Paper: arXiv 2508.20225

Authors: Alexander Barzykin, Philippe Bergault, Olivier Guéant, Malo Lemmel

Abstract

Over the past decade, many dealers have implemented algorithmic models to automatically respond to RFQs and manage flows originating from their electronic platforms. In parallel, building on the foundational work of Ho and Stoll, and later Avellaneda and Stoikov, the academic literature on market making has expanded to address trade size distributions, client tiering, complex price dynamics, alpha signals, and the internalization versus externalization dilemma in markets with dealer-to-client and interdealer-broker segments. In this paper, we tackle two critical dimensions: adverse selection, arising from the presence of informed traders, and price reading, whereby the market maker’s own quotes inadvertently reveal the direction of their inventory. These risks are well known to practitioners, who routinely face informed flows and algorithms capable of extracting signals from quoting behavior. Yet they have received limited attention in the quantitative finance literature, beyond stylized toy models with limited actionability. Extending the existing literature, we propose a tractable and implementable framework that enables market makers to adjust their quotes with greater awareness of informational risk.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 8.0/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 3.0/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper relies heavily on advanced stochastic optimal control theory, stochastic calculus, and complex Hamiltonian-based derivations, indicating high mathematical density. However, it lacks backtesting results, implementation details, or empirical datasets, focusing instead on theoretical model derivation and first-order approximations.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal"] --> B["Data & Inputs"]
  B --> C["Computational Process"]
  C --> D["Key Findings"]
  
  A["Research Goal<br>Model adverse selection & price reading<br>in algorithmic market making"]
  
  B["Data & Inputs<br>• RFQ flow data<br>• Trade size distributions<br>• Inventory levels<br>• Adverse selection signals"]
  
  C["Computational Process<br>• Extend Avellaneda-Stoikov model<br>• Solve optimization problem<br>• Implement quote adjustment<br>• Simulate market scenarios"]
  
  D["Key Findings<br>• Tractable framework for quote adjustment<br>• Quantified adverse selection costs<br>• Inventory-aware quoting strategy<br>• Implementation guidelines for dealers"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper introduces a tractable and implementable optimal market making model that accounts for adverse selection and price reading effects using first‑order adjustments.

Source sentence
We introduce a tractable and implementable optimal market making model à la Cartea-Jaimungal, in infinite horizon, that accounts for both adverse selection and price reading effects.

Assumes 6

  • The model is set in an infinite‑horizon stochastic control framework. model
    Source sentence
    We introduce a tractable and implementable optimal market making model à la Cartea-Jaimungal, in infinite horizon, that accounts for both adverse selection and price reading effects.
  • Taylor expansions are used and only first‑order adjustments are retained. model
    Source sentence
    To avoid introducing a lot of assumptions, we rely on Taylor expansions and focus on the first-order adjustments in optimal quotes induced by each effect.
  • A filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions supports all stochastic processes. model
    Source sentence
    2 Model Setup Throughout this paper, we work on a filtered probability space �Ω, F, P; F = (Ft)t≥0  satisfying the usual conditions.
  • The market maker quotes bid and ask prices on a single asset. market
    Source sentence
    2.1 Modeling Framework and Notation We consider a market maker responsible for quoting bid and ask prices on a single asset.
Show 2 more
  • Clients are divided into N tiers and transaction sizes are discrete multiples of a smallest size. market
    Source sentence
    Specifically, clients are divided into N tiers, indexed by the set N := {1, . . . , N}. Transaction sizes are assumed to be discrete, taking values 0 < ∆1 < . . . < ∆K for some K ≥1, with index set K := {1, . . . , K}.
  • The analysis focuses on first‑order effects and ignores cross‑effects between adverse selection and price reading. model
    Source sentence
    This separation is without loss of generality in our framework, which is restricted to first-order effects and therefore ignores any cross-effects.

Data

  • Simulated market data for a two‑tier currency pair synthetic unknown
    Source sentence
    As an illustration, consider a standard size ladder of (1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50) million (hereafter M) notional and two tiers with total baseline intensities Λ1,k 0 +Λ2,k 0 = (2000, 800, 600, 400, 120, 80) day−1 and κn,k = 3 bp−1. This corresponds to a relatively liquid currency pair with a daily turnover exceeding 6 billion notional and a top-of-book spread of approximately 0.7 bp.

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result.

Finds 2

  • Informational risk impacts can be split into a global component affecting all clients and a tier‑specific component mitigating risk for each tier. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Using perturbation analysis, we have found that the impact of informational risk can be split into two components: (i) a global component related to induced changes in the value function that applies to pricing for all clients, and (ii) a tier-specific component to mitigate the perceived informational risk associated with each tier.
  • Adverse selection with sharp signals forces the market maker to use defensive quotes and act as if more risk‑averse with the global franchise. theoretical
    Source sentence
    In contrast, adverse selection with sharp signals forces the market maker to act protectively by showing defensive quotes even for risk-reducing trades with informed clients and to behave as if they were more risk averse with their global franchise.

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 8 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Cited by 1 paper in the archive

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.