Paper: arXiv 2502.10512

Authors: Manuel Naviglio, Francesco Tarantelli, Fabrizio Lillo

Abstract

Blockchain technology has revolutionized financial markets by enabling decentralized exchanges (DEXs) that operate without intermediaries. Uniswap V2, a leading DEX, facilitates the rapid creation and trading of new tokens, which offer high return potential but exposing investors to significant risks. In this work, we analyze the financial impact of newly created tokens, assessing their market dynamics, profitability and liquidity manipulations. Our findings reveal that a significant portion of market liquidity is trapped in honeypots, reducing market efficiency and misleading investors. Applying a simple buy-and-hold strategy, we are able to uncover some major risks associated with investing in newly created tokens, including the widespread presence of rug pulls and sandwich attacks. We extract the optimal sandwich amount, revealing that their proliferation in new tokens stems from higher profitability in low-liquidity pools. Furthermore, we analyze the fundamental differences between token price evolution in swap time and physical time. Using clustering techniques, we highlight these differences and identify typical patterns of honeypot and sellable tokens. Our study provides insights into the risks and financial dynamics of decentralized markets and their challenges for investors.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 4.5/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 6.0/10 (capped from 8.5: no out-of-sample test; see penalty flags)
  • Quadrant: Street Traders — empirical and applied, lower math complexity (effective empirical rigor capped from 8.5)

Why this score: The paper relies heavily on real blockchain data (17k+ tokens) and empirical techniques like clustering and dynamic simulation for classification, showing high empirical rigor. However, the mathematical models are relatively accessible, focusing on descriptive analytics, optimal sandwich sizing, and time-series comparisons rather than dense theoretical derivations.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal:<br>Analyze financial impact & risks<br>of new tokens on Uniswap V2"] --> B["Data Collection & Processing"]
  B --> C["Methodology: Buy-and-Hold Strategy<br>& Liquidity Analysis"]
  C --> D["Computational Processes:<br>Sandwich Attack Simulation & Clustering"]
  D --> E["Key Findings"]
  
  subgraph B ["Data/Inputs"]
      B1["Uniswap V2 Event Logs"]
      B2["On-chain Transaction Data"]
  end

  subgraph D ["Computational Details"]
      D1["Extract Optimal Sandwich Amount"]
      D2["Cluster Price Evolution:<br>Swap Time vs. Physical Time"]
  end

  subgraph E ["Outcomes"]
      E1["Honeypots trap significant liquidity"]
      E2["Prevalence of Rug Pulls & Sandwich Attacks"]
      E3["Identification of Honeypot vs.<br>Sellable Token Patterns"]
  end

  B2 --> C
  B1 --> D1
  B2 --> D2

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper introduces the Net Traded Value (NTV) metric to quantify real token value and derives the optimal sandwich attack size for low‑liquidity pools.

Source sentence
the concept of NTV, which allows us to assess their actual economic value within the market.

Assumes 6

  • Tokens created on Uniswap V3 are ignored because only a small number were created in the sample window. data
    Source sentence
    We neglect the new tokens created on Uniswap V3 because only about 1,107 were created within our time window, which is an orde…
  • Honeypot tokens can be distinguished from sellable tokens using the NTV measure. model
    Source sentence
    Some of these can be identified using a measure introduced in this paper, i.e. Net Traded Value (NTV), which measures the value of new tokens and quantifies the percentage trapped in honeypots.
  • Sandwich attacks require the attacker’s transactions to be placed in the same block as the victim’s trade. execution
    Source sentence
    Our strategy sells after the front‑runner’s buy in a sandwich attack, which appears effective in swap time but is not possible in physical time.
  • Most sandwich attacks are executed via private relays (e.g., FlashBots) and are invisible in the public mempool. execution
    Source sentence
    Additionally, most sandwich attacks occur via private relays like FlashBots, making them invisible in the public mempool and harder to exploit without specialized access.
Show 2 more
  • A slippage tolerance η ∈ [0,1] set by the victim caps the price the victim is willing to pay. model
    Source sentence
    When executing a trade on Uniswap V2, users can set a slippage tolerance, i.e. η ∈[0,1], which defines the maximum acceptable price deviation from the expected execution price.
  • Price trajectories can be meaningfully compared after min‑max scaling to [0,1]. statistical
    Source sentence
    To allow meaningful comparisons across different tokens, we normalize each price trajectory using a min‑max scaler, which rescales values between 0 and 1.

Data

  • Newly created tokens dataset · Ethereum blockchain via Infura/Alchemy crypto-onchain public
    2024-10-02 to 2024-12-02 · 17,194 tokens launched
    Source sentence
    The dataset consists of 17,194 tokens launched between October 2, 2024, and December 2, 2024. Data collection was carried out by connecting to an Ethereum node using an RPC provider such as Infura or Alchemy via Web3.

Costs

Partial Costs appear only as a robustness check, a flat fee without spread or impact, or outside the headline numbers.

Gas fees are excluded from the reported maximum extractable profit of sandwich attacks; pool fees are accounted for in the analytical expressions.

Source sentence
To quantify the maximum extractable profit (excluding gas fees) from a sandwich attack, we derive an expression showing that the attacker profit is approximately equal to the victim trade size, minus adjustments that depend on the pool fee and the reserve size of WETH within the pair pool.

