Paper: arXiv 2409.03586
Authors: Neil A. Chriss
Abstract
This paper develops a mathematical framework for building a position in a stock over a fixed period of time while in competition with one or more other traders doing the same thing. We develop a game-theoretic framework that takes place in the space of trading strategies where action sets are trading strategies and traders try to devise best-response strategies to their adversaries. In this setup trading is guided by a desire to minimize the total cost of trading arising from a mixture of temporary and permanent market impact caused by the aggregate level of trading including the trader and the competition. We describe a notion of equilibrium strategies, show that they exist and provide closed-form solutions.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 8.5/10
- Empirical Rigor: 3.0/10
- Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing
Why this score: The paper employs advanced mathematics including game theory, differential equations, and the Euler-Lagrange equation, but it focuses on theoretical derivations and closed-form solutions without providing backtesting frameworks or data-driven implementation details.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
A["Research Goal<br>Find optimal competitive position-building strategies<br>minimizing total trading cost"] --> B
subgraph B ["Methodology"]
B1["Develop game-theoretic framework<br>strategies vs. strategies"]
B2["Model market impact<br>temporary & permanent"]
B3["Formulate cost minimization problem"]
end
B --> C["Inputs<br>Fixed time horizon, initial/final inventory,<br>market impact parameters, competitor behavior"]
C --> D["Computation<br>Derive Euler-Lagrange equations<br>Solve for best-response strategies"]
D --> E["Outcome<br>Existence of Nash Equilibrium<br>Closed-form solution for optimal strategies<br>Optimal execution rate formula"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper proposes a game‑theoretic framework for building a stock position over a fixed horizon in competition, defining equilibrium trading‑strategy solutions and providing closed‑form expressions.
Source sentence
This paper develops a mathematical framework for building a position in a stock over a fixed period of time while in competition with one or more other traders doing the same thing. We develop a game-theoretic framework that takes place in the space of trading strategies where action sets are trading strategies and traders try to devise best-response strategies to their adversaries.
Assumes 6
- Trading costs are driven by a linear temporary market impact model. model
Source sentence
In this paper we will use linear models for both temporary and permanent market impact following [AC01] and define them next. Definition 4.2 (Temporary market impact).
- Trading costs also include a linear permanent market impact component. model
Source sentence
In some sense the polar opposite of temporary market impact is permanent market impact, defined as follows: Definition 4.3 (Permanent market impact). Is the change in the price of a stock due to persistent trading over time.
- Traders are aware of other traders pursuing the same position‑building objective. other
Source sentence
In such a case the trader is often aware that there are other traders looking to purchase the stock over the same period of time for the same reason.
- The objective of each trader is to minimize total cost of trading relative to a counterfactual unperturbed price path. market
Source sentence
To begin, we note that in the context of optimal trading strategies, whether with or without competition, the objective relates to minimizing the cost of trading relative to the price that would have been in the absence of trading. In this context one has to imagine a counterfactual price path unperturbed by concerted trading (see Definition 4.1).
Show 2 more
- The set of actions for each player consists of entire trading strategies rather than discrete trades. model
Source sentence
To address this challenge we develop a version of game theory where each trader’s available set of actions are trading strategies themselves.
- The analysis assumes a fixed time interval [0,1] for building the position. execution
Source sentence
In this setup there are two traders A and B in competition to buy the same stock starting at time t = 0 and completing at time t = 1. Both traders trade position-building strategies with trader A trading a unit strategy and trader B a λ-scaled strategy with λ > 1.
Data
No dataset named in the text.
Costs
Modeled
Costs are modeled as a mixture of temporary and permanent market impact, both assumed linear.
Source sentence
In this setup trading is guided by a desire to minimize the total cost of trading arising from a mixture of temporary and permanent market impact caused by the aggregate level of trading including the trader and the competition. These forms of price change are respectively referred to as temporary (also referred to as transient) and permanent market impact.
Finds 5
- Equilibrium strategies exist and can be expressed in closed form for the two‑trader case. theoretical
Source sentence
We describe a notion of equilibrium strategies, show that they exist and provide closed-form solutions.
- When permanent impact is absent, the equilibrium reduces to trivial linear strategies a(t)=t, b(t)=t. theoretical
Source sentence
Applying the boundary conditions for position-building strategies a(0), b(0) = 0 and a(1), b(1) = 1 the solutions are a(t) = t and b(t) = t. In other words, in the absence of permanent impact, the equilibrium competitive position building reduces to the most trivial of cases.
- For n+1 symmetric traders the equilibrium strategy is a(t)=1−e^{−n·κ}·t/(1−e^{n·κ}), showing dependence on the number of traders and impact parameter κ. theoretical
Source sentence
If the traders are buying, the price moves up, if they are selling, it moves down. Then for n + 1 traders we obtain: a(t) = 1 −e−n·κ n+2 ·t 1 −e n·κ n+2 (31) We call a(t) in Eq. (31) the multi-trader symmetric equilibrium strategy for n traders.
- Mis‑estimating the permanent impact parameter κ can significantly alter total trading costs. theoretical
Source sentence
Mis-estimating κ can significantly affect the total cost of trading, as illustrated in Figure 22. We provide a numerical exposition of how variations in κ influence costs across a range of values.
- Risk‑averse equilibrium with a risk‑aversion term modifies the loss function but still admits numerical solutions illustrating parameter importance. theoretical
Source sentence
Specifically we propose equilibrium equations analogous to those in Section 8.3 but add a risk-aversion term to the loss functions that penalizes the total volatility a trader’s position holds during the course of building the position. We proceed to study various numerical examples to gain intuition regarding the relative important of the parameters involved.
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 20 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
3 papers in the archive
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.
Cited References (16)
- Optimal execution of portfolio transactions (2001)
- Optimal liquidation (1997)
- Calculus of variations (2000)
- Differential Games: A Mathematical Theory with Applications to Warfare and Pursuit, Control and Optimization (1999)
- Market reaction to temporary liquidity crises and the permanent market impact (2006)
- Direct estimation of equity market impact (2005)
- No-dynamic-arbitrage and market impact (2010)
- Optimal trade execution under geometric Brownian motion in the Almgren and Chriss framework (2011)
and 8 more
- Beyond the square root: Evidence for logarithmic dependence of market impact on size and participation rate (2015)
- Optimal trading strategy and supply/demand dynamics (2013)
- Three models of market impact and Data, High-Frequency (2010)
- Handbook of price impact modeling (2023)
- Dynamical models of market impact and algorithms for order execution (2013)
- The market impact of a limit order (2012)
- Optimal Execution: A Review (2022) — link
- Mathematica, V ersion 14.1 — link
0 of 16 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.