Paper: arXiv 2601.00738

Authors: Aleksei Adadurov, Sergey Barseghyan, Anton Chtepine, Antero Eloranta, Andrei Sebyakin, Arsenii Valitov

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of reducing Ethereum slot time on decentralized exchange activity, with a focus on CEX-DEX arbitrage behavior. We develop a trading model where the agent’s DEX transaction is not guaranteed to land, and the agent explicitly accounts for this execution risk when deciding whether to pursue arbitrage opportunities. We compare agent behavior under Ethereum’s default 12-second slot time environment with a faster regime that offers 1-second subslot execution. The simulations, calibrated to Binance and Uniswap v3 data from July to September 2025, show that faster slot times increase arbitrage transaction count by 535% and trading volume by 203% on average. The increase in CEX-DEX arbitrage activity under 1-second subslots is driven by the reduction in variance of both successful and failed trade outcomes, increasing the risk-adjusted returns and making CEX-DEX arbitrage more appealing.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 6.5/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 7.0/10
  • Quadrant: Holy Grail — high math complexity, high empirical rigor

Why this score: The paper employs a stochastic trading model with execution risk and parameterized agent utility (risk-adjusted returns), involving moderate mathematical complexity. Empirical rigor is high due to detailed calibration using real-world exchange data (Binance, Uniswap v3) and quantitative simulation results (535% transaction increase, 203% volume increase).

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal:<br>How does reducing Ethereum slot time<br>impact CEX-DEX arbitrage?"] --> B["Modeling Methodology:<br>Trading Agent with<br>Execution Risk Framework"]
  B --> C["Data Inputs:<br>Calibrated to Binance &<br>Uniswap v3 (Jul-Sep 2025)"]
  C --> D["Computational Process:<br>Simulate Behavior under<br>12s vs 1s Slot Times"]
  D --> E["Key Finding 1:<br>535% Increase in<br>Arbitrage Transactions"]
  D --> F["Key Finding 2:<br>203% Increase in<br>Trading Volume"]
  D --> G["Key Finding 3:<br>Reduced Execution Variance<br>Makes Arbitrage More Appealing"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper develops a trading model in which a CEX‑DEX arbitrageur explicitly accounts for execution risk of the DEX leg and uses this model to simulate arbitrage behavior under different block‑time regimes.

Source sentence
We develop a trading model where the agent's DEX transaction is not guaranteed to land, and the agent explicitly accounts for this execution risk when deciding whether to pursue arbitrage opportunities.

Assumes 6

  • The DEX transaction is not guaranteed to land in a block and may fail due to competition or congestion. execution
    Source sentence
    However, this strategy is not risk-free: while the CEX leg is executed almost instantaneously, the DEX leg must wait for block inclusion, which is not guaranteed.
  • Infinite liquidity and instant, guaranteed execution on Binance (CEX leg). market
    Source sentence
    Assuming infinite liquidity and instant and guaranteed execution on Binance, the CEX leg settlement bears no risks, but the DEX leg needs to be included in a block.
  • DEX prices are updated only at slot boundaries (every 12 seconds) unless subslot execution is enabled. model
    Source sentence
    If the DEX transaction fails to land, due to competition from other arbitrageurs, network congestion, among other reasons, the trader is left with unhedged exposure.
  • Zero gas fees are assumed in the baseline model. execution
    Source sentence
    Our model assumes zero gas fees, which may overstate the viability of small trades in low-fee pools.
Show 2 more
  • The agent’s probability of landing a DEX trade (α) is fixed and not endogenously determined by competition. model
    Source sentence
    Also, the agent’s probability of landing DEX trades is fixed rather than endogenously determined by competition; in equilibrium, faster execution might attract more arbitrageurs and compress α.
  • Noise trades are classified using four criteria (first in block, price discrepancy exceeds fee, price moves toward CEX, post‑trade discrepancy remains above fee). data
    Source sentence
    A trade is considered arbitrage if it satisfies all of the following four conditions: (1) it is the first transaction in a block, (2) the pre-trade CEX-DEX price discrepancy exceeds the pool fee, (3) the trade moves the DEX price toward the CEX price, and (4) the post-trade price discrepancy remains equal to or above the pool fee.