Finds 5

  • Around 88% of tokens are honeypots that trap liquidity, making the apparent profitability illusory. performance
    Source sentence
    The most profitable tokens were those associated with honeypots, which, by definition, prevent uninformed investors from selling their tokens once purchased. These honeypot tokens make up approximately 88% of the total.
  • Sandwich attacks are far more profitable in low‑liquidity pools, explaining their prevalence in new tokens. theoretical
    Source sentence
    This result stresses a fundamental conclusion: sandwich attacks are far more profitable in low‑liquidity pools.
  • A simple buy‑and‑hold strategy appears profitable but is severely limited by honeypots and rug pulls. performance
    Source sentence
    highly lucrative, as demonstrated by a simple buy & hold strategy. However, a closer examination
  • The Net Traded Value (NTV) metric reveals that a substantial portion of market liquidity is fictitious, trapped in honeypots. statistical
    Source sentence
    NTV helps reveal that a substantial portion of market liquidity is, in reality, fictitious, as it remains trapped in honeypots.
  • Clustering of price trajectories in swap time versus physical time shows distinct patterns, with honeypots clustering together due to continuous price rise. other
    Source sentence
    We clearly observe a dominant presence of honeypots in cluster 1. This is expected, as honeypot tokens prevent selling, leading to a characteristic initial price behavior.

Checked by others

Supported by

  • Enhancing Meme Token Market Transparency: A Multi-Dimensional Entity-Linked Address Analysis for Liquidity Risk Evaluation (2025)
    On the question: How much of the reported liquidity in new crypto‑tokens is actually fictitious or misleading?
    Compare the findings

    This paper: The Net Traded Value (NTV) metric reveals that a substantial portion of market liquidity is fictitious, trapped in honeypots.

    That paper: Empirical analysis of tokens such as BabyBonk, NMT, and BonkFork shows significant disparities between apparent and actual liquidity in meme token markets.

    Both findings report large gaps: A finds a substantial portion of market liquidity trapped in honeypots, B shows significant disparities between apparent and actual liquidity in meme tokens.

Cited by 1 paper in the archive

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.

Cited References (45)

  1. Router02 (Uniswap V2) — Technical Reference
  2. Ethereum Gas Tracker
  3. The fragility of decentralised trustless socio-technical systems (2019) — link
  4. DApps ecosystems: mapping the network structure of smart contract interactions (2024) — link
  5. Mitigating MEV attacks with a two-tiered architecture utilizing verifiable decryption (2024) — link
  6. Transaction-based classification and detection approach for Ethereum smart contract (2021) — link
  7. TokenAware: Accurate and Efficient Bookkeeping Recognition for Token Smart Contracts (2023) — link
  8. Detecting DeFi securities violations from token smart contract code (2024) — link
and 37 more
  1. The rise and fall of cryptocurrency coins and tokens (2021) — link
  2. Initial Coin Offerings (2018) — link
  3. Initial Coin Offerings: Risk or Opportunity? (2020) — link
  4. Stock Market Manipulations (2006)
  5. Digital Tulips? Returns to Investors in Initial Coin Offerings (2021) — link
  6. Behavioral structure of users in cryptocurrency market (2021) — link
  7. An examination of the cryptocurrency pump-and-dump ecosystem (2021) — link
  8. Price manipulation in the Bitcoin ecosystem (2018) — link
  9. Cryptocurrencies as a financial asset: A systematic analysis (2019) — link
  10. The rise and fall of cryptocurrencies (2018)
  11. An Experimental Study of Cryptocurrency Market Dynamics (2018) — link
  12. The Potential of Self-Regulation for Front-Running Prevention on DEXes (2024) — link
  13. Scams, rugpulls and honeypots. What are they, and how to avoid them — link
  14. Maximal extractable value: Current understanding, categorization, and open research questions (2024) — link
  15. A Flash(bot) in the Pan: Measuring Maximal Extractable Value in Private Pools (2022) — link
  16. An Efficient Algorithm for Optimal Routing Through Constant Function Market Makers — → 2302.04938
  17. An Analysis of Uniswap markets (2020) — link
  18. Improved Price Oracles: Constant Function Market Makers (2020) — link
  19. Optimal Trading in Automatic Market Makers with Deep Learning (2023) — link
  20. Price Discovery in Constant Product Markets (2023) — link
  21. Price Discovery on Decentralized Exchanges (2024) — link
  22. The Economics of Automated Market Makers (2023) — link
  23. COBRAS-TS: A new approach to Semi-Supervised Clustering of Time Series (2018) — link
  24. Dynamic programming algorithm optimization for spoken word recognition (1978) — link
  25. The Eye of Horus: Spotting and Analyzing Attacks on Ethereum Smart Contracts (2021) — link
  26. Solidity Documentation (2025) — link
  27. Review of Clustering Methods for Functional Data (2023) — link
  28. Weighted variance swaps hedge against impermanent loss (2023) — link
  29. XBlock-ETH: Extracting and Exploring Blockchain Data From Ethereum (2020) — link
  30. Uniswap v2 Core (Feb 24, 2021) — link
  31. SoK: Decentralized Finance (DeFi) Attacks (2022) — link
  32. Quantifying Blockchain Extractable Value: How dark is the forest? (2021) — link
  33. High-Frequency Trading on Decentralized On-Chain Exchanges (2020) — link
  34. The Art of The Scam: Demystifying Honeypots in Ethereum Smart Contracts (2019) — link
  35. SoK: Comprehensive Analysis of Rug Pull Causes, Datasets, and Detection Tools in DeFi (2024) — link
  36. Hacking the hackers: Honeypots on ethereum network (2018) — link
  37. Dissecting an Ethereum HoneyPot (2018) — link

1 of 45 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.