Paper: arXiv 2610.01562
Authors: Teemu Pennanen
Abstract
The tendency of the double auction mechanism to drive prices to competitive equilibrium has been well documented in laboratory experiments, but the phenomenon has lacked a theoretical explanation. This paper studies dynamic double auctions in a pure exchange economy where agents bid their indifference prices implied by their current holdings and preferences. We show that Walras equilibria coincide with the fixed points of the double auction and that repeated double auctions generate bounded sequences of allocations and prices whose cluster points are Walras equilibria with transfers.
Complexity vs Empirical Score
- Math Complexity: 8.5/10
- Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10
- Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing
Why this score: This paper presents a highly mathematical and theoretical explanation for a well-documented empirical phenomenon, offering significant novelty in its approach. However, it lacks empirical validation or backtesting, focusing purely on theoretical derivations. The clarity is good for a theoretical paper, but reproducibility is moderate due to the absence of code or data for its theoretical constructs.
Research Flowchart
flowchart TD
A["Research Goal: Explain Price Discovery in Double Auction"] --> B{"Methodology: Dynamic Double Auction Model"};
B --> C["Inputs: Pure Exchange Economy, Agent Indifference Prices"];
C --> D{"Computational Process: Simulate Repeated Double Auctions"};
D --> E["Outcomes: Walras Equilibria as Fixed Points, Bounded Sequences Converge to WE with Transfers"];
Evidence Card
What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card
Proposes
The paper proposes a dynamic double auction model in a pure exchange economy where agents bid their indifference prices, and shows that Walras equilibria are the fixed points of the double auction and that repeated auctions generate bounded sequences of allocations and prices whose cluster points ar
Source sentence
This paper studies dynamic double auctions in a pure exchange economy where agents bid their indifference prices implied by their current holdings and preferences. We show that Walras equilibria coincide with the fixed points of the double auction and that repeated double auctions generate bounded sequences of allocations and prices whose cluster points are Walras equilibria with transfers.
Assumes 6
- Agents bid their indifference prices (truthful bidding). model
Source sentence
Truthful bidding thus isolates the role of the market mechanism itself, and even in this setting a theoretical explanation of price discovery in double auctions has been missing.
- A strictly preferred numeraire asset exists (Assumption 1). model
Source sentence
Assumption 1 on a strictly preferred numeraire asset allows us to get away with Assumptions 3 and 2 below.
- Zero belongs to the interior of the sum of domains of the agents' demand functions (Assumption 2). model
Source sentence
0 ∈int X i∈I dom Di(¯xi; ·).
- If a portfolio is not worst, the agent can give away a small amount of the numeraire and remain feasible (Assumption 3). model
Source sentence
The following was introduced in [21, Section 5]. Assumption 3.
Show 2 more
- Utility functions are concave (not required to be monotone or positive‑orthant). model
Source sentence
All our results apply to general concave utility functions without requiring monotonicity nor that their domains are contained in the positive orthant.
- The economy is a finite pure‑exchange economy with given initial endowments and concave preferences. market
Source sentence
9 Conclusions This paper analyzed the double auction mechanism in a pure exchange economy consisting of a finite set of agents with given initial endowments and preferences described by concave utility functions.
Data
No dataset named in the text.
Costs
Not applicable
Finds 4
- Walras equilibria coincide with the fixed points of the double auction mechanism. theoretical
Source sentence
We show that Walras equilibria coincide with the fixed points of the double auction and that repeated double auctions generate bounded sequences of allocations and prices whose cluster points are Walras equilibria with transfers.
- Repeated double auctions generate bounded sequences of allocations and prices whose cluster points are Walras equilibria with transfers. theoretical
Source sentence
The main results, Theorems 8, 12 and 16, show that, under general conditions on the utility functions, repeated double auctions generate sequences of allocations and prices whose cluster points are Walras equilibria with transfers.
- This work provides the first theoretical explanation of the price convergence observed in laboratory double‑auction experiments. theoretical
Source sentence
To our knowledge, this is the first theoretical explanation of the price convergence observed in laboratory experiments with double auctions.
- The authors note that while experiments suggest actual convergence, their theorem only guarantees that all cluster points are equilibria. theoretical
Source sentence
First, both laboratory experiments and the computational results suggest that the alloca-tions and prices generated by double auctions actually converge while Theo-rem 16 only asserts that all the cluster points are equilibria.
Checked by others
No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 12 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.
Code
No repository by the authors found in the paper.
Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.