025) — link
  74. High-frequency trading and market performance (2020)
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  83. A Note on Optimal Fees for Constant Function Market Makers (2021)
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  121. Arbitrageurs’ profits, LVR, and sandwich attacks: batch trading as an AMM design response (2023) — link
  122. Automated market making and arbitrage profits in the presence of fees — → 2305.14604
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  124. G3M impermanent loss dynamics (2021) — link
  125. Decentralised Finance and Automated Market Making: Predictable Loss and Optimal Liquidity Provision — → 2309.08431
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18 of 142 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.