Paper: arXiv 2409.15459
Authors: Neil A. Chriss
Abstract
This paper extends the optimal-trading framework developed in arXiv:2409.03586v1 to compute optimal strategies with real-world constraints. The aim of the current paper, as with the previous, is to study trading in the context of multi-player non-cooperative games. While the former paper relies on methods from the calculus of variations and optimal strategies arise as the solution of partial differential equations, the current paper demonstrates that the entire framework may be re-framed as a quadratic programming problem and cast in this light constraints are readily incorporated into the calculation of optimal strategies. An added benefit is that two-trader equilibria may be calculated as the end-points of a dynamic process of traders forming repeated adjustments to each other’s strategy.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 8.0/10
- Empirical Rigor: 4.0/10
- Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing
Why this score: The paper is heavily theoretical, featuring advanced mathematics like variational methods, PDEs, and convex quadratic programming, but lacks any mention of code, backtests, or empirical data, focusing purely on computational methods for theoretical solutions.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD A["Research Goal:<br>Optimal Trading Strategies<br>with Real-World Constraints"] --> B["Methodology:<br>Formulate as Quadratic Programming Problem"] B --> C["Incorporate Constraints:<br>Order size, Liquidity, Risk"] C --> D["Compute Solutions:<br>Numerical Optimization"] D --> E["Dynamic Equilibrium:<br>Simulate Repeated Adjustments"] E --> F["Outcome:<br>Equilibrium Strategies &<br>Multi-Trader Interactions"]
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper extends the optimal‑trading framework to a quadratic programming formulation that can incorporate real‑world constraints and computes two‑trader equilibria via an iterative algorithm.
Source sentence
This paper extends the optimal-trading framework developed in arXiv:2409.03586v1 to compute optimal strategies with real-world constraints. While the former paper relies on methods from the calculus of variations and optimal strategies arise as the solution of partial differential equations, the current paper demonstrates that the entire framework may be re-framed as a quadratic programming problem and cast in this
Assumes 6
- Traders act in a non‑cooperative game; collusion is prohibited. model
Source sentence
The nature of the competition studied is non-cooperative, collusion is strictly prohibited.
- Trading strategies are static (time‑invariant) over the trading horizon. model
Source sentence
A feature and limitation of this paper and [Chriss(2024)] is that the strategies considered are static throughout the course of trading.
- All strategies start at zero inventory and end at the target quantity at t=1. execution
Source sentence
For this paper all trading strategies start at zero and end at the target quantity. In both cases strategies satisfy the boundary conditions of vanishing at t = 0 and acquiring λi units of stock at time t = 1.
- Aggregate trading of all participants determines the marginal price impact (linear market impact). market
Source sentence
Market impact: When n traders are in competition it is assumed that their aggregate trading exerts the marginal influence on the price of the stock. For strategies ai we model the cost paid by trader i at time t as proportional to: X j ˙aj(t) ˙ai(t) + κ X j aj(t) ˙ai(t) (1.1) This cost says that relative to the price at time 0 and executing every trade at the prevailing price at the time of trade depends
Show 2 more
- The market impact coefficient κ splits temporary and permanent impact and is treated as a constant parameter. model
Source sentence
The parameter κ is called the market impact coefficient and represents the relative contribution between the temporary and permanent impact terms.
- Constraints such as position caps, channel limits, end‑strategy fractions, short‑selling and no‑sell can be expressed as linear inequalities on the strategy path. other
Source sentence
ader may be subject to restrictions on maximum position size which would lead to a constraint of the form, say, a(t) ≤1 + ρ for all t; • Channel constraints (see Section 3.3): a trader may wish to confine the trajectory of the trading strategy to a certain channel. • End-strategy constraints (see Section 3.4): a trader may wish to have a certain fraction of the target quantity acquired by no later than a certain
Data
No dataset named in the text.
Costs
Modeled
Cost is modeled as a sum of a temporary impact term and a permanent impact term proportional to the aggregate trading rate, with market impact coefficient κ.
Source sentence
For strategies ai we model the cost paid by trader i at time t as proportional to: X j ˙aj(t) ˙ai(t) + κ X j aj(t) ˙ai(t) (1.1) This cost says that relative to the price at time 0 and executing every trade at the prevailing price at the time of trade depends on the aggregate quantity traded at time t by all traders and the net quantity acquired from time t = 0 to t. The parameter κ is called the market
Finds 3
- The algorithm reproduces the dynamic adjustment process to a two‑trader equilibrium and shows that equilibrium trading costs can be higher than the risk‑neutral (non‑equilibrium) costs. theoretical
Source sentence
The algorithm allows one to understand the entire path leading to equilibrium and helps to explain certain features of equilibria such as in certain cases the cost of trading in equilibrium are higher than non-equilibrium, which can be seen as a direct consequence of the non-cooperative nature of the games. The conclusion is that in certain instances where two traders are trading approximately the same quantity, the
- When collusion is prohibited, both traders incur higher total trading costs in equilibrium compared to both trading the risk‑neutral strategy. negative
Source sentence
However, because the traders cannot coordinate their trading they each must successively fashion the best-response to the other’s best response and inevitably pay more. Of interest is for the two rightmost charts the total cost of trading is higher for both traders than it would be if they both traded a risk-neutral strategy as in initiation – they would both be better off, but because collusion is prohibited, they
- Constrained equilibria (e.g., with over‑buying and short‑selling limits) also result in higher costs than the risk‑neutral baseline, and the larger trader’s cost rises as the smaller trader reduces her own cost. performance
Source sentence
The solutions presented are the reconstructed functions a∗ and b∗ λ in Eq. (5.9), representing constrained equilibrium trading strategies, subject to constraints on overbuying and short selling, see 3.2 and 3.5. Of interest is that for the left column of charts the total cost of trading is higher for both traders than it would be if they both traded a risk-neutral strategy as in initiation – they would both be
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 17 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
3 papers in the archive
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.
Cited References (23)
- Optimal execution of portfolio transactions (2001)
- Optimal liquidation (1997)
- Calculus of variations (2000)
- Differential Games: A Mathematical Theory with Applications to Warfare and Pursuit, Control and Optimization (1999)
- Market reaction to temporary liquidity crises and the permanent market impact (2006)
- Direct estimation of equity market impact (2005)
- No-dynamic-arbitrage and market impact (2010)
- Optimal trade execution under geometric Brownian motion in the Almgren and Chriss framework (2011)
and 15 more
- Beyond the square root: Evidence for logarithmic dependence of market impact on size and participation rate (2015)
- Optimal trading strategy and supply/demand dynamics (2013)
- Three models of market impact and Data, High-Frequency (2010)
- Handbook of price impact modeling (2023)
- Dynamical models of market impact and algorithms for order execution (2013)
- The market impact of a limit order (2012)
- Optimal Execution: A Review (2022) — link
- Mathematica, V ersion 14.1 — link
- Optimal position-building in competition — → 2409.03586
- Theory of games and economic behavior: 60th anniversary commemorative edition (2007)
- Equilibrium points in n-person games (1950)
- The Nash Equilibrium: A Perspective (2004) — link
- Two-person cooperative games (1953)
- Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games (1950) — link
- Non-Cooperative Games (1951) — link
1 of 23 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.