Paper: arXiv 2408.07227

Authors: Brian Zhu

Abstract

Stablecoins have historically depegged due from par to large sales, possibly of speculative nature, or poor reserve asset quality. Using a global game which addresses both concerns, we show that the selling pressure on stablecoin holders increases in the presence of a large sale. While precise public knowledge reduces (increases) the probability of a run when fundamentals are strong (weak), interestingly, more precise private signals increase (reduce) the probability of a run when fundamentals are strong (weak), potentially explaining the stability of opaque stablecoins. The total run probability can be decomposed into components representing risks from large sales and poor collateral. By analyzing how these risk components vary with respect to information uncertainty and fundamentals, we can split the fundamental space into regions based on the type of risk a stablecoin issuer is more prone to. We suggest testable implications and connect our model’s implications to real-world applications, including depegging events and the no-questions-asked property of money.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 7.5/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 2.0/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper is built on a formal global game model with unique equilibrium analysis and comparative statics, indicating high mathematical density. It presents theoretical findings and testable implications but lacks any empirical data, backtests, or implementation details, focusing on conceptual analysis.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal<br>Understanding stablecoin depegging<br>due to large sales & reserve quality"] --> B["Methodology<br>Global Game Model<br>incorporating information asymmetry"]
  B --> C["Key Inputs<br>1. Fundamentals (F)<br>2. Precision of private signals (θ)<br>3. Large Sale volume (S)"]
  C --> D["Computational Process<br>Solve for Equilibrium:<br>Derive run probability thresholds<br>Decompose total run risk<br>into Sale vs. Collateral components"]
  D --> E["Key Findings<br>1. Interaction Effect:<br>Precision impacts runs differently<br>based on fundamentals (strong/weak)<br>2. Risk Decomposition:<br>Regions of vulnerability to Sales<br>vs. Collateral risks identified"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper proposes a global‑game model of stablecoin runs that incorporates the effect of a large seller, dispersion of private signals, and a risk‑framework that decomposes run probability into large‑sale and collateral‑quality components.

Source sentence
Using a global game which addresses both concerns, we show that the selling pressure on stablecoin holders increases in the presence of a large sale. Our contribution is threefold.

Assumes 6

  • η < 1 and (1−δ)σx < √2πσ3 model
    Source sentence
    Assumption 2.1 We assume that η < 1 and (1 −δ)σx < √ 2πσ3. Proposition 2.1.
  • η, the returns from holding stablecoins, and σx, the dispersion of investors’ private signals, are not too large model
    Source sentence
    For the remainder of this paper, we also assume that η, the returns from holding stablecoins, and σx, the dispersion of investors’ private signals, are not too large.
  • There exists a unique equilibrium in the global game with switching thresholds x*0 < x*1 model
    Source sentence
    Under Assumption 1, there exists a unique equilibrium (x⋆ 0, x⋆ 1) in switching strategies of the global game in which x⋆ 0 < x⋆ 1.
  • A large seller can occur, exerting selling pressure on investors market
    Source sentence
    First, we study the effect of a large seller on selling pressure.
Show 2 more
  • Public information can be represented by a precision parameter τ and private signals by τx model
    Source sentence
    To facilitate analysis, we use precision parameters τ = σ−2 and τx = σ−2 x .
  • The risk components can be decomposed into a large‑sale risk and a poor‑collateral risk model
    Source sentence
    probability given a large sale occurring and not occurring. The former component can be interpreted as the risk from by a large sale, and the latter as the risk from poor collateral.

Data

No dataset named in the text.

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result.

Finds 5

  • Selling pressure on stablecoin holders increases in the presence of a large redemption. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Using a global game which addresses both concerns, we show that the selling pressure on stablecoin holders increases in the presence of a large sale.
  • More precise public knowledge reduces the probability of a run when fundamentals are strong and increases it when fundamentals are weak. theoretical
    Source sentence
    While precise public knowledge reduces (increases) the probability of a run when fundamentals are strong (weak), interestingly, more precise private signals increase (reduce) the probability of a run when fundamentals are strong (weak), potentially explaining the stability of opaque stablecoins. These conditional run probabilities decrease (increase) as public knowledge is more precise when fundamentals are
  • More precise private signals increase the probability of a run when fundamentals are strong and reduce it when fundamentals are weak. theoretical
    Source sentence
    While precise public knowledge reduces (increases) the probability of a run when fundamentals are strong (weak), interestingly, more precise private signals increase (reduce) the probability of a run when fundamentals are strong (weak), potentially explaining the stability of opaque stablecoins. Con-trary to Proposition 3.2, Proposition 3.3 states that for each component, there exists a single threshold at which the
  • The region where the all‑hold equilibrium is unique shrinks and a region where the all‑sell equilibrium is unique appears when a large sale occurs. theoretical
    Source sentence
    In the common knowledge game, the large seller exerts selling pressure on the investors: the region for θ where the all-hold equilibrium is unique shrinks, and a region for θ where the all-sell equilibrium is unique is present (whereas such as region is not present in the absence of a large sale). θ ∈(−∞, δ] θ ∈(δ, 1 −δ] θ ∈(1
  • Each risk component exhibits a threshold in θ: below it, risk decreases with higher private‑signal precision, and above it, risk increases. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Con-trary to Proposition 3.2, Proposition 3.3 states that for each component, there exists a single threshold at which the risk component decreases in τx for values of θ below the threshold and increases in τx for values of θ above the thresh-old. This seemingly paradoxical implication that more uncertainty improves financial stability in good states can be explained by the connection between global games and risk

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 24 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Code

No repository by the authors found in the paper.

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.