Paper: arXiv 2502.10512
Authors: Manuel Naviglio, Francesco Tarantelli, Fabrizio Lillo
Abstract
Blockchain technology has revolutionized financial markets by enabling decentralized exchanges (DEXs) that operate without intermediaries. Uniswap V2, a leading DEX, facilitates the rapid creation and trading of new tokens, which offer high return potential but exposing investors to significant risks. In this work, we analyze the financial impact of newly created tokens, assessing their market dynamics, profitability and liquidity manipulations. Our findings reveal that a significant portion of market liquidity is trapped in honeypots, reducing market efficiency and misleading investors. Applying a simple buy-and-hold strategy, we are able to uncover some major risks associated with investing in newly created tokens, including the widespread presence of rug pulls and sandwich attacks. We extract the optimal sandwich amount, revealing that their proliferation in new tokens stems from higher profitability in low-liquidity pools. Furthermore, we analyze the fundamental differences between token price evolution in swap time and physical time. Using clustering techniques, we highlight these differences and identify typical patterns of honeypot and sellable tokens. Our study provides insights into the risks and financial dynamics of decentralized markets and their challenges for investors.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 4.5/10
- Empirical Rigor: 6.0/10 (capped from 8.5: no out-of-sample test; see penalty flags)
- Quadrant: Street Traders — empirical and applied, lower math complexity (effective empirical rigor capped from 8.5)
Why this score: The paper relies heavily on real blockchain data (17k+ tokens) and empirical techniques like clustering and dynamic simulation for classification, showing high empirical rigor. However, the mathematical models are relatively accessible, focusing on descriptive analytics, optimal sandwich sizing, and time-series comparisons rather than dense theoretical derivations.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
A["Research Goal:<br>Analyze financial impact & risks<br>of new tokens on Uniswap V2"] --> B["Data Collection & Processing"]
B --> C["Methodology: Buy-and-Hold Strategy<br>& Liquidity Analysis"]
C --> D["Computational Processes:<br>Sandwich Attack Simulation & Clustering"]
D --> E["Key Findings"]
subgraph B ["Data/Inputs"]
B1["Uniswap V2 Event Logs"]
B2["On-chain Transaction Data"]
end
subgraph D ["Computational Details"]
D1["Extract Optimal Sandwich Amount"]
D2["Cluster Price Evolution:<br>Swap Time vs. Physical Time"]
end
subgraph E ["Outcomes"]
E1["Honeypots trap significant liquidity"]
E2["Prevalence of Rug Pulls & Sandwich Attacks"]
E3["Identification of Honeypot vs.<br>Sellable Token Patterns"]
end
B2 --> C
B1 --> D1
B2 --> D2
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper introduces the Net Traded Value (NTV) metric to quantify real token value and derives the optimal sandwich attack size for low‑liquidity pools.
Source sentence
the concept of NTV, which allows us to assess their actual economic value within the market.
Assumes 6
- Tokens created on Uniswap V3 are ignored because only a small number were created in the sample window. data
Source sentence
We neglect the new tokens created on Uniswap V3 because only about 1,107 were created within our time window, which is an orde…
- Honeypot tokens can be distinguished from sellable tokens using the NTV measure. model
Source sentence
Some of these can be identified using a measure introduced in this paper, i.e. Net Traded Value (NTV), which measures the value of new tokens and quantifies the percentage trapped in honeypots.
- Sandwich attacks require the attacker’s transactions to be placed in the same block as the victim’s trade. execution
Source sentence
Our strategy sells after the front‑runner’s buy in a sandwich attack, which appears effective in swap time but is not possible in physical time.
- Most sandwich attacks are executed via private relays (e.g., FlashBots) and are invisible in the public mempool. execution
Source sentence
Additionally, most sandwich attacks occur via private relays like FlashBots, making them invisible in the public mempool and harder to exploit without specialized access.
Show 2 more
- A slippage tolerance η ∈ [0,1] set by the victim caps the price the victim is willing to pay. model
Source sentence
When executing a trade on Uniswap V2, users can set a slippage tolerance, i.e. η ∈[0,1], which defines the maximum acceptable price deviation from the expected execution price.
- Price trajectories can be meaningfully compared after min‑max scaling to [0,1]. statistical
Source sentence
To allow meaningful comparisons across different tokens, we normalize each price trajectory using a min‑max scaler, which rescales values between 0 and 1.
Data
- Newly created tokens dataset crypto-onchain public
Source sentence
The dataset consists of 17,194 tokens launched between October 2, 2024, and December 2, 2024. Data collection was carried out by connecting to an Ethereum node using an RPC provider such as Infura or Alchemy via Web3.
Costs
Partial
Gas fees are excluded from the reported maximum extractable profit of sandwich attacks; pool fees are accounted for in the analytical expressions.
Source sentence
To quantify the maximum extractable profit (excluding gas fees) from a sandwich attack, we derive an expression showing that the attacker profit is approximately equal to the victim trade size, minus adjustments that depend on the pool fee and the reserve size of WETH within the pair pool.
