Paper: arXiv 2410.00031

Authors: Ryan Y. Lin, Siddhartha Ojha, Kevin Cai, Maxwell F. Chen

Abstract

Machine-learning technologies are seeing increased deployment in real-world market scenarios. In this work, we explore the strategic behaviors of large language models (LLMs) when deployed as autonomous agents in multi-commodity markets, specifically within Cournot competition frameworks. We examine whether LLMs can independently engage in anti-competitive practices such as collusion or, more specifically, market division. Our findings demonstrate that LLMs can effectively monopolize specific commodities by dynamically adjusting their pricing and resource allocation strategies, thereby maximizing profitability without direct human input or explicit collusion commands. These results pose unique challenges and opportunities for businesses looking to integrate AI into strategic roles and for regulatory bodies tasked with maintaining fair and competitive markets. The study provides a foundation for further exploration into the ramifications of deferring high-stakes decisions to LLM-based agents.

Complexity vs Empirical Score

  • Math Complexity: 6.5/10
  • Empirical Rigor: 3.0/10
  • Quadrant: Lab Rats — high math complexity, limited empirical testing

Why this score: The paper employs advanced economic theory (Cournot competition, Folk Theorem, game-theoretic equilibria) and quantitative modeling, but its empirical component relies on simulation of LLM agents in controlled environments without backtesting on real market data or providing executable code and datasets.

Research Flowchart

  flowchart TD
  A["Research Goal: Assess Strategic Collusion of LLMs in Market Division"] --> B["Methodology: Multi-Commodity Cournot Competition"]
  B --> C["Input: LLM Agents & Market Parameters"]
  C --> D["Process: Dynamic Pricing & Quantity Adjustment"]
  D --> E["Outcome: LLM-Generated Market Division"]
  E --> F["Finding: Emergent Anti-Competitive Behavior"]
  F --> G["Implication: Regulatory & Business Strategy Challenges"]

Evidence Card

What the authors claim, on what data, and who has checked it. Read from the paper's own text by a language model: every quote is verbatim, nothing was re-run. How to read this card

Proposes

The paper introduces a novel application of large language model (LLM) based agents to a multi‑commodity variant of the Cournot competition model and empirically studies their ability to engage in market division.

Source sentence
2 In this work, we present a novel application of LLM-based agents to a multi-commodity variant of the Cournot competition model.

Assumes 6

  • The game is simulated as an infinitely repeated Cournot competition. execution
    Source sentence
    However, because the total number of rounds is unknown to firms, and firms are told to maximize long-run profits, we effectively simulate an infinitely repeated game.
  • There are exactly two firms competing in two commodity markets. market
    Source sentence
    4 3.4 Environment Configuration For our experiments, we restrict ourselves to the case of n = 2 firms simultaneously competing in m = 2 commodity markets.
  • Firms face fixed marginal costs drawn from the set {40, 50}. model
    Source sentence
    Both firms face a set of fixed marginal costs drawn from the cost set C = {40, 50}.
  • Each experiment pairs identical LLM models to isolate intrinsic model behavior. execution
    Source sentence
    In each experiment, we only pair models of the same type with each other (i.e., within the same experiment, both agents are identical).
Show 2 more
  • The inverse demand function for each commodity is linear of the form p* = α - β·Q. model
    Source sentence
    Then, there exists a linear inverse demand function of the form p∗ j(Qj) = αj −Qj βj where αj, βj ∈R++ and Qj = n X i=1 qi,j (1) Firm fi faces a marginal production cost ci,j to produce commodity j, drawn from the cost set C = {c1, . . . cn}.
  • Agents choose quantity vectors to maximize long‑run profit across rounds. model
    Source sentence
    Every round, each firm fi ∈F chooses a strategy si ∈Si from its strategy space, Si = (qi,1, . . . , qi,m) ∈Rm +.

Data

Synthetic data only.

Costs

Not applicable The paper reports no trading or execution result.

Finds 4

  • LLM‑based agents display cooperative behavior and divide the market, achieving an HHI of 1.0 and a Consumer Surplus Ratio of approximately 0.726, indicating monopolistic control and reduced consumer welfare. performance
    Source sentence
    This particular run achieves a CSR of ≈0.726 and an HHI of 1.0 across both product markets, indicating market division at the expense of consumer welfare (a hallmark of textbook collusion).
  • The observed high HHI and low CSR are statistically significant compared to the Cournot‑Nash benchmark. statistical
    Source sentence
    To account for the potential non-normality and autocorrelation in the 50-round time series produced by each experiment, we use a circular block bootstrap method from the ARCH toolbox [32] with a block size of 7 and 10,000 resamples to test whether the observed mean HHI is significantly greater than that expected at the Nash equilibrium at the 5% significance level. We conducted similar experiments with CSR and found
  • Temperature ablations with GPT‑4.1 show that collusive outcomes remain statistically significant across temperature settings. statistical
    Source sentence
    We follow the same statistical testing procedure outlined in 4.1 and conclude that these results are indeed statistically significant when compared to the expected HHI/CSR values at the Cournot-Nash.
  • LLM agents can achieve market division without any explicit coordination channels. theoretical
    Source sentence
    Our experi-ments identify that LLM-based agents do indeed engage in market division, resulting in an effectively monopolistic control over specific commodities.

Checked by others

No other paper in the archive has been found to support or contradict these findings (compared with 23 related papers). Coverage is partial, so this is neither replication nor refutation.

Cited by 1 paper in the archive

Code

https://github.com/smojha/collusive-llm-agents — the authors' own repository

Extracted 2026-11-14 · same card as JSON · A language model chose these items: check the source sentence before relying on one.

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and 37 more
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0 of 45 cited works are in the corpus; resolved via arXiv source bundles, Semantic Scholar and OpenAlex. Corpus-wide: 2596 linked papers.