Data

  • Binance CEX price data · Binance market-prices commercial
    July to September 2025
    Source sentence
    The simulations, calibrated to Binance and Uniswap v3 data from July to September 2025, show that faster slot times increase arbitrage transaction count by 535% and trading volume by 203% on average. We use data from July to September 2025, including millisecond-level best bid and ask prices 4 0 12 24 P0 Slot n Slot n + 1 slot subslot Time, t (seconds) Price, P CEX mid price DEX slot price DEX subslot price Figure
  • Uniswap v3 ETH‑USDC pool transactions · Uniswap crypto-onchain public
    July to September 2025 · ETH‑USDC pools
    Source sentence
    The simulations, calibrated to Binance and Uniswap v3 data from July to September 2025, show that faster slot times increase arbitrage transaction count by 535% and trading volume by 203% on average. We use data from July to September 2025, including millisecond-level best bid and ask prices 4 0 12 24 P0 Slot n Slot n + 1 slot subslot Time, t (seconds) Price, P CEX mid price DEX slot price DEX subslot price Figure

Recognised sources: Binance

Costs

Not modeled A trading or execution result is reported without costs.

Source sentence
Our model assumes zero gas fees, which may overstate the viability of small trades in low-fee pools.

Finds 5

  • Reducing slot time from 12 seconds to 1‑second subslots increases arbitrage transaction count by 535% on average. performance
    Source sentence
    The simulations, calibrated to Binance and Uniswap v3 data from July to September 2025, show that faster slot times increase arbitrage transaction count by 535% and trading volume by 203% on average. Under reasonable assumptions about agent risk preferences and inclusion probabilities, the shift from a 12-second to a 1-second execution environment increases the number of arbitrage transactions by 535%, with effects
  • The same reduction raises arbitrage trading volume by 203% on average. performance
    Source sentence
    The simulations, calibrated to Binance and Uniswap v3 data from July to September 2025, show that faster slot times increase arbitrage transaction count by 535% and trading volume by 203% on average. Under reasonable assumptions about agent risk preferences and inclusion probabilities, the shift from a 12-second to a 1-second execution environment increases the number of arbitrage transactions by 535%, with effects
  • In the simple model, average volume increase across three pools ranges from 148% to 211% (average 168%). performance
    Source sentence
    When weighing the volume increases based on the arbitrage volume across different pools, the average increase in volume for the three pools varies between 148% and 211% for the simple model, with the average being 168%.
  • In the risk‑averse model, average volume increase across three pools is 203% (range 159%–243%). performance
    Source sentence
    Similarly, for the risk-averse model, the overall increase varies be-tween 159% and 243%, with the average being 203%. Robustness Tests.
  • Faster execution reduces profit variance by compressing the window for adverse price moves during failed‑trade recovery. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Faster execution also reduces profit variance by compressing the window for adverse price moves during failed-trade recovery.

Checked by others

Supported by

  • Measuring Arbitrage Losses and Profitability of AMM Liquidity (2024)
    On the question: How does reducing block or slot time affect arbitrage activity in AMM markets?
    Compare the findings

    This paper: Reducing slot time from 12 seconds to 1‑second subslots increases arbitrage transaction count by 535% on average.

    That paper: Faster block times reduce arbitrage losses, with 100 ms blocks cutting losses by 20 % to 70 % relative to Ethereum’s 12 s blocks, depending on the pair.

    A shows 100 ms blocks cut losses 20‑70 % vs 12 s blocks; B shows 1‑s subslots raise transaction count 535 % vs 12 s slots. Samples differ (AMM pairs vs CEX‑DEX on Ethereum).

Cited by 1 paper in the archive

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.