Paper: arXiv 2501.01241

Authors: Neil A. Chriss

Abstract

This paper examines strategic trading under incomplete information, where firms lack full knowledge of key aspects of their competitors’ trading strategies such as target sizes and market impact models. We extend previous work on competitive trading equilibria by incorporating uncertainty through the framework of Bayesian games. This allows us to analyze scenarios where firms have diverse beliefs about market conditions and each other’s strategies. We derive optimal trading strategies in this setting and demonstrate how uncertainty significantly impacts these strategies compared to the complete information case. Furthermore, we introduce a novel approach to model the presence of non-strategic traders, even when strategic firms disagree on their characteristics. Our analysis reveals the complex interplay of beliefs and strategic adjustments required in such an environment. Finally, we discuss limitations of the current model, including the reliance on linear market impact and the lack of dynamic strategy adjustments, outlining directions for future research.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 8.5/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper is mathematically dense, relying heavily on game theory, Bayesian Nash equilibrium derivations, and complex analytical proofs, placing it in the ‘Lab Rats’ category where high theory outweighs empirical testing.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal: How does incomplete information<br>affect optimal trading strategies?"]
  
  B["Methodology: Bayesian Games Framework<br>Uncertainty on competitor trading parameters"]
  
  C["Inputs: Beliefs about<br>Target Sizes & Market Impact<br>Presence of Non-Strategic Traders"]
  
  D["Computation: Derivation of Optimal<br>Bayesian Nash Equilibrium Strategies"]
  
  E["Outcomes: Equilibrium Analysis<br>& Comparison to Complete Info Case"]
  
  F["Key Findings:<br>1. Uncertainty alters optimal strategies significantly<br>2. Complex interplay of beliefs & adjustments<br>3. Limitations: Linear impact, static strategies"]
  
  A --> B
  B --> C
  C --> D
  D --> E
  E --> F

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper derives optimal trading strategies under incomplete information and introduces a novel approach to model non‑strategic traders within this framework.

Source sentence
We derive optimal trading strategies in this setting and demonstrate how uncertainty significantly impacts these strategies compared to the complete information case. Furthermore, we introduce a novel approach to model the presence of non-strategic traders, even when strategic firms disagree on their characteristics.

Assumes 6

  • There are n firms that trade in competition over a fixed common trading period. model
    Source sentence
    There are n firms that trade in competition with each other over a fixed and common period of time (the "trading period"). 2.
  • Each firm has a target quantity of stock to acquire before the end of the trading period. execution
    Source sentence
    Each firm has a target quantity of stock it wishes to acquire before the end of the trading period. 3.
  • Firms choose an ex‑ante complete description of their trading strategy at the outset. model
    Source sentence
    At the outset, each firm chooses a trading strategy that provides an ex-ante complete description of how it will trade during the trading period. 4.
  • Firms use the linear Almgren‑Chriss market impact model with a single impact coefficient. market
    Source sentence
    Each firm uses the market impact model from the Almgren-Chriss framework (see [AC01]), a linear model with both permanent and temporary impact3. This model features a single market impact parameter, referred to as the market impact coefficient.
Show 2 more
  • Target quantities and market impact parameters are not common knowledge (relaxing the common‑knowledge assumption). model
    Source sentence
    The novelty of this paper lies in relaxing a key assumption implicit in [Chr24a], namely that each firm’s target quantity and market impact parameter are common knowledge.
  • A common prior over type profiles is known to all players (common prior assumption). statistical
    Source sentence
    Assumption 2.1 (Common prior assumption). For an n-player game with incomplete information, where the types are denoted by tk i for i = 1, . . . , n and k = 1, . . . , Ki, we assume: 1.

Data

No dataset named in the text.

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result; the cost the extractor found is a model parameter.

The paper-text extraction found a cost parameter inside a model (Linear market impact with permanent and temporary components as in the Almgren‑Chriss model, using a single market impact coefficient.); the classifier found no reported trading result, so costs are not applicable.

Finds 3

  • Uncertainty about competitors' target quantities and market impact parameters can have significant and sometimes profound effects on optimal trading strategies compared to the complete‑information case. theoretical
    Source sentence
    We derive optimal trading strategies in this setting and demonstrate how uncertainty significantly impacts these strategies compared to the complete information case. In Section 5, we demonstrate that uncertainty about what firms do and do not know regarding other firms’ target quantities and beliefs about market impact parameters can have significant—and sometimes profound—effects on optimal strategies.
  • Treating trading in competition as a game with incomplete information is a novel contribution. theoretical
    Source sentence
    The approach of treating trading in competition as a game with incomplete information appears to be novel.
  • The analysis reveals a complex interplay of beliefs and strategic adjustments required when firms have diverse information. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Our analysis reveals the complex interplay of beliefs and strategic adjustments required in such an environment.

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 10 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Cited by 1 paper in the archive (1 by independent authors)

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.

Cited References (37)

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  2. Optimal liquidation (1997)
  3. Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality (1987)
  4. Calculus of variations (2000)
  5. Differential Games: A Mathematical Theory with Applications to Warfare and Pursuit, Control and Optimization (1999)
  6. Market reaction to temporary liquidity crises and the permanent market impact (2006)
  7. Direct estimation of equity market impact (2005)
  8. No-dynamic-arbitrage and market impact (2010)
and 29 more
  1. Optimal trade execution under geometric Brownian motion in the Almgren and Chriss framework (2011)
  2. Optimal trading strategy and supply/demand dynamics (2013)
  3. Three models of market impact and Data, High-Frequency (2010)
  4. Handbook of price impact modeling (2023)
  5. Dynamical models of market impact and algorithms for order execution (2013)
  6. The market impact of a limit order (2012)
  7. Optimal Execution: A Review (2022) — link
  8. Mathematica, V ersion 14.1 — link
  9. Theory of games and economic behavior: 60th anniversary commemorative edition (2007)
  10. Equilibrium points in n-person games (1950)
  11. The Nash Equilibrium: A Perspective (2004) — link
  12. Two-person cooperative games (1953)
  13. Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games (1950) — link
  14. Non-Cooperative Games (1951) — link
  15. Worst-case equilibria (1999)
  16. How markets slowly digest changes in supply and demand (2009)
  17. Market efficiency and the long-memory of supply and demand: Is price impact variable and permanent or fixed and temporary? (2006)
  18. Beyond the square root: Evidence for logarithmic dependence of market impact on size and participation rate (2015)
  19. Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players, I–III Part I. The basic model (1967)
  20. Competitive equilibria in trading — → 2410.13583
  21. Optimal position-building strategies in competition — → 2409.03586
  22. Position-building in competition with real-world constraints — → 2409.15459
  23. Prize Lecture to the Memory of Alfred Nobel: Game Theory; Incomplete Information (1994) — link
  24. Comments on “Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’Players, I–III Harsanyi’s Games with Incoplete Information” (2004)
  25. The common prior assumption in economic theory (1995)
  26. Rationality and knowledge in game theory (1997)
  27. Incomplete information (2002)
  28. Agreeing to Disagree (1976)
  29. Convention: A philosophical study (2008)

3 of 37 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.