Finds 5
- Around 88% of tokens are honeypots that trap liquidity, making the apparent profitability illusory. performance
Source sentence
The most profitable tokens were those associated with honeypots, which, by definition, prevent uninformed investors from selling their tokens once purchased. These honeypot tokens make up approximately 88% of the total.
- Sandwich attacks are far more profitable in low‑liquidity pools, explaining their prevalence in new tokens. theoretical
Source sentence
This result stresses a fundamental conclusion: sandwich attacks are far more profitable in low‑liquidity pools.
- A simple buy‑and‑hold strategy appears profitable but is severely limited by honeypots and rug pulls. performance
Source sentence
highly lucrative, as demonstrated by a simple buy & hold strategy. However, a closer examination
- The Net Traded Value (NTV) metric reveals that a substantial portion of market liquidity is fictitious, trapped in honeypots. statistical
Source sentence
NTV helps reveal that a substantial portion of market liquidity is, in reality, fictitious, as it remains trapped in honeypots.
- Clustering of price trajectories in swap time versus physical time shows distinct patterns, with honeypots clustering together due to continuous price rise. other
Source sentence
We clearly observe a dominant presence of honeypots in cluster 1. This is expected, as honeypot tokens prevent selling, leading to a characteristic initial price behavior.
Checked by others
Supported by
- Enhancing Meme Token Market Transparency: A Multi-Dimensional Entity-Linked Address Analysis for Liquidity Risk Evaluation
Compare the findings
This paper: The Net Traded Value (NTV) metric reveals that a substantial portion of market liquidity is fictitious, trapped in honeypots.
That paper: Empirical analysis of tokens such as BabyBonk, NMT, and BonkFork shows significant disparities between apparent and actual liquidity in meme token markets.
1 paper in the archive
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.
Cited References (45)
- Router02 (Uniswap V2) — Technical Reference
- Ethereum Gas Tracker
- The fragility of decentralised trustless socio-technical systems (2019) — link
- DApps ecosystems: mapping the network structure of smart contract interactions (2024) — link
- Mitigating MEV attacks with a two-tiered architecture utilizing verifiable decryption (2024) — link
- Transaction-based classification and detection approach for Ethereum smart contract (2021) — link
- TokenAware: Accurate and Efficient Bookkeeping Recognition for Token Smart Contracts (2023) — link
- Detecting DeFi securities violations from token smart contract code (2024) — link
and 37 more
- The rise and fall of cryptocurrency coins and tokens (2021) — link
- Initial Coin Offerings (2018) — link
- Initial Coin Offerings: Risk or Opportunity? (2020) — link
- Stock Market Manipulations (2006)
- Digital Tulips? Returns to Investors in Initial Coin Offerings (2021) — link
- Behavioral structure of users in cryptocurrency market (2021) — link
- An examination of the cryptocurrency pump-and-dump ecosystem (2021) — link
- Price manipulation in the Bitcoin ecosystem (2018) — link
- Cryptocurrencies as a financial asset: A systematic analysis (2019) — link
- The rise and fall of cryptocurrencies (2018)
- An Experimental Study of Cryptocurrency Market Dynamics (2018) — link
- The Potential of Self-Regulation for Front-Running Prevention on DEXes (2024) — link
- Scams, rugpulls and honeypots. What are they, and how to avoid them — link
- Maximal extractable value: Current understanding, categorization, and open research questions (2024) — link
- A Flash(bot) in the Pan: Measuring Maximal Extractable Value in Private Pools (2022) — link
- An Efficient Algorithm for Optimal Routing Through Constant Function Market Makers — → 2302.04938
- An Analysis of Uniswap markets (2020) — link
- Improved Price Oracles: Constant Function Market Makers (2020) — link
- Optimal Trading in Automatic Market Makers with Deep Learning (2023) — link
- Price Discovery in Constant Product Markets (2023) — link
- Price Discovery on Decentralized Exchanges (2024) — link
- The Economics of Automated Market Makers (2023) — link
- COBRAS-TS: A new approach to Semi-Supervised Clustering of Time Series (2018) — link
- Dynamic programming algorithm optimization for spoken word recognition (1978) — link
- The Eye of Horus: Spotting and Analyzing Attacks on Ethereum Smart Contracts (2021) — link
- Solidity Documentation (2025) — link
- Review of Clustering Methods for Functional Data (2023) — link
- Weighted variance swaps hedge against impermanent loss (2023) — link
- XBlock-ETH: Extracting and Exploring Blockchain Data From Ethereum (2020) — link
- Uniswap v2 Core (Feb 24, 2021) — link
- SoK: Decentralized Finance (DeFi) Attacks (2022) — link
- Quantifying Blockchain Extractable Value: How dark is the forest? (2021) — link
- High-Frequency Trading on Decentralized On-Chain Exchanges (2020) — link
- The Art of The Scam: Demystifying Honeypots in Ethereum Smart Contracts (2019) — link
- SoK: Comprehensive Analysis of Rug Pull Causes, Datasets, and Detection Tools in DeFi (2024) — link
- Hacking the hackers: Honeypots on ethereum network (2018) — link
- Dissecting an Ethereum HoneyPot (2018) — link
1 of 45 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.