Paper: arXiv 2609.33799
Authors: Hamed Amini, Zachary Feinstein
Abstract
This paper introduces oracle-parametrized automated market makers (OP-AMMs), i.e., automated market makers whose quoted price depends jointly on the pool reserves and an external oracle price. In doing so, we extend the information-agnostic AMM framework to settings, such as tokenized securities, for which price discovery occurs off-chain. Under a strict oracle-contraction condition, we show that the quoted price of any OP-AMM interpolates between the oracle price and an implicit autarkic price determined by the pool reserves. We then derive a general loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR) decomposition that separates the residual exposure to market lags from the losses induced by oracle errors. This analysis is further extended to stale, discrete-update oracles and to sandwich attacks around oracle updates. Using this framework, we find conditions under which OP-AMMs simultaneously increase local capital efficiency and reduce normalized LVR relative to information-agnostic AMMs. However, sufficiently noisy or stale oracles can reverse these gains. A counterfactual backtest using one-second SPY NBBO data is provided to demonstrate these trade-offs. In particular, we map the Pareto-efficient frontier of oracle-parametrized constant function market maker (OP-CFMM) designs across stylized oracle regimes.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 8.5/10
- Empirical Rigor: 7.0/10
- Quadrant: Holy Grail — high math complexity, high empirical rigor
Why this score: This paper presents a highly mathematical framework for Oracle-Parametrized AMMs, including axiomatic definitions and rigorous derivations. It supports its theoretical claims with a counterfactual backtest using real-world data, demonstrating a strong blend of advanced theory and empirical validation. The novelty lies in extending AMM frameworks to incorporate external oracle prices and providing a detailed LVR decomposition.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
A["Research Goal: Introduce OP-AMMs & Analyze Performance"] --> B{"Key Methodology: Extend AMM Framework & LVR Decomposition"};
B -- Input Data --> C["Data/Inputs: Pool Reserves, Oracle Prices (e.g., SPY NBBO 1-sec)"];
C -- Computational Processes --> D{"Computational Processes: Derivations, Counterfactual Backtesting"};
D --> E["Key Findings/Outcomes: OP-AMMs interpolate prices, LVR decomposition, Conditions for improved capital efficiency & reduced LVR, Impact of noisy/stale oracles, Pareto-efficient OP-CFMM designs"];
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper proposes a general framework for oracle‑parametrized automated market makers (OP‑AMMs) whose quoted price depends on both pool reserves and an external oracle price.
Source sentence
This paper introduces oracle‑parametrized automated market makers (OP‑AMMs), i.e., automated market makers whose quoted price depends jointly on the pool reserves and an external oracle price.
Assumes 4
- For each fixed reserve level r>0, the oracle‑price mapping π↦p(r,π) is a contraction on ℝ with constant cr∈[0,1). model
Source sentence
Assumption 2.6. For each fixed r > 0, the map π 7→p(r, π) is a contraction on R. Equivalently,
- The market consists of exactly two assets and structural conditions are imposed to guarantee economically meaningful pricing behavior. market
Source sentence
on markets with two assets and impose structural conditions to guarantee economically meaningful pricing behavior.
- The oracle price and the internal reserve‑based price match the mid‑price at market open each day. execution
Source sentence
To initialize each day, we assume that both the oracle and the internal reserve‑based price exactly match the mid‑price at market open.
- The oracle updates are discrete and may be stale; the analysis extends to such discrete‑update oracles. model
Source sentence
We further extend this analysis to discrete oracle updates, identify the resulting oracle‑refresh losses as oracle extractable value, and study sandwich attacks around these updates.
Data
- one‑second SPY NBBO data market-prices unknown
Source sentence
A counterfactual backtest using one‑second SPY NBBO data is provided to demonstrate these trade‑offs.
Costs
Modeled
Fees γ are varied from 0 to 50 basis points and affect tracking error and LVR; the optimal fee often sits at the 50 bps upper grid boundary.
Source sentence
as the simulation contains no liquidity‑motivated demand, increasing the fee carries no penalty in trading volume and this boundary solution should not be read as an equilibrium fee recommendation.
Finds 5
- With a sufficiently reliable oracle, OP‑AMMs can reduce stale‑price arbitrage (lower LVR) while increasing local liquidity compared to information‑agnostic AMMs. theoretical
Source sentence
These results suggest that, with a sufficiently reliable oracle, OP‑AMMs can reduce stale‑price arbitrage (and the associated LVR) while simultaneously deepening the local liquidity available to liquidity‑motivated order flow.
- In the Pull‑oracle regime, a modest tracking error of ~7.5 bps yields an annualized LVR of roughly 0.001 bps, i.e., a $1 M LP would lose only $0.10 per year. performance
Source sentence
by accepting a modest TE of approximately 7.5 bps, the Pull oracle regime attains negligible LVR of roughly 0.001 bps annualized, i.e., a liquidity provider with a $1,000,000 position would lose just $0.10 to arbitrage over the course of a full year.
- The L1 oracle requires high fees and low oracle sensitivity to keep LVR low, whereas L2 and Pull oracles can achieve low LVR with moderate fees when the oracle is reliable. performance
Source sentence
the L1 oracle requires defensive parameters, i.e., high fees γ and low oracle sensitivity λ, to mitigate the losses to arbitrageurs, while the L2 and Pull oracles demonstrate that sufficiently reliable oracles can effectively reduce these losses.
- Average relative market depth is primarily determined by the (1‑λ)⁻¹ multiplier, deviating by at most 0.22 % (L1) or 0.012 % (L2/Pull) from that baseline. performance
Source sentence
the average relative market depth falls below this multiplier by at most 0.22% under the L1 oracle and by at most 0.012% under the L2 and Pull oracles.
- Across the efficient frontier, the optimal fee level consistently sits at the upper tested bound of 50 bps. performance
Source sentence
across this entire frontier, the optimal fee level sits at γ* = 50 bps, i.e., the upper boundary of the tested grid.
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 33 